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The present work aimed at researching into the constructs of intuition and analysis in 
decision-making through the integration of different sources of data in order to provide a 
comprehensive and multifaceted outline of the issue at hand.  
Specifically, the first part of the investigation concerned the study of intuition and analysis by 
employing self-report inventories. The general purpose of the Study 1 and 2 was to verify the 
existence of relationships among different instruments which, even though providing varied 
conceptual and operational definitions of the same constructs, showed some points of 
overlapping. Basing on these relations the goal was, then, to identify broad cognitive and 
decision profiles including a set of characteristics, rather than defining individual styles 
through single and isolated dimensions.  
The second part of the investigation intended to study intuition and analysis “in action”, that 
is to assess the role of both intuitive-analytical strategies and individual styles within a 
specific strategic context. Focussing on the proposer’s perspective, Study 3, 4, and 5 all 
employed the Ultimatum Game as experimental setting. Study 3 aimed at assessing whether 
people can activate relevant mindreading processes in order to successfully interact in the 
course of the game. Study 4, then, investigated how the monetary proposals were affected by 
the introduction of two distinct modes, intuitive and analytical, of processing information 
about the counterpart. Finally, in Study 5, the role of individual intuitive and analytical style 
in directly influencing the entity of the offers and, in case, modulating the effect of the 
intuitive and analytical modes of thinking was examined. 
Results from the five studies were discussed and compared with existing literature. 
RIASSUNTO 
Il presente lavoro di ricerca si è proposto di indagare i costrutti di intuizione e analisi 
nell’ambito del decision-making attraverso l’integrazione di differenti tipologie di dati al fine 
di delineare un quadro esauriente e dettagliato dell’oggetto di studio.  
Nello specifico, la prima parte della ricerca si è occupata dello studio di intuizione e analisi 
attraverso l’impiego di scale self-report. L’obiettivo generale degli Studi 1 e 2 è stato quello 
di verificare l’esistenza di relazioni tra differenti strumenti che, sebbene propongano 
definizioni e operazionalizzazioni diverse dello stesso costrutto, presentano aree di 
sovrapposizione. A partire da tali connessioni, ci si è, quindi, posti l’obiettivo di identificare 
ampi profili individuali, cognitivi e decisionali, descritti attraverso tali differenti dimensioni 
stilistiche.  
La seconda parte della ricerca si è posta l’obiettivo di indagare intuizione e analisi “in 
azione”, ossia di valutare il ruolo di strategie e stili individuali intuitivi e analitici nell’ambito 
di uno specifico contesto strategico. Focalizzando l’indagine sulla prospettiva del proposer, 
negli Studi 3, 4 e 5 è stato utilizzato l’Ultimatum Game come setting sperimentale. In 
particolare, lo Studio 3 si è proposto di verificare se le persone siano in grado di attivare 
processi di mindreading pertinenti per interagire con successo nel corso del gioco. Attraverso 
lo Studio 4, ci si è posti l’obiettivo di valutare come l’introduzione di due distinte modalità, 
intuitiva e analitica, di processamento delle informazioni relative all’altro giocatore influenzi 
le proposte monetarie. Da ultimo, nello Studio 5 ci si è focalizzati sul ruolo giocato dallo stile 
individuale intuitivo e analitico nell’influenzare direttamente l’entità delle offerte e nel 
modulare l’effetto della modalità di pensiero intuitivo e analitico.  
I risultati e le implicazioni dei cinque studi sono stati discussi anche attraverso il confronto 
























Nowadays intuition has come to a popular appeal. The best-selling book Blink 
by Gladwell (2005) testifies that this issue is not confined to the academic 
research, but, rather, it is widespread also across the general public. This volume 
has helped to shed light not only on the scientific basis of the concept, but on the 
powerful influence that intuition has in both everyday life choices and in various 
life-or-death situations, such as the decisions of firefighters (Klein, 1998), 
military commanders (Kaempf et al., 1996), and emergency room surgeons 
(Abernathy & Hamm, 1995).  
The great interest which intuition has recently arisen could be due to a number 
of reasons. First, nowadays our environment is as complex as it has ever been 
(Sadler-Smith, 2008); second, everything appears to move ever-quickly and 
changes rapidly (Andersen, 2000); and, last, the amount of available information 
is overwhelming and, often, inadequate (Goodman, 1993). Given this scenario, 
people have little time to devote to decision-making requiring the consideration 
of a potentially enormous amount of information under an ever-increased time 
pressure (Kuo, 1998). In these days, it seems that intuition is not only necessary, 
but it is an absolute requirement for dealing with this reality. As a consequence, 
intuition could be a tool which is particularly responsive to today’s environment, 
in that it permits an overcoming of the limits of analysis in a such unstable 
environment (Prietula & Simon, 1989). For all these reasons, a renewed interest 
in intuition arose, which has led to the claim that intuition needs not to be 
magical but, rather it can be defined and explained scientifically, made intuition 
a very intriguing and promising topic in various fields of research, such as 
entrepreneurship, business management, education, training, and health care 
(Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008).  
Even though intuition has an indubitable power, its use, however, can not be 
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considered as a panacea for the speed-accuracy outcomes, since it may facilitate 
speed at the expense of accuracy (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Traditionally, rational 
analysis has been considered the best, if not the only, way of thinking which 
allowed people to make effective decisions. However, the above-mentioned 
growing body of research has questioned recently the assumption concerning the 
supremacy of analytical thinking. An in-between position claims that none of the 
two modes of thinking is absolutely better than the other. Rather both kinds 
together are better than either alone, since the effectiveness of a decision 
depends on the ability to select and adapt the right mental process for the task at 
hand (Sadler-Smith, 2008). 
In spite of the acknowledgment of the fundamental role played by intuition and 
analysis in decision-making, there still exist some barriers to a productive 
discourse on these topics. Even though intuition and analysis have been the 
subject of research for a very long time, any agreement has been reached yet on 
what intuition and analysis are, how intuition and analysis work, and under 
which circumstances the employment of one mode of thinking is better than the 
other (Dane & Pratt, 2007).   
The present work aimed at researching into the constructs of intuition and 
analysis in decision-making through the integration of different sources of data 
in order to provide a comprehensive and multifaceted outline of the issue.  
Specifically, the first part of the investigation concerned the study of intuition 
and analysis by employing self-report inventories. Starting from the 
establishment that varied conceptual and operational definitions of the 
constructs underlie the existing scales, the main purpose of the first two studies 
was to examine the relationship between different commonly used measures of 
cognitive and decision styles. Basing on these relations the goal was, then, to 
identify, if possible, broader stylistic profiles, which constituting dimensions, 
even if conceptually and operationally conceived in different ways and pertained 
to distinct fields, tap the same intuitive-analytical dimension. Whereas in Study 
1 decision-making and cognitive styles only were employed, in Study 2 the 
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relationships between these dimensions and mental abilities were also 
investigated. After the validation of those instruments whose Italian versions 
were neither applied nor validated yet and the subsequent comparison between 
different occupational groups on these scales, the connection between decision-
making and cognitive styles was explored (Study 1). Then, employing a larger 
experimental sample, the possible relationships between decision and cognitive 
styles and a measure of cognitive abilities were verified so to identify broad and 
comprehensive cognitive and decision profiles (Study 2). Once these profiles 
had been established, people showing “extreme” scores within each profile were 
selected (Study 2) to constitute the experimental sample of Study 5, which, in 
fact, required the involvement of people with an intuitive or analytical stylistic 
profile.  
The second part of the investigation intended to study intuition and analysis “in 
action”, that is to assess the role of both intuitive-analytical strategies and 
individual styles within a specific strategic context. Focussing on the proposer’s 
perspective, Study 3, 4, and 5 all employed the Ultimatum Game as 
experimental setting.  Specifically, the three studies were nested, in that each 
subsequent study aimed at providing further support to what found in the 
previous study and, in addition, at investigating a specific aspect which 
distinctive of that study. The assessment of whether people can activate relevant 
mindreading processes, that is taking into account the other player’s perspective, 
in order to successfully interact in the course of the game (Study 3) was, then, 
qualified through the introduction of two distinct modes of processing 
information about the counterpart. How the monetary proposals were affected 
by these two modes of thinking, intuitive and analytical ones, was then 
investigated (Study 4). Afterwards, the role of individual intuitive and analytical 
style in directly influencing the entity of the offers and, in case, modulating the 
effect of the intuitive and analytical modes of thinking was examined (Study 5). 
Lastly, both intuitive and analytical thinking and styles were controlled for the 
corresponding patterns of physiological activation in order to clarify if the 
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possible behavioural differences depended either on general arousal activation 
or on the specific quality of each type of elaboration process (Study 5).  






















As shown in the figure, every study, through its specific methods and 
procedures, dealt with precise and definite aims contributing to the achievement 
of the general purpose of the whole research, that is the investigation of intuition 


















































1.1 DEFINING INTUITION AND ANALYSIS 
Multiple and competing definitions of the constructs of intuition and analysis 
have been proposed across years. The definitions vary widely depending, on one 
side, on the different underlying theoretical foundations, and, on the other side, 
on the specific aspects of intuition and analysis that they stress. 
Intuition and analysis, in fact, have been referred to as personality traits (Myers 
et al., 1998) or cognitive styles (Allinson & Hayes, 1996), different level of 
awareness (Bastick, 1982), right/left hemisphere brain skills (Lank & Lank, 
1995), the result of past experience either implicitly or explicitly learned (Covin, 
Slevin & Heeley, 2001), cognitive strategies (Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 2003) and 
abilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Moreover, different definitions focus on specific features of the constructs: some 
focus on the antecedents of the process identified as implicit/explicit knowledge 
(Epstein, 1994; Hogarth, 2001; T. Betsch, 2007); in other definitions the focus is 
on the features of the process itself, that is the cognitive (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Gigerenzer, 1991), metacognitive (Barnard, 1968), affective (Epstein, 
1991; Haidt, 2001) elements; and, finally, some other definitions highlight the 
consequences of the constructs (T. Betsch, 2007; Sinclair et al., 2002). 
Specifically, conceiving intuition and analysis as processes, it follows that it is 
possible to identify the sources and consequences of the two processes and, 
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moreover, determine a series of features which characterize them. Figure 1.1 
provides a general overview of this layout.  
 
 Fig. 1.1 - Intuition and analysis: input, process and output.   
 
Defining intuition is usually a difficult undertaking, as the broadness of the 
phenomena that are subsumed under the umbrella of intuition impedes a precise 
definition. From the above review of the definitions of intuition and analysis it 
should appear clear that an integrated and coherent account of the nature and the 
role of these concepts has generally lacked. For this purpose dual-process 
theories provide a conceptual framework in which to place intuition and analysis 
that, in fact, lie at the heart of a great number of dual-process theories of social 
cognition and cognitive psychology (Epstein, 1991; Evans, 2008; Gilovich, 
Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000; Wilson, 2002; Wilson, 
Linsey & Schooler, 2000). Most researchers distinguish between two basic 
systems of information processing (Bruner, 1986; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Evans & Over, 1996; 2003; Sloman, 1996; Sun, Slusarz & Terry, 2005) by 
referring to dual process theories and sometimes combining the theories 
resulting in two sets of features that distinguish intuition from analysis. The first 
information processing system, which is believed to be the older of the two 
systems from an evolutionary perspective (Epstein, 1994; Evans & Over, 1996), 
involves the automatic and effortless processing of information (Stanovich & 
West, 2002). This system, which permits individuals to learn from experience 
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referred to as experiential (Epstein, 1994), automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999), tacit and intuitive (Hogarth, 2001), natural (Tversky & Khaneman, 1983), 
associative (Sloman, 1996). The second system enables individuals to learn 
information deliberatively, to develop ideas, and to carry out analyses in an 
attentive manner. This system has been referred to by various names, including 
rational (Epstein, 1994), intentional (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), deliberate and 
analytical (Hogarth, 2001), extensional (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), rule 
based (Sloman, 1996). 
Following the above-mentioned distinction among the antecedents, the core 
process, and the consequences of intuition and analysis, it is possible to identify 
and classify the specific features of both processes as described in literature. 
This overall outline provides a clear and, at the same time, comprehensive 
systematization of the varied and diverse characteristics that the different 
theoretical descriptions of the constructs highlight. All these features, which are 
schematized in Figure 1.2, will be tackle in detail in the next paragraph.  
 
Fig. 1.2 - Intuition and analysis as a function of the intuitive and analytical system yielding different processing 
features 
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1.1.1 Where intuition and analysis stem from 
Various theories assume that intuition allows judgments based on implicit 
knowledge (Epstein, 2007; Hogarth, 2007) which is acquired unconsciously, 
since the individual is unaware of the learning process. Experiments on 
artificial-grammar learning represent illustrative examples such implicit learning 
(Reber, 1967; for an overview see Frensch & Rünger, 2003). Participants were 
asked to memorize letter strings that were created by some rules. The 
spontaneous behaviour – classifying new strings as grammatical or not – 
revealed the application of the implicitly learned rules (participants were better 
than chance); however, if they were asked to explicate the rules, participants 
were not able to do so. This and subsequent findings (Reber, 1967; Reber & 
Allen, 1978) have been interpreted in terms of an unconscious abstraction of the 
underlying rule, thus providing evidence for the existence of implicit knowledge 
and inducing researchers to study it in different domains, such as unconscious 
perception (Merikle & Daneman, 1996), perception of structure (Bolte, Goschke 
& Kuhl, 2003), implicit memory (Perrig, 2000), and problem solving (Bowers et 
al., 1990; Reber, Ruch-Monachon & Perrig, 2007) Moreover, spontaneous 
judgments on the valence or the frequency of events and objects reflect the 
entire stream of prior, incidentally acquired experiences (T. Betsch, Plessner & 
Schallies, 2004), while explicit judgments failed to correctly represent the 
implicitly learned content. In sum, the findings suggest that implicitly learned 
knowledge seems to be better accessible by means of an intuitive judgment or 
decision.  
This assumption is further substantiated by theoretical models. Regarding the 
differential acquisition of knowledge, the cognitive experiential self theory 
(CEST, e.g. Epstein, 2007) proposes that the experiential system, which hosts 
intuition, features associative learning (e.g. through conditioning) that relates 
stimulus-response connections to outcomes. The rational system, on the other 
hand, consciously monitors the acquisition of information as learning is assumed 
as a conscious acquisition of beliefs from explicit sources of information 
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(Epstein, 2007). Regarding the use of this knowledge in judgments and 
decisions, the MODE model (Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of 
Behaviour; Fazio, 1990) assumes that spontaneous judgments reflect implicit 
attitudes, while deliberate judgments reflect explicit attitudes. Experimental 
results underline this proposal: intuitive judgments and decisions were better 
predicted by implicit rather than by explicit attitudes (Friese, Wänke & Plessner, 
2006; Richetin et al., 2007), while deliberate choices seemed to be a function of 
a positive explicit attitude. Following this line, Koriat (2000; 2007) distinguishes 
between experience-based and information-based judgments which correspond 
to intuitive and analytical judgments. The authors claims that “fast, unconscious, 
automatic inference results in a sheer subjective experience, and that subjective 
experience can then serve as the basis for noetic judgments” (p.314). 
Experience-based judgments are immediate impressions which have the same 
quality of a direct intuition. Conversely, information-based judgments are based 
on explicit inferential processes which are influenced by conscious thoughts and 
expectations.  
In sum, explicit learning can be understood as the feed for the analytical system, 
while implicit learning seems to be the major input of intuition. 
 
1.1.2 Features of the intuitive and analytical processes 
Intuition and analysis are described as quick and slow processes, respectively. 
Intuition allows people to know almost instantly what the best course of action 
is, since, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, it compresses years of 
experience and learning into seconds (Isenberg, 1984). In fact, not being 
constrained to process information serially, one by one, but, rather, having the 
possibility to call a number of problems and issues at the same time, intuition 
allows to apprehend the entirety of the situation in a rapid and quick synthesis. 
Its speed is the consequences of the fact that thinking is considered an 
evolutionary precursor to more conscious and analytical thinking: intuitive 
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system responds quickly to environmental stimuli, whereas analytical system 
operates in a slower way being oriented toward delayed action. In fact, under the 
analytical mode of thinking, people have the necessary time to go through a 
sequential process, since analysis can take a considerable long time to come to 
an end (Epstein et al., 1996).  Even though, traditionally, trade-off decision 
accuracy has been considered as inversely related to decision speed, a growing 
body of literature has proved that speed does not necessarily affect the decision 
quality, thus proving that even quick choices can result in high-quality outcome 
(Hayashi, 2001; Hitt, Keats & DeMarie, 1998; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Perlow, 
Okhuyensen & Repenning, 2002).  
Relying on associative thinking (Sloman, 1996; 2002), intuition is a synthetic 
psychological function, in that it apprehends the totality of a given situation 
(Vaughan, 1990). It allows to synthesize isolated pieces of information and 
experience into an integrated picture, thus permitting a holistic processing of 
reality that transcends each single parts. 
Intuition is also described as automatic processing similar to visual insight and 
pattern recognition resulting from holistic processing (Epstein, 2007; Klein, 
1998; 2003). Glöckner (2007) illustrates how intuition resembles visual 
perception processes by referring to the fact that individuals immediately form a 
consistent impression of a decision situation on perceiving it (p.312).  In other 
words, intuition implies a process of linking disparate elements of information 
so that intuitive thinking can be defined as an holistic recognition of patterns or 
structures such as prototypes, script, narratives (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 
2003). The process of intuition thinking can be also defined as automatic, since 
it can be executed with minimal impact on the capacity of cognition, thus not 
reducing the capacity for performing other tasks (Kyllonen & Shute, 1989). 
Analysis, conversely, can be described as rule-based thinking mode which 
implies making formal, abstract, and logical connections by encoding reality in 
abstract symbols, words or numbers (Verschueren et al., 2005). To do this, 
analytical thinking requires conscious control and deliberate effort. The 
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demands for cognitive resources makes analysis subject to the constraints of 
human cognitive capacity.  
Being automatic and effortless, intuition lies at subconscious level, in that it 
consists of “assessing the internal reservoir of cumulative experience and 
expertise developed over a period of years, without being able to understand 
consciously how we get the answers” (Parikh, 1994, p.38). In fact, the process of 
intuition is characterized by a lack of awareness of how judgments have been 
achieved (Shapiro & Spence, 1997; Wally & Baum, 1994). Intuition somehow 
produces an answer without the use of a conscious process which, as a 
consequence, can not be reconstructed and made transparent (Khatri & Ng, 
2000). People unconsciously make holistic associations between the stimuli they 
encounter and their underlying cognitive structures integration of wide-ranging 
stimuli into categories of information. On the contrary, analytical thinking 
operates under conscious control and forces the decision maker to make explicit 
the bases for a decision. This is possible due to the fact that analysis is 
transparent, that is open to scrutiny and to be verbalized (Arkes & Hammond, 
1986). 
Due to the fact that intuition involves little time and little effort, it has been 
maintained that intuition promotes the use of heuristic rules. In the tradition of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics and biases program (e.g. Gilovich, Griffin, 
& Kahneman, 2002) the term intuition represents the application of useful and 
timesaving, however sometimes faulty heuristics. Heuristic is considered as a 
low-effort way of reasoning that can produce less than optimal judgments and 
decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In particular, according to this 
perspective, relying on these mental shortcuts may be disadvantageous when 
processing abstract and probabilistic information since statistical and 
probabilistic judgments require a slower and more detailed way of reasoning.  
Even though the traditional view of heuristics generally highlights their 
faultiness and the fact that they result in erroneous and biased judgments 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), the more recent fast-and-frugal perspective 
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proposes an alternative and positive idea of heuristics which are considered as 
fast and cognitively economical but, at the same time, accurate and effective 
means of making judgments and decisions (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). People 
are particularly susceptible to relying on heuristics when they are under time 
pressure (Finucane et al., 2000), under cognitive load (Gilbert, 2002), in a good 
mood (Eisenberg, 2000), or lacking in motivation (Pelham & Neter, 1995).  
From the affective point of view, a basic feature of intuition is that it involves 
quickly accessible affect (Epstein, 1994). The sudden feeling can be seen as 
representative of the implicitly learned information and is thus only as valid as 
the informational basis it refers to (Hogarth, 2001). It can be compared with an 
aesthetic judgment of liking and disliking (Haidt, 2001) and serve as a basis for 
judgments and decisions (T. Betsch, 2007). The affective valence of a stimulus, 
e.g. the assessment of whether objects are good or bad, is a “natural assessment” 
which is automatically registered by the intuitive system (Kahneman, 2003; see 
also “the affect heuristic”: Slovic et al., 2002). However, it has been argued that 
intuition involves not only an immediate affective reaction, but, it is explicitly 
connected with emotions (Epstein, 1994; Sinclair, 2003). According to some 
researchers, this link is further thorough, leading them to claim that intuition is 
affectively charged (Hassin et al., 2005). Moreover, recent research point out 
that emotion can activate an intuitive process since they represent inputs to 
intuitive thought (Hogarth, 2001); emotion may also play a role during the 
intuitive process and, thus, results in affective judgments (Epstein, 1994). This 
findings are further supported by neuroscience research which highlight the 
existence of an intuitive system of thought and show that both intuitions and 
emotional appraisals appear to arise through similar neurological pathways 
(Lieberman, 2000; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001; Lieberman, 2007). The idea 
that emotions play a key role in making decisions is also being developed in 
some recent work that contrasts a rapid emotional basis for decision making 
with a slower, affect-free, and more deliberative cognitive basis (Haidt, 2001; 
Hanoch & Vitouch, 2004; Wang, 2006).  
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To sum up, the view that emerges from the work underpinning the two systems 
distinction is that each system represents qualitatively different modes of 
processing. Specifically, intuition turns out to be a process which capitalizes on 
implicit knowledge, is associative, heuristic, automatic/subconscious, and 
affective in nature; therefore, it is relatively rapid and undemanding in terms of 
its use of scarce cognitive resources.  In contrast, analytical processing is rule-
based, conscious, and relatively affect-free in nature; hence, it is relatively slow 
and makes great demands on cognitive resources (Schroyens et al., 2003; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). 
 
1.1.3 What intuition and analysis result in 
The output of intuition is a feeling which can be defined as an involuntary and 
immediate breaking into consciousness (Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980) that 
informs conscious thought about what happens at the unconscious level (Weber 
& Lindemann, 2007). Intuition can result in numerous types of feeling, but, 
despite their differences, all share some properties, that is they are immediate, 
nonverbal, require few cognitive resources, and evolve from experience (Perrig, 
2000). In addition, they have in common a metacognitive informational content, 
since they convey information about people’s own past, present or future mental 
processes that allow people to both monitor and regulate those processes 
(Koriat, 1998; Nelson, 2001). Even though the concept of feeling suddenly 
reminds of the emotional component, it should be kept in mind that not all 
feelings map on the affective dimension. In fact, the outcomes of intuition do 
not necessarily coincide with emotional type of feeling (T. Betsch, 2007). The 
feeling of knowing (Hart, 1965), which, for instance, represents a nonemotional 
feeling produced by intuition, indicates that people are able to recognize the 
correct answer to a question that they cannot currently recall (Koriat, 1993; 
Matcalfe, 2000). The feeling of familiarity refers to that cases when people have 
encountered a certain situation before, even if there is no longer any explicit 
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memory of the encounter (Dunn, 2004). The feeling of preference identifies 
those situations in which people express a preference for a decision path without 
having reasons for that preference. The feeling of coherence refers to the 
situation in which people perceived consistency even if they do not have 
reasoned grounds for it (Bowers et al., 1990).  
As a consequence, intuition is often thought as a “hunch” or “gut feeling”, a 
sense of calling certainty that is on the threshold of consciousness (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005) as opposed to a rational and analytical conclusion based on 
explicit evidence. While intuition results in immediate apprehension of objects, 
analysis produces reasoned responses obtained through logical inferences.  
 
1.1.4 How intuition and analysis work 
Even though the dual-models of processing conveyed the idea of two distinct 
and separate modes of processing information, most authors (Epstein, 1994; 
Hammond, 1996; Hogarth, 2001; Slovic et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2003) did not 
refer to them as independent systems. According to Epstein (1994), people do 
not reason in only experiential or rational mode. The two systems are 
continually active and interacting in much of our cognitive activity (Slovic et al., 
2002). Far from working in a dichotomous way, intuition and analysis are 
considered as parallel yet interconnected (Epstein, 1998; Sinclair, 2003). A 
slightly different theoretical perspective, in turn, describes people’s cognitive 
activity across a range of styles, since there is a sort of continuum  identified by 
intuitive cognition at one pole and analytical cognition at the other pole. The 
position along this continuum determines the relative dominance of either two 
systems (Hammond, 1996).  
Hogarth (2001) studied in depth the functional meaning of the two systems. The 
author highlighted that the two systems work in tandem maintaining that the 
intuitive system is the default information-processing mode whereas, just in 
case, the analytical system intervenes; on the other way round, the migration 
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from the analytical system to intuition represents the hallmark of the acquisition 
of the expertise. The dominance of either approach seems to be determined by 
personal disposition and decision-making context (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). 
As for the latter is concerned, some authors (Burke & Miller, 1999; Hogarth, 
2001; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998) emphasized the fundamental role 
of the nature of the stimuli and the types of information involved in the two 
modes of thinking as important factors that affect the functionality of intuitive 
and analytical systems. In particular, Hogarth (2001) stated that tasks promoting 
visual processing induce more intuitive reasoning, which is mostly activated 
when  information provided is partial and do not involve comprehensive 
consideration of all aspects of a decision but, instead, is sensitive to specific 
features of the stimulus. In this case the response is based on only part of the 
information that could be relevant to the issue at hand and it is holistic, based on 
an impression of  the whole. On the contrary, in analytical thinking information 
is additional since it involves manipulation of information that is not just 
represented by the stimulus and it is independent of the other cues. According to 
Kahneman (2003),  the operating characteristics of System 1 are similar to the 
features of perceptual processes. In fact, the perceptual system and the intuitive 
operations of System 1 generate impressions which are neither voluntary nor 
verbally explicit. On the contrary, System 2 is involved in all types of 
judgments, whether they originate in impressions or in deliberate reasoning, and 
they are always intentional and explicit. Intuitive are those judgments that reflect 
impressions and are not modified by System 2. It is possible to assume that 
System 2 continuously monitors the judgments and intentions that System 1 
produces, so that an intuitive judgment will be modified or overridden just in 
case System 2 identifies it as biased. However, corrective thoughts are 
accessible just in specific circumstances, that is when persons experience no 
time pressure (Finucane et al., 2000), are not involved in a concurrent cognitive 
task (Gilbert, 2002) and are not in a good mood (Isen, Nygre & Ashby, 1988). 
Kahneman (2003) pointed out that a key-point of the intuitive and analytical 
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judgments’ functionality is the idea of accessibility, or the ease with which 
mental contents come to mind. Under specific circumstances intuitive thoughts 
come to mind spontaneously and without effort depending on the actual 
properties of the object of judgment such as physical salience, on the states of 
priming and associative activation (e.g.  “hot” states of high emotional and 
motivational arousal increase accessibility of thoughts) and on the effect of 
context on the accessibility of interpretations as context induces a certain type of 
interpretation.   
 
1.1.5 Which is better? 
One might wonder what is the best way to make a decision when facing with a 
choice, either engaging in a detailed analysis or relying on immediate intuition. 
Research on decision making has traditionally supported the idea that careful 
analysis leads to better decisions (Janis & Mann, 1977; Koriat, Lichtenstein & 
Fischoff, 1980; Raiffa, 1968), thus conveying a predominant negative view of 
intuition in the field of psychology (Bettman, Luce & Payne, 1998; Kahneman, 
2003). Historically, science itself has called for explainable assumptions, hence 
rationality has tended to be the default mode of cognition against which intuition 
has been compared. However, the pervasive assumption that analytical 
processing is always the best way to make decisions has been challenged by a 
number of studies, thus inducing the development of both positive and negative 
views of intuition among psychology researchers. Whereas those with a negative 
view of intuition maintain that intuitive decisions are biased and poorer than the 
analytical ones, those with a positive view of intuition highlight the great 
opportunities that this mode of thinking affords (Hoch, 1987; Lewicki, 1986). 
Among the latter, the prevailing opinion highlights the great potential for 
intuitive processing, but, at the same time, suggests that, in terms of 
functionality and utility, the two processing systems each have their own 
strengths and weaknesses (Epstein et al., 1996; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; 
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Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008). According to this perspective, 
successful decision-making does not hinge on analysis or intuition alone, but 
involves a mix of both processes. This perspective also claims that analytical or 
intuitive mode of thinking are not efficient in an absolute way, but their 
effectiveness and accuracy depend on the kind of tasks that they face: decisions 
are more valid when there is a match between properties of the task and the 
mode of thought employed (Hammond et al., 1987). McMackin and Slovic 
(2000) have emphasized the importance of understanding the joint effects of 
types of task and cognition. They claimed that task characteristics could 
critically affect the quality of decisions under the two modes of thinking, thus 
showing that intuition is more valid in an intuitive task and analysis in an 
analytical task. For the intuitive task, providing reasons has a negative effect on 
performance, whereas generating reasons has a positive effect on performance in 
the analytical task. When people engage in problem solving are asked to 
verbalize their thoughts, there is evidence that this as a negative effect on 
problems that require insightful solutions but not on analytical problems. 
Verbalization forces people to act in deliberative mode and cut off access to 
intuitive processes (Wilson et al., 1993). Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) provide 
support to the idea that the characteristics of the task at hand may affect the 
effectiveness either modes of thinking. Specifically, they conclude that intuitive 
processing leads to efficient performance when the tasks implies limited and 
visual information. A series of studies recently carried out (Dijksterhuis, 2004; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) provide further evidence concerning the existence of a 
relation between mode of thinking and the complexity and quality of decisions. 
Specifically, it has been suggested that when decision problems are fairly 
complex and multiattributed, unconscious intuitive processing leads to superior 
decision making. According to the authors, the inferiority of analysis in complex 
decisions is probably due to both the low capacity of analytical system (Miller, 
1956; Nørretranders, 1998) which induces decision makers to take into account 
only a subset of information (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 
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2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) and to the fact that analysis can lead to 
suboptimal weighting of the attributes (Levine, Halberstadt & Goldstone, 1996).  
Besides the type of task people have to face, Hogarth (2001; 2005) identifies 
other informational variables which represent conditions under which analytical 
and intuitive judgments are likely to be accurate: feedback quality and the 
consequences of inferential errors. Depending on the interaction between these 
factors, it is possible to predict in which cases intuitive or analytical thought will 
be more valid. As suggested also by other research (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 
2004), the type of feedback that people receive may be crucial in determining if 
an environment enhances or suppresses the effectiveness of intuitive thinking. In 
fact, only when people receive timely and veridical feedback on their judgments 
and actions and when inferential errors are easy to detect the quality of intuitive 
judgments and decisions increases (Hogarth, 2001).  
 
1.1.6 Intuition and analysis in the present work 
Although dual-process models provide a productive foundation for the 
development of a more integrated account on intuition and analysis 
(Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008), we believe that some issues  
raised by this theoretical model have to be qualified.  
An important question which has often come in for criticism is that this feature-
based approach leaves open how many attributes must be present, necessary, 
and sufficient to recognize intuitive and analytical processes (Plessner et al., 
2007). Our claim, in this respect, is that the series of equivalences established by 
dual-process models among intuition and analysis and their respective 
qualifying features should be taken very cautiously. A fine distinction which is 
worth clarifying, in our opinion, is that intuition does not coincide with emotion, 
in that intuition does not spring from emotion as opposed to reason (Vaughan, 
1990, Ray & Myers, 1990). We believe that the equivalence between intuition 
and emotion, on one side, and analysis and pure cognition, on the other side, 
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should be softened. Intuition does not mean emotion, they are not synonyms, 
but, rather, they probably show some points of overlapping even if it is possible 
to keep them separate. Conversely, analysis does not coincide with “cold” 
cognition, completely detached from any emotional involvement. We share the 
assumption that both intuition and analysis can involve an emotional 
component, but, so that intuition and analysis can be specified, the 
presence/absence of emotion is neither sufficient, nor necessary.   
Moreover, we do not agree with the widespread opinion suggesting that intuition 
necessarily suffers from biases and errors. We share the growing body of 
research (Ilgen & Feldman, 1983; Harung, 1993; Seebo, 1993) which maintains 
that intuition, far from being a biased process, it can be very accurate. Moreover, 
the analytical thinking can suffer from biases too, and, it can even produce 
extreme errors (Hammond et al., 1987).  
In our acceptation, intuition is rapid, holistic and mainly, but not exclusively, 
based on visual cues. It capitalizes on implicit learning and experience, and is 
not accessible to introspection. Conversely, analysis is slow, analytical and 
primarily based on verbal cues. It stems from explicit learning and experience, 
and is transparent, that is accessible to introspection.  
 
 
1.2 MEASURING INTUITION AND ANALYSIS 
The measurement of intuition and analysis represents a very interesting and, at 
the same time, debated topic within different fields of research. Being constructs 
whose definitions and bounds are not always univocal, the operationalization of 
intuition and analysis could constitute a really difficult effort (Mitchell, Friga & 
Mitchell, 2005). The multifaceted nature of these concepts is difficulty hosted in 
their entirety within a single measure. Typically, each measure focuses on one, 
or at least some, attribute of intuition and analysis. For this reason, when 
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measuring these constructs, researchers should clear up which aspects of 
intuition and analysis they are willing to investigate, in order to employ an 
instrument which is really suitable for that goal. Given the complexity and 
heterogeneity of these concepts, there is a continuing need for the development 
of multiple approaches to their assessment. A number of differentiated measures 
of intuition and analysis have been developed across time, including traditional 
self-reported inventories, and techniques to measure behaviours, and even 
neurobiological correlates, in laboratory. 
   
1.2.1 Self-report measures: cognitive and decision styles 
The differences we have already described among systems and processes can be 
partly reflected in systematic individual differences in relying upon a specific 
type of processing. In fact, starting from the evidence that individuals differ in 
their tendency to mainly rely on either processes, intuition and analysis have 
also been conceived as preferred or habitual ways of thinking. The identification 
of distinct habitual pattern of behaviour leads to the notion of “cognitive style”.  
1.2.1.1 Defining cognitive and decision styles 
The term cognitive styles has been referred to consistent attitudes, preferences, 
or habitual strategies that affect person’s modes of perceiving, learning, judging, 
decision-making, problem-solving (Messick, 1984). Individual differences about 
people’s cognitive functioning can be defined as cognitive style when they are 
pervasive and stable, that is they appear consistently in different situations and 
they are fairly fixed characteristics at different times (Ausburn & Ausburn, 
1978; Riding, Glass & Douglas, 1993). In fact, cognitive styles can be described 
as transversal dimensions which lead people to similar attitudes, behaviours and 
strategies in a variety of domains. They reflects “how”, rather than “how well”, 
people process information. Rather than being abilities, cognitive styles are 
ways of using abilities. Whereas the latter are measured in terms of level of 
performance, the former are measured in terms of manner of performance. 
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Moreover, they are different as for the fact that abilities are unipolar dimensions 
while styles are bipolar or multipolar dimensions (Antonietti, 2003).   
The existence of stable individual differences has been also identified in the 
specific field of decision making (Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000; Glaser, Nöth 
& Weber, 2004; Glaser & Weber, 2005). Hence, it seems that people can be 
differentiated according to their style in making decisions. Over the years, 
several definitions of the decision style construct has been provided. It has been 
described as a habitual pattern individuals use in decision-making (Driver, 1979; 
Scott & Bruce, 1995) or individuals’ specific mode of perceiving and 
responding to decision-making tasks (Harren, 1979) or preference for a certain 
decision-making strategy (Epstein et al., 1996). Driver, Brousseau and Hunsaker 
(1990) claimed that decision-making style is identified by the amount of 
information gathered and the number of options considered when making a 
decision, whereas other authors suggested that decision-making style regards the 
way individuals make sense of the data they gather (Hunt et al., 1989). More 
recently, Galotti et al. (2006) maintained that decision-making styles are far 
from being connected to information gathering, they affect the way individuals 
conceptualize decisions instead. According to the authors, stylistic differences 
would influence the decision-making phase which concerns setting goals and 
representing the consequences of one’s own decisions. Decision making style 
has been referred to alternatively as “tendency or preference” (Epstein et al., 
1996) or “personality trait” (Myers et al., 1998). Even though all of these 
concepts deal with the way people process information concerning decision 
making, the idea of personality trait highlights the stability of one’s decision-
making behaviour across various situations whereas the concept of preference 
pinpoints the possibility that individuals, though within a repertoire of preferred 
or dominant decision styles, modulate their own behaviour according to the 
situation at hand. In fact, although individuals tend to use certain styles more 
frequently than others (Drivers et al., 1990) or have a dominant style (Rowe & 
Mason, 1987), they can adapt their styles to the different situations they 
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encounter, thus showing flexibility in their use and application of decision styles 
especially over long time (Hayes & Allinson, 1998; Zhang & Sternberg, 2007).   
1.2.1.1 Theoretical dimensions for cognitive and decision styles 
Many proposals have been offered for dimensions of cognitive and decision 
making style which ranged from the relatively simple to articulated and 
complex. However, the most popular and unifying dimension concerns the 
distinction between intuition, on one side, and analysis, on the other.  In fact, a 
number of different style dimensions have been described basing on the idea of 
bipolarity which identified two value-equal opposing poles corresponding to 
distinctive modes of cognitive functioning, such as field dependent-independent 
(Witkin, 1962), impulsive-reflective (Kagan et al., 1964), holist-serialist (Pask, 
1972), verbalizer-visualizer (Paivio, 1971), adaptive-innovative (Kirton, 
1976;1989). Confronting with this myriad of style dimensions and starting from 
the lack of a global perspective and of a common conceptual framework and 
language (Zhang & Sternberg, 2007), some researchers attempted to integrate 
different styles categorization (Cassidy, 2004; Coffield et al., 2004; Vance et al., 
2007). As already said, however, in the specific field of decision making, the 
most common and global dimension is represented by the contrast between 
intuitive and analytical styles (Agor, 1989; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Klaczynski, 
2001; Nygren, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2000). Specifically, people with an 
intuitive style rely more on feelings to make decisions and solve problems 
holistically; people characterised by an analytical style prefer to solve problems 
and make decisions by using analytical techniques. In line with this 
classification, other authors (Epstein et al., 1996; Betsch, 2004) maintained that 
people differ in their inclinations and preference for certain strategies. In 
particular, they distinguished between people with a preference for the intuitive 
decision mode and people who prefer the analytical decision mode. Intuitive 
people are those who habitually make decisions in a fast, effortless and 
automatic way, whereas analytical people tend to make slower, elaborated, 
planned and analytic decisions. Intuition and anlaysis can be treated as opposite 
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poles along the same bipolar dimension and therefore as mutually exclusive 
(Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Simon, 1987). However, 
recent findings (Hodgkinsons & Sadler-Smith, 2003) suggest that people’s 
behaviour is better modelled as two separate unipolar scales. In line with dual-
process theories, this view argues that intuition and deliberation are 
complementary and, as a consequence, can be concurrent. Instruments based on 
this premise measure intuition and deliberation separately, since the two 
constructs are conceived as orthogonal and independent dimensions (Isenberg, 
1984; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Sauter, 1999). This implies that people process 
information by two parallel, interactive systems that interface and are 
interconnected, although they operate in a different way (Epstein, 1994). The 
two ways of thinking permit people to switch back and forth from one mode of 
processing to the other, as required, albeit moderated to some degree by 
individual styles and preferences (Dane & Pratt, 2007). 
Starting from the distinction between intuitive and analytical styles, other 
authors proposed more complex models of decision-making styles which are not 
based on the idea of bipolarity, but they rather included more stylistic 
dimensions. Rowe and Mason (1987) defined four different styles: directive 
style refers to people who are practical and power-oriented; analytic style 
defines logical and systematic people; conceptual style concerns the intuitive 
and creative individuals; behavioural people can be defined as being supportive 
and receptive.  Scott and Bruce (1995) identified the following styles: a rational 
style characterized by comprehensive search for information and logical 
evaluation of alternatives;  an intuitive style characterized by attention to details 
and a reliance on hunches and feelings;  a dependent style characterized by the 
search for guidance from others before making decisions;  an avoidant style 
characterized by attempts to avoid decision-making whenever possible; a 
spontaneous style characterized by the desire to come through the decision-
making process as quick as possible.  
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1.2.1.2 Measuring intuitive and analytical styles 
The majority of measures of intuitive and analytical styles have been designed 
as self-report inventories (see Hayes & Allison, 1994; Myers & McCaulley, 
1985) that require the subject to express one’s own agreement or disagreement 
with several statements. However, even though the scales which have been 
devised across time claim to measure intuition and analysis, they refer to 
theoretical constructs which are partially different in nature (Pretz & Totz, 2007; 
Betsch & Iannello, submitted). Some questionnaires reflect the conception of 
intuition and deliberation as personality traits (MBTI, Myers et al. 1998, Pretz & 
Trotz, 2007); others are meant to measure intuition and deliberation as abilities 
(REI, Pacini & Epstein, 1999); in most other inventories the two constructs are 
conceived as styles and chronic preference or tendencies (PID, C. Betsch, 2004; 
GDMS, Scott & Bruce, 1995; SOLAT, Torrance et al., 1977; 1978; Torrance, 
1987).  
In the Myers-Brigg Type Indicator (MBTI: Myers et al., 1998), which is based 
on Jungian theory (Jung, 1926), intuition and analysis have been conceived as 
personality constructs. The Intuitive/Sensate subscale distinguishes between the 
intuitive types who prefer imagination and abstraction in contrast to sensing 
individuals who prefer reality and concrete facts, whereas the Thinking/Feeling 
subscale identifies thinking people who are analytical and logical as opposed to 
feeling types who value emotions and feelings over analysis.  
Other instruments, on the contrary, tap on the individual’s preference and ability 
in using specific strategies. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI: Epstein et 
al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which is the first of its kind, measures the 
degree to which people tend to rely on intuition and hunches over logical and 
analysis when making decisions. Specifically, the REI aims at measuring both 
the individual engagement in (preference for) for rational or experiential mode 
of thinking and the individual beliefs in one’s own ability to successfully use 
that mode. Even if the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (C. 
Betsch, 2004) has its root in the REI scale, it focuses only on the assessment of 
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strategy preferences in decision situations. The main goal of the intuitive scale is 
the measurement of reliance on intuition and affect, while the deliberate scale 
aims at assessing the reliance on analysis and cognition. Other instruments aim 
at measuring preferences in the use of specific strategies, but in a broader sense 
than just intuitive and analytical tendencies. The General Decision Making Style 
(Scott & Bruce, 1995) identifies five different styles corresponding to specific 
patterns of behaviour that individuals use in decision-making: rational, intuitive, 
dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous style.  
Whereas the instruments which have been just described refer to the specific 
field of decision-making, others are meant to measure preferences for intuition 
and deliberation  in general cognitive processes. The Cognitive Style Index 
(CSI: Allinson & Hayes, 1996) and the more recent Cognitive Style Indicator 
(CoSI: Cools & van den Broeck, 2007) have been developed to assess the 
individual tendency to rely either on intuition or analysis when engaging in 
cognitive processes. Within these instruments, the Style of Learning and 
Thinking (Torrance et al., 1977; 1978; Torrance, 1987) mirrors the connection 
between the intuition-analysis dimensions with the areas of neurological activity 
associated with the two halves of the human brain. This inventory distinguishes 
between “right” and “left” thinkers. Right brain thinking has been considered 
characteristic of the right hemisphere, whose activity, in fact, emphasizes 
synthesis and simultaneous integration of many inputs at once, whereas left 
brain thinking   
An issue which is still open and is worth deepening concerns the possible 
relation between analytical thinking and cognitive abilities. In this respect, some 
authors claim that no connection does exist (Epstein et al., 1996; Handley, 
Newstead & Wright, 2000), others, conversely, suggest that intelligence, and 
mental abilities in general, may influence the actual use of intuition and analysis 
(Frederick, 2005; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 2006; Stanovich & West, 
2000). Whereas the former maintain the independence of analysis and mental 
abilities, the latter claim the possibility that they are causally related (Frederick, 
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2005). Specifically, in the “heuristics and biases” literature, which supports the 
idea of intuition as a possible source thinking bias, it has been studied the 
correlation between thinking biases and cognitive ability, thus showing the 
existence of a relationship between cognitive ability and individual differences 
in the operation of thinking biases ((Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007; 
Newstead et al., 2004; Parker & Fishhoff, 2005). 
A simple measure of cognitive ability employed in the study of individual 
differences within the dual-process framework is the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT: Frederick, 2005). It is made up of three brief problems, for which the 
default intuitive response is incorrect. Only engaging in a deliberate 
reconsideration, people can correct the intuitive response and give the right 
answer. For this reason, it has been considered as a measure of the ability to 
monitor initial default impressions and reason accurately.  
 
1.2.2 Behavioural measures: intuitive and analytical strategies 
Intuition and analysis have been measured also through a number of behavioural 
tasks (Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fishhoff, 2007; Shiloh, Salton & Sharabi 
2002) supporting the characterization of these two systems. Whereas research on 
individual styles focus on the dispositional features, behavioural studies pinpoint 
the situational and contextual aspects affecting and modulating intuition and 
analysis.  
1.2.2.1 Intuition and analysis in conflict: the Ultimatum Game  
Decision behaviours, in fact, may be conceived as the operation of multiple 
underlying systems that interact, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in 
competition, to form judgment and decisions (Sanfey & Chang, 2008). While 
most  judgments and decisions result from the synergistic interaction between 
intuitive and analytical thinking, at times the two systems may compete, thus 
making a conflict arise. Particularly interesting are those tasks where such a 
conflict clearly emerges. Among the others,  the  Ultimatum  Game, which is 
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one of the most common games studied by  experimental economists (Güth et 
al., 1982; Roth et al., 1991), turned out to be particularly suitable for the 
emergence of different and opposed tendencies (Sanfey & Chang, 2008).  In the 
Ultimatum Game two players are given the possibility to split a sum of money. 
One player (the proposer) offers a part of the money to the second player (the 
responder). The responder can either accept the offer (in which case both players 
split the money as proposed) or reject the offer (in which case both players get 
nothing). According to traditional, computational models of decision making, 
both proposer and responder are supposed to behave rationally, and, as a 
consequence, the former should select his/her offer basing on expected utility 
and weight it by the probabilities that it would be accepted by the responder. 
Similarly, the latter, adopting a rational behaviour, should accept any positive 
offers, even the smallest possible offer, since any should be more attractive than 
receiving nothing. In sum, under the assumption of the predominance of a 
rational, computational, and “cognitive” conduct, proposers are expected to offer 
the smallest possible offer, and, in turn, responders are supposed to accept any 
positive offer. However, several decades of research employing the Ultimatum 
Game produced a wealth body of evidence showing that computational models 
do not provide an actual description of human behaviour. Results obtained 
across many studies demonstrate that the majority of proposers typically offer 
40 to 50% of the total sum, and about half of all responders reject offers below 
30% (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & Gachter, 1999; 
Nowak, Page & Sigmund, 2000; Henrich et al., 2004). To  explain  these  
anomalies, it has been claimed the involvement of noncomputational affective 
processes (Pham, 2004) beside, or as an alternative to, computation cognitive 
processes. Specifically, the intervention of emotional aspects has been supposed 
to affect the actual behaviour of both proposer and responder. Some authors 
refer to a more general theory of reciprocity (Falk & Fishbacher, 2006; Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000) according to which people’s behaviour is other-oriented, 
altruistic, it rewards fair and punishes unfair actions. This could explain why, on 
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one side, proposers usually offer about half of the entire sum of money, and 
responders, on the other side, reject low offers. In fact, the negative emotions 
caused by an unfair treatment in the Ultimatum Game can lead responders to 
sacrifice considerable amount of money in order to punish their partner and 
maintain their social reputation (Nowak, Page & Sigmund, 2000). Both players, 
proposer and responder experience a conflict between “analytical, cognitive”, 
and “intuitive, emotional” tendencies. Specifically, the proposer has to decide 
whether offering low amount of money (“cognitive suggestion”) or fair amount 
of money (“emotional suggestion”), whereas the responder has to opt for either 
accepting low offers (“cognitive suggestion”) or rejecting them (“emotional 
suggestion!”). Decisions to solve this conflict in Ultimatum Game have been 
conceived as a consequence of the predominance of a mode of thinking against 
the other one.  
The Ultimatum Game has been studied focussing either on the responder or on 
the proposer perspective. Most of the studies concentrates on the responders; it 
was particularly studied the specific reactions to what are considered as unfair 
offers. As already said, responders would reject unfair offers in order to punish 
those who treat them unfairly or those who refuse to cooperate (Haselhuhn &  
Mellers, 2005). It is as if subjects have an implicit notion of fairness (Camerer, 
1997); in some case this notion can be an hyper-fairness since responders tended 
to reject both low and high offers (Bahry & Wilson, 2006).The notion of 
fairness  regards  both the intention and the consequences of an action. The same 
consequences of an action are perceived and reciprocated in a different way 
depending on the intention that guides the action. The major role played by 
intentions during interactive social games is testified by several studies (Sally &  
Hill, 2006; Rilling et al., 2004).  Rilling et al. (2004), in particular, employed an 
Ultimatum Game version in which the proposers were either human person or 
computer. It turned out that responders distinguished between human and 
computer partners, rejecting unfair offers from human partners more frequently 
than unfair offers from computer. In accordance with the idea of reciprocity, 
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when participants could attribute and infer the intentions of real social partners 
they reciprocate punishing unkind offers. On the contrary, when partners were 
non-intentional agents, such as computers, participants were willing to accept 
even unfair offers.   
As far as proposers is concerned, research focused on the factors that could 
introduce variations in numerous aspects of both the players and the setting. In  
particular,  researchers introduced variations in specific characteristics of players 
such as demographic variables like gender (Solnick, 2001), race and culture 
(Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Oosterbeek, Sloof & Van de Kuilen, 2004; Roth et 
al., 1991), and age (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998; Harbaugh, Krause & Liday, 
2003); and in the characteristics of the setting such as the total number of player 
involved in the game (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), the number of games played 
(Knez & Camerer,  2000), and the size of the stakes (Hoffman et al., 1996).  
Other types of manipulation directly intervene on either the elicitation of 
cognition and emotion, that is the priming of the cognitive and emotional 
systems (Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Tesch & Sanfey, 2008). Primes are based on the 
idea that an induced mood can influence decision making, and in particular 
social decision making (Forgas, 2003; Zajonc, 2000). In Ultimatum Game 
research, it was found that, when responders were induced to engage in a spatial 
cognition task, that is when the cognitive system was primed, they accepted 
unfair offers more frequently than when no primes occurred (Tesch & Sanfey, 
2008). On the contrary, when the emotional system was primed through movies 
or pictures inducing negative emotions (sadness or disgust), responders were 
more prone to reject unfair offers (Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Moretti & Di 
Pellegrino, 2008). The exposure to attractive sex-related pictures, conversely, 
which is supposed to induce positive emotional activations led to a higher rate of 























HOW INTUITIVE AND ANALYTICAL STYLES ARE 




A number of different self-report inventories have been devised to measure how 
people differ in relying on intuition and analysis in making decisions. As 
discussed in the Introduction, some of them refer to the specific field of 
decision-making, whereas others regard the more general ambit of cognitive 
styles. Moreover, some instruments conceive intuition and analysis as two 
complementary or independent ways of thinking, while others embrace a 
complex and multidimensional, as opposed to unitary, perspective in this regard 
(Scott & Bruce, 1995; Sternberg, 1997). Both the different points of view from 
which they have been studied and the various conceptual and operational 
definitions of the constructs have resulted in inconsistencies (Shipman & 
Shipman, 1985; Pretz & Totz, 2007). In fact, the dimensions of styles are still 
not clearly established, thus leaving unresolved whether the variety of 
inventories measures the same or different factors (Curry, 1990) and to which 
degree the different dimensions of styles overlap (Bostic & Tallent-Runnels, 
1991). Within this framework, some authors have suggested that studies 
designed to investigate the connections among different styles dimensions in 
order to, in case, identify a small number of significant factors are needed 
(Goldstein & Blackman, 1978; Bostic & Tallent-Runnels, 1991). 
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The purpose of the present study is to examine the relationship between different 
commonly used measures of cognitive and decision styles, in order to identify, if 
possible, broader stylistic profiles, whose constituting dimensions, even if 
conceptually and operationally conceived in different ways and pertained to 
distinct fields, tap on the same intuitive-analytical dimension.  In order to do so, 
five different measures have been selected and employed in the present study. 
Since our main focus was on decision making, most inventories concern 
decision-making styles. In particular, three decision-making style instruments 
were selected because of the specific constructs they claim to measure. In fact, 
in order to identify broad stylistic profile, we selected a number of instruments 
whose dimensions ranged from the intuitive-analytical dimension to both a more 
differentiated taxonomy of styles and a diverse dimension which, despite the 
difference, shows some overlapping with the intuitive-analytical dimension. 
Moreover, from the perspective of identifying multifaceted stylistic profile, it 
was decided to include an inventory concerning the more general field of 
cognitive styles. Finally, since in literature findings were inconclusive about the 
possibility of connecting the intuitive-analytical dimension to mental abilities, 
an instrument suitable for this scope was employed.   
The Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (PID: C. Betsch, 2004) can 
be valued as a measure which assesses the inclination to intuitive vs. deliberate 
decision making, with a particular emphasis on the affect-cognition and on the 
implicit-explicit attitude distinction. The PID assumes individual inclinations 
towards intuitive decision making (based on affective reactions towards the 
decision option) and deliberate decision making (based on beliefs, evaluations, 
reasons). A number of empirical findings supported these assumptions. It has 
been shown that intuitive people included affective reactions in their choices, 
while deliberate people refrained from doing so (Schunk & C. Betsch, 2006; C. 
Betsch & Kunz, 2008). Moreover, intuitive subjects are faster in decisions 
(Schunk & C. Betsch, 2006; C. Betsch, 2004) and their decisions were better 
predicted by implicit attitudes Richetin et al., 2007).  
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The General Decision Making Style (GDMS) developed by Scott and Bruce 
(1995) identifies rational and intuitive dimensions as two of five separate 
decision-making styles. This inventory suggests the existence of five distinct 
decision-making styles, which are defined by the authors as a learned habitual 
response pattern, corresponding to specific patterns of behaviour that individuals 
use in decision-making. In particular, the authors distinguished the following 
stylistic dimensions: a rational style characterized by comprehensive search for 
information and logical evaluation of alternatives; an intuitive style 
characterized by attention to details and a reliance on hunches and feelings; a 
dependent style characterized by the search for guidance from others before 
making decisions; an avoidant style characterized by attempts to avoid decision-
making whenever possible; a spontaneous style characterized by the desire to 
come through the decision-making process as quick as possible. Several studies, 
which have been conducted to validate the instrument (Loo, 2000; Spicer & 
Sadler-Smith, 2005; Thunholm, 2004), demonstrated that it is a 
psychometrically sound inventory.  
The intuitive-analytical dimension measured by PID and the more articulated 
taxonomy proposed by GDMS  and the more differentiated two above illustrated 
measures of decision-making styles seem to present, from a theoretical point of 
view, some points of overlapping also with other stylistic measures, either with 
specific decision tendencies or more general cognitive styles. Specifically, they 
show some point of intersection with the distinction between maximizers and 
satisficers proposed by Schwartz et al. (2002). The authors distinguished 
between people who tend to be satisfied with what is considered a “good enough 
option”, the so-called “satisficers” and, on the other side, people who tend to 
achieve what is considered the “best option”, the so-called “maximizers”. The 
satisficers look for the alternative that is over the threshold of acceptability and 
as soon as they find it, they opt for it. On the contrary, the maximizers aim to 
obtain the best outcomes and to achieve it they carefully examine all the 
available alternatives and they tend to rely on other people’s opinion in making 
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their own decisions. Thus, the rational and dependent decision styles could be 
related with maximizing tendencies, whereas the intuitive and spontaneous 
decision styles could be connected with satisfying tendencies. The Maximization 
Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) has been proposed as an instrument designed to 
measure the maximizing and satisfying tendencies. 
Furthermore, all these decision-making measures, they show some points of 
overlapping with the broader cognitive styles dimensions, as the thinking and 
learning styles identified by Torrance et al. (1977; Torrance 1987). Hypotheses 
derived from research into brain lateralization induced Torrance (1987) to 
propose the distinction between a left and a right style of thinking. The Style of 
Learning and Thinking (Torrance et al., 1977; Torrance, 1987) inventory was 
originally intended to assess the notion of left-right brain dominance before 
further research disconfirmed the hypothesized independence of the two 
hemispheres (Zalewski, Sink & Yachimowicz, 1992). At present the inventory is 
considered a useful tool for assessing analytic versus intuitive modes of thinking 
(Zhang, 2002). Left style is concerned with verbal, logical, analytical, and 
abstract tasks; the left style implies preference for sequential processing of 
information and systematicity in solving problems. The right style refers to 
nonverbal, holistic, spatial, and concrete thinking and style implies preference 
for parallel processing, perceptual representation in the form of synthesized 
patterns, intuitive and creative problem-solving.  People who tend to be 
conformist and to operate in a logic way are left thinkers, whereas people who 
tend to be non-conformist, intuitive and creative have a right thinking profile. 
The right thinking style shares some features with both the intuitive and 
spontaneous decision styles and the tendencies to be satisfied, whereas the left 
thinking style presents connections with both the rational and dependent 
decision styles and the tendencies to maximize. 
All these instruments measure the tendency, the habit, or the preference for a 
specific pattern of behaviour, which is considered as different and separate from 
cognitive ability (Epstein et al., 1996; Handley, Newstead & Wright, 2000). As 
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already discussed in the Introduction, whereas the former refers to what people 
are able to do, the latter to what they are inclined to do. However, some authors 
suggest that, even if they do not coincide, styles and mental abilities may 
partially overlap. Specifically, some authors claim that intelligence, and mental 
abilities in general, may influence the actual use of intuition and analysis 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007; Frederick, 2005; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; 2006; Parker & Fishhoff, 2005). The Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT: Frederick, 2005) has been employed as a measure of cognitive ability in 
the study of individual differences within the dual-process framework. It is made 
up of three brief problems, for which the default intuitive response is incorrect. 
People can correct the intuitive response only engaging in a deliberate 
reconsideration of the problem. For this reason, it has been considered as a 
measure of the ability to monitor initial default impressions and reason 
accurately. The CRT measure has been found to highly correlate with a variety 
of measures associated with analytical thinking, including intelligence 
(Stanovich & West, 2000), however, these results do not provide a conclusive 
finding concerning the relationship between intuitive/analysis and mental 
abilities. In fact, it has to be clearly stated what this instrument actually measure, 
that is what aspects of intuition and analysis are really addressed through it.  
The general purpose of the Study 1 and 2 was to verify the existence of 
relationships among these instruments in order to identify broad cognitive and 
decision profiles including a set of characteristics, rather than defining 
individual styles through single and isolated dimensions in which reciprocal 
boundaries and overlaps are still unclear.  Within this general aim, four specific 
goals are set across the two studies: 
- to validate those inventories whose Italian versions were neither applied nor 
validated yet; 
- to verify the existence of relationships among all the instruments employed; 
- to compare the scores obtained by different experimental subsamples on these 
instruments; 
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- to identify two samples of participants showing an “extreme” intuitive or 
analytical stylistic profile on the instruments employed. 




2.1  STUDY 1 
 
2.1.1 Aims  
The specific aims of the first study were as follows.  
Study 1 had an exploratory purpose, that is, it was aimed at verifying the internal 
structure of the inventories whose Italian versions were neither applied nor 
validated yet. 
The second aim was to verify the existence of relationships between different 
stylistic measures, such as the styles identified by General Decision Making 
Style Inventory (Scott & Bruce, 1995) and the maximizing tendencies assessed 
by the Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002), and a more general thinking 
and learning stylistic dimension such as the left-right style as measured by the 
Style of Learning and Thinking questionnaire (Torrance et al., 1977; 1978; 
Torrance, 1987). In particular, it was hypothesized to find positive correlations 
among: 
-  the rational and dependent decision style, the tendency to maximize, and the 
left thinking  style; 
- the intuitive and spontaneous style, the tendency to satisfy, and the right 
thinking style.  
The third aim was to further substantiate the evidence that cognitive and 
decision styles vary depending on the occupational status of the participants. 
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Some studies have researched into the role of other personal characteristics such 
as gender (Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Meric & Capen, 2008; Pacini & Epstein, 
1999; Parikh, 1994; Taggart et al., 1997), and age (Phillips, 2008), but very few 
attempts have been made to connect individual styles and occupational status 
(Iannello, 2007; Iannello & Antonietti, 2007; Meric & Capen, 2008). In 
particular, in the present study, a comparison between subsamples of students 
and workers was made.  
 
2.1.2 Method 
2.1.2.1 Materials  
The following inventories were administered to participants: 
GDMS (General Decision Making Style)  
GDMS (Scott & Bruce, 1995) is a questionnaire used to determine the 
individual decision-making style. The instrument consists of five subscales 
corresponding to the different styles identified by Scott and Bruce (1995): 
rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous.  
The questionnaire is composed of 25 item which are behaviourally phrased. 
For each item subjects are requested to express their degree of agreement on 
a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree).  
Maximization Scale 
Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) is a questionnaire aimed at 
identifying people who tend to achieve what is considered the “best option” 
(the so-called “maximizers”) and people who tend to be satisfied with what is 
considered a “good enough option” (the so-called “satisficers”).  
The measurement consists of 13 items behaviourally phrased. Respondents 
answer questions regarding their decision-making habits on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1=completely disagree; 7=completely agree).  
SOLAT (Style of Learning and Thinking) 
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SOLAT (Torrance et al., 1977; 1978; Torrance, 1987) aims at measuring 
individual thinking and learning style. In particular, the instrument 
distinguishes between people who tend to be conformist, to operate in a logic 
and systematic way (“left” thinking profile) and people who can be described 
as non-conformist, intuitive and creative (“right” thinking profile). The 
standardized Italian version of SOLAT (Antonietti et al., 2005) consists, as 
the original one, of 28 items. Each of them is composed of two different 
statements: one of the statement refers to left thinking style, the other refers 
to the right thinking style. Subjects are requested to choose the statement 
which best suits him/her. The individual thinking style is the style in which 
the subject obtains the highest score. Choosing both statements results in 
scoring on the integrative subscale.   
The Italian version of SOLAT shows a quite adequate internal-consistency 
reliability (α = .69) and a good fit of global model (Pearson Separation index 
= .71). 
2.1.2.2 Participants 
One hundred and seventy-three people (78 men and 95 women), aged from 18 to 
60 (mean = 29.8 yrs.), were involved in the study. According to occupation, the 
total sample consisted of two different subsamples. The first subsample was 
composed of 71 high school students (57 men and 14 women); the mean age for 
this group was 18.8 yrs (SD = 1.5). The second subsample consisted of 102 
workers (21 men and 81 women); the mean age for this group was 36.8 yrs (SD 
= 9.9).  
All participants were volunteers. As for the recruitment of the students, some 
high schools in Milan were contacted. One of them confirmed the availability of 
some of the classes to participate in the present study. As for the workers, they 
were contacted during training courses they attended.  
The selection of two different subsamples was decided upon to ensure that the 
individual differences in terms of styles could be studied in people with different 
characteristics concerning age and occupation so allowing us to make 
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comparisons between them. Some of the research studies that are referred to in 
this paper used a mix of samples to research into stylistic measures (Allinson & 
Hayes, 1996).   
2.1.2.3 Procedure 
Data were collected in November 2006. As for the sample of students, the 
administration of the questionnaires took place in their school during lesson 
time; as for the workers, it took pace during the training courses they attended. 
Participants were asked to fill in the three questionnaires (GDMS, Maximization 
Scale, SOLAT) presented in a counterbalanced order in a single session. No time 
limits were established. Participants took 20 minutes to fill in the three 
questionnaires. Participants were told that the questionnaires were anonymous 
and that there were no right or wrong answers. 
 
2.1.3 Results  
Analyses of the data proceeded as follows. We first assessed the factorial 
structure and the internal consistency reliability of both the GDMS questionnaire 
and the Maximization Scale (for SOLAT this step was skipped since the 
properties of the Italian translation of the instrument, showing that it matches the 
original one, had already been assessed: Antonietti et al., 2005). Next, we 
investigated the relationships among the Maximization Scale, GDMS, and 
SOLAT. Finally, we verified the existence of differences between the two 
subsamples on the GDMS, Maximization Scale and SOLAT.  
2.1.3.1 Exploratory factor analysis and internal consistency  
On the data derived from each instrument, an exploratory factor analysis was 
carried out to identify the factorial structure of each scale. Moreover, the internal 
consistency reliabilities were calculated for each subscale of the instruments. 
Before running the analysis the assumption of univariant normality was assessed 
on each item of the three inventories by getting skewness and kurtosis and 
dividing these by the standard errors. Both skewness and kurtosis were within 
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the +1 to -1 range, so allowing to conclude that data were normally distributed 
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). In particular, as for the GDMS the 
skewness values ranged from -.75 to .64, whereas the kurtosis values ranged 
from -.96 to .28; for the Maximization Scale the skewness varied from -.1.02 to 
.01 and the kurtosis from -.50 to .69; for the SOLAT the skewness values ranged 
from .15 to .97 and the kurtosis values from  -.99  to .88. 
General Decision Making Style  
Prior to the application of the factor analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO, 
Kaiser, 1970; 1974) was used to measure sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) was used to test whether the correlation was 
appropriate for factor analysis and statistically significant. The KMO value for 
this analysis was 0.75. KMO measure above 0.60 is considered acceptable; 
above 0.70 is good; above 0.80 is commendable; above 0.90 is exceptional 
(Henry et al., 2003).  The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was statistically significant 
(χ²=1376.193, p<.001), indicating that the data were appropriate for the analysis.  
Factor Analysis, using principal components extraction and Varimax rotation, 
was performed on the data derived from GDMS. Items with a component pattern 
of at least 0.30 were used in interpreting the component. Five factors were 
extracted.  
The rotated components coefficient matrix, which accounted for 52.9% of the 
postrotational variance, is shown in Table 2.1.                                    
Items of GDMS 
Factors 
16R 6R 11R 21R 1R 4A 2 I 22I 7 I 12I 18D 3D 23D 13D 8D 9A 14A 24A 19A 10S 5S 15S 20S 25S
2. Rational  .71 .66 .65 .63 .59 .35                   
5. Intuitive       .77 .74 .70 .58               
1.Dependent           .85 .79 .73 .72 .67          
3. Avoidant                .85 .79 .71 .37      
4.Spontaneous                    .73 .68 .67 .63 .49
Tab. 2.1 – GDMS: Rotated components matrix 
  
The five factors extracted corresponded to the structure identified by Scott and 
Bruce (1995) even though some exceptions came out. Factor 1 (eigenvalue = 
4.60, corresponding to the 18.1 % of the variance) was labelled “dependent” 
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because all five dependent items loaded on this factor. All five items from the 
rational style loaded on factor 2 (eigenvalue =  3.20, corresponding to the 13.1% 
of the variance); however also item 4 loaded on this factor instead of loading on 
its expected component, that is, factor 3. In fact, only four items loaded on factor 
3 (eigenvalue = 2.40, corresponding to the 9.5% of the variance), which 
corresponded to the avoidant style. Factor 4 (eigenvalue = 1.70, corresponding 
to the 6.9 % of the variance) represented the spontaneous style. Four out of five 
intuitive items loaded on factor 5 (eigenvalue = 1.30, corresponding to the 5.3% 
of the variance) since item 17, which was expected to load on this factor, failed 
to load any of the five components. 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each factor. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
for the first subscale (“dependent style”) was .82. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
second and the fourth subscales was above .70 (.74 for the “rational style” and 
.73 for the “spontaneous style”), whereas it was found to be .61 for the third 
subscale (“avoidant style”) and .56 for the last one (“intuitive style”).   
Maximization Scale 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure and Bartlett's test of sphericity showed 
that the samples met the criteria for factor analysis. KMO measure was 0.75 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ²=373.851, p<.001). 
Four components were extracted from the items of the Maximization Scale by 
applying the principal components extraction and Oblimin rotation. Items with a 
component pattern of at least .30 were used in interpreting the component. The 
rotated components coefficient matrix, which accounted for 54% of the 
postrotational variance, is shown in Table 2.2.  
Items of Maximization Scale 
Components 
9 7 8 10 6 1 3 2 5 11 13 4 12 
2. Difficulty in choice  .71 .70 .68 .63          
1. Search for options     .75 .70 .50 .49 .48     
3. High standard          .74 .72 .58  
4. Second best             .86 
Tab. 2.2 – Maximization Scale: Rotated components matrix 
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The first three components corresponded to the three original ones extracted by 
Schwartz et al. (2002). The first and second components represented behavioural 
examples of maximizing. The first one referred to the difficulties encountered in 
choosing among different alternatives, in particular while shopping (eigenvalue 
= 3.30, corresponding to the 25.3% of the variance). The second component 
concerned the attitude of being open to different options and actively searching 
for them (eigenvalue = 1.50, corresponding to the 11.4% of the variance). The 
third component represented the tendency to have high standards, for oneself 
and in general (eigenvalue = 1.20, corresponding to the 8.9% of the variance). 
Item 12 could not be included in any of these components, forming a new fourth 
component, which referred to the claim “Never settling for the second best” 
(eigenvalue = 1.10, corresponding to the 8.4% of the variance). 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each component emerging from factor 
analysis (with the obvious omission of the fourth factor). Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was .66 for the first component (“difficulty in choice”), whereas it 
was .50 for the second component (“search for options”) and .52 for the third 
one (“high standard”).  
2.1.3.2 Relationships among decision and cognitive styles  
Correlations were first calculated between GDMS and Maximization Scale, then 
between GDMS and SOLAT, and, finally, between Maximizations Scale and 
SOLAT.  
Bivariate correlations between Maximization Scale and GDMS resulted to be as 
shown in Table 2.3. 
Tab. 2.3 – Maximization Scale and GDMS: Bivariate correlations          **  p <  .01           *  p <  .05 
 GDMS 
  Rational Intuitive Dependent Avoidant Spontaneous 
Summed scale .120** .097 .145* .227** .059 
Search for options -.065 .234** .021 .139 .174* 
Difficulty in choice -.090 .096 .156* .352** -.018 




Second best -.002 .222** -.043 -.128 -.050 
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As suggested by previous research (Nenkov et al., 2008) people’s scores on the 
maximization components were assessed in addition to their summed 
maximization score. Evidence, in fact, suggest that the components are related to 
different psychological variables (Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz et al., 2002).  
Correlational analyses revealed that Maximization Scale and GDMS showed 
some statistically significant relationships. In particular, results highlighted that 
the summed scale was positively related to almost every GDMS scale, with the 
exception of the intuitive and spontaneous ones. As for the specific components 
of the Maximization Scale, it turned out that the subscale concerning the 
difficulty in choosing among different alternatives was positively associated 
with the dependent and avoidant style subscales. Scores on the Maximization 
component referring to the active search for different options were positively 
correlated with both the spontaneous and intuitive GDMS subscales. Scores on 
the maximization subscale referring to the tendency of having high standard of 
life were associated with both rational and intuitive GDMS style. Finally, scores 
on the intuitive style subscale were associated with the tendency of never 
settling for the second best.  
Then, bivariate correlations between GDMS and the subscales of SOLAT were 
calculated. Results are shown in Table 2.4. Before calculating correlations, 
SOLAT data were recoded as follows. To identify which style the participants 
preferred, the number of items in which they chose the left-style, the right-style 
statements and either both or none of them was calculated. As a consequence, 
for each participants three total sums (corresponding to the three styles: left, 
right, and integrated) were obtained.   
 GDMS 
 Rational Intuitive Dependent Avoidant Spontaneous 
Right style -.152* .132* -.042 .010 .128* 
Left style .300** -.125* .095 .102 -.046 
 
SOLAT 
Integrated style -.084 -.021 -.025 -.093 -.077 
Tab. 2.4 – GDMS and SOLAT: Bivariate correlations    **  p <  .01              *  p <  .05 
 50
SOLAT and GDMS pointed out the existence of some statistically significant 
relationships. In particular, the analysis revealed that scores on the rational style 
subscale were associated positively with the left style subscale and negatively 
with right style subscale. Conversely, the intuitive style was positively 
associated with the right style and negatively with the left style. Finally, the 
spontaneous style was positively correlated with the right style.  
Finally, bivariate correlations between Maximization Scale and the three 
subscales of SOLAT were calculated. Results are reported in Table 2.5. 
 Tab. 2.5 – SOLAT and Maximization Scale: Bivariate correlations           **  p <  .01        *  p <  .05 
 
Correlation coefficients revealed that SOLAT and Maximization Scale showed 
some statistically significant relationships. Specifically, results pointed out that 
scores on the Maximization summed scale were positively correlated with the 
left style and negatively with the integrated style; the Maximization component 
concerning the active search for different options were positively associated 
with scores on the right style subscale and negatively associated with scores on 
the integrated style subscale; lastly, the maximization component concerning the 
difficulties in choosing showed a positive correlation with the left style.  
2.1.3.3 Differences between subsamples  
In order to investigate the existence of differences in terms of decision-making 
styles, maximization tendencies and thinking styles depending on the 
participants’ occupational status (students and workers), mean scores obtained 
on each instrument by the two different subsamples were compared. 
Furthermore, since the mean age of the two occupation subsamples are 
substantially different (18.8 years for the student group and 36.8 for the worker 
 MAXIMIZATION SCALE 
 Summed scale Search for optino Difficulty in choice High standard Second best 
Right style .066 .182* .058 -.076 -.086 
Left style .130* .042 .120* -.063 .104 
 
SOLAT 
Integrated style -.148* -.224** -.112 .129 -.014 
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one) the effect of age was controlled in order to exclude that any effect due to 
occupation could have been due to the age instead.    
General Decision Making Style 
The assumption of homogeneous variances was tested by using Levene’s test. P-
values were not statistically significant (values ranged from p = .094 to p = 
.896), thus indicating that the analysis of variance was possible.   
In order to compare scores obtained on GDMS by students and workers, a one-
way ANOVA was computed. Results are reported in Table 2.6. 
Subscales Occupation Mean SD F(1,171), P η2 
Students 3.70 0.58 
1. Rational 
Workers 3.86 0.65 
2.643 .074 .030 
Students 3.53 0.59 
2. Intuitive 
Workers 3.39 0.73 
0.992 .373 .011 
Students 3.34 0.72 
3. Dependent 
Workers 3.45 0.61 
2.571 .087 .023 
Students 2.79 0.82 
4. Avoidant 
Workers 2.32 0.81 
6.615 <.005 .070 
Students 3.08 0.71 
5. Spontaneous 
Workers 2.92 0.70 
1.164 .315 .013 
Tab. 2.6 – GDMS: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences were found only on the avoidant style subscale in 
which students obtained significantly higher scores than workers. Nevertheless, 
even though differences on the other style subscales did not reach the statistical 
significance, students reported higher scores than workers also on the 
spontaneous and intuitive style subscales and lower scores on the rational and 
dependent ones.  
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was computed in order to compare scores 
obtained on each subscale by the different age groups.  Subdividing the 
experimental sample into regular intervals (decades) with respect to age, five 
different age groups were identified (18-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-60). 
Results are reported in Table 2.7. Statistical mean differences were found on the 
rational, intuitive and avoidant styles. Specifically, post-hoc tests (LSD and 
Newman-Keuls tests) showed that 18-19 and 20-29 years people obtained 
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significantly lower scores as compared to the older groups on the rational style 
scale and, conversely, they obtained higher scores on the avoidant style scale. 
As for the intuitive style scale, 40-49 years people scored lower as compared to 
all other age groups.  
Subscales Age Mean SD F(4,168), P η2 
18-19 3.51 0.53 
20-29 3.60 0.51 
30-39 3.85 0.66 
40-49 3.87 0.61 
1. Rational 
50-59 3.90 0.61 
3.286 <.05 .084 
18-19 3.57 0.58 
20-29 3.52 0.60 
30-39 3.42 0.77 
40-49 3.05 0.71 
2. Intuitive 
50-59 3.51 0.72 
3.007 <.05 .065 
18-19 3.23 0.76 
20-29 3.66 0.84 
30-39 3.20 0.77 
40-49 3.44 0.79 
3. Dependent 
50-59 3.27 0.66 
2.325 .059 .060 
18-19 2.80 0.79 
20-29 2.53 0.76 
30-39 2.35 0.88 
40-49 2.08 0.80 
4. Avoidant 
50-59 2.33 0.88 
4.223 <.005 .094 
18-19 3.16 0.68 
20-29 2.98 0.67 
30-39 2.89 0.78 
40-49 2.71 0.56 
5. Spontaneous 
50-59 3.10 0.73 
2.228 .068 .047 
Tab. 2.7 – GDMS: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
  
Maximization Scale  
Prior to the application of the analysis of variance, Levene's test (Levene, 1960) 
was used to verify the assumption that variances were equal across samples. For 
each component the resulting p-value of Levene’s test was not statistically 
significant (p-values ranged from p = .084 to p = .990, thus allowing to conclude 
that  no differences between variances in samples exist. A one-way ANOVA 
was performed to compare the factorial scores of the Maximization Scale 
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obtained by the two different subsamples (students and workers). Results are 
reported in Table 2.8.  
Components Occupation Mean  SD F(1,171),  P η2 
Students 4.27 0.85 
1. Summed scale 
Workers 3.42 0.85 
41.648 <.001 .200 
Students 3.92 1.35 
2. Search for options 
Workers 2.94 1.19 
38.127 <.001 .186 
Students 4.46 1.02 3. Difficulty in  
choice Workers 3.25 1.20 
21.569 <.001 .177 
Students 4.36 1.00 
4. High standard 
Workers 4.36 1.08 
0.131 .718 .001 
Students 3.32 1.73 
5. Second best 
Workers 3.54 1.73 
0.127 .722 .001 
Tab. 2.8 - Maximization Scale: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences emerged on the summed maximization scale and on 
the two subscales representing behavioural examples of maximizing tendencies: 
the one which includes being open to different options and actively searching for 
them and the one which refers to the difficulties encountered in choosing among 
different alternatives. In particular, students obtained significantly higher scores 
than workers in these three subscales. On the contrary, statistical differences 
between scores obtained by students and workers did not emerged on the third 
component, which concerns having high standards and on the last component 
which refers to the claim “Never settling for the second best”.  
To verify the effect of age on the maximization scores, a one-way ANOVA was 
computed on the scores obtained by the different age groups on the 
maximization subscales. Results are reported in Table 2.9. Statistical mean 
differences were found on the same subscales. In particular, LSD and Newman-
Kreuls post-hoc tests highlighted that 18-19 and 20-29 years groups obtained 
significant higher scores than the other groups on both the summed scale and the 
subscale concerning the difficulties in choosing among alternatives. On the 




Components Age Mean SD F(4,168), p η2 
18-19 4.26 0.87 
20-29 3.97 1.05 
30-39 3.49 0.76 
40-49 3.15 0.87 
1. Summed scale 
50-59 3.29 1.02 
9.841 <.001 .185 
18-19 3.95 1.32 
20-29 3.25 1.26 
30-39 2.87 1.49 
40-49 2.82 1.11 
2. Search for options 
 
 
50-59 2.70 0.63 
6.607 <.001 .135 
18-19 4.48 1.07 
20-29 4.20 1.84 
30-39 3.32 1.11 
40-49 2.80 1.14 
3.Difficulty in choice 
 
50-59 2.52 0.87 
13.629 <.001 .247 
18-19 4.25 0.95 
20-29 4.48 0.93 
30-39 4.66 1.11 
40-49 4.29 1.15 
4. High standard 
50-59 4.06 1.31 
1.299 .272 .030 
18-19 3.16 1.69 
20-29 3.31 1.52 
30-39 3.76 2.01 
40-49 3.60 1.57 
5. Second best 
 
50-59 3.86 2.09 
0.981 .420 .023 
Tab. 2.9 – Maximization Scale: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
 
Style of Learning and Thinking 
To assess the equality of variance in different samples Levene’s test was used. 
The results confirmed that the samples met the criteria for the analysis (p-values 
ranged from p=.339 to p=.923)  
Three one-way ANOVA were carried out to compare scores in the subscales of 






Subscales Subsamples Mean SD F(1,171) p η2 
Students 9.32 4.98 
1. Left  
Workers 8.28 4.83 
1.924 .167 .011 
Students 13.14 5.18 
2. Right 
Workers 12.53 5.29 
0.560 .455 .003 
Students 5.52 5.28 
3. Integrated  
Workers 7.17 5.28 
4.117 <.05 .023 
Tab. 2.10 - SOLAT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical differences came out only on the integrated style subscale on which 
workers obtained higher scores than students. As for the left and right style 
subscales students obtained higher scores than workers, even though in both 
subscales the difference did not reach the statistical significance. 
A one-way ANOVA was computed to verify the effect of age variable on 
SOLAT scores. Results are reported in Table 2.11. Results showed that statistical 
mean differences emerged on the left and integrated style subscales. LSD and 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests highlighted that 20-29 and 30-39 years groups 
scored lower than 40-49 and 50-59 years groups on the left style subscale 
whereas 30-39 years group obtained higher scores than younger people on the 
integrated style subscale.   
Subscales Age Mean SD F(4,168), p η2 
18-19 8.30 4.73 
20-29 7.30 4.75 
30-39 7.30 4.60 
40-49 9.46 5.19 
 
1. Left  





18-19 13.40 4.79 
20-29 13.90 5.65 
30-39 12.20 4.88 
40-49 11.07 5.96 
2. Right  
 
50-59 11.83 4.69 
1.672 .159 .038 
18-19 5.30 4.73 
20-29 6.80 4.63 
30-39 8.50 5.21 
40-49 7.46 5.99 
3. Integrated  





Tab. 2.11 – SOLAT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
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2.1.4 Discussion 
A first finding is that the data collected partially supported the structures of the 
instruments described in literature, so allowing to conclude that the Italian 
translation of the questionnaires employed in the research mirrors to some extent 
the corresponding original versions. In fact, factor analysis showed that, in 
general, the same components as the ones which were found in the original 
versions emerged, even though some slight differences occurred, such as the two 
items which do not load on their expected components in GDMS and the item 
which constitutes an additional component in the Maximization Scale. The 
internal reliability for the scales employed (computed with coefficient alpha) can 
be considered acceptable for the GDMS whose subscales’ internal reliability 
was, in almost all cases, consistent with the values previously reported in 
literature (Loo, 2000; Galotti et al., 2006), whereas for the Maximization Scale it 
was below the level of acceptability, even though these results are in line with 
other previous research (Nenkov et al., 2008) . 
Findings from this study add support to the instruments developed by Scott and 
Bruce (1995), even if some adjustments to the Italian version are needed in order 
to overcome some minor problems that emerged in the study. As for the 
Maximization Scale, the study revealed that the psychometric qualities of the 
instruments are less than ideal. However, since our results are in line with 
findings from other research, this does not seem to be ascribable to our Italian 
version of the instrument, but, on the contrary, it turns out to be a finding 
common to different and numerous investigations (Diab, Gillespie & 
Highhouse, 2008; Highhouse & Diab, 2006; Parker, Bruine de Bruin & 
Fishhoff, 2007), so that recently it has been suggested that the existing 
Maximization Scale is a “candidate for refinement” (Nenkov et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, given the fundamental importance that the maximizing construct 
has in decision-making research and being the Maximization Scale the only 
instrument (at least at the moment of the present research) aimed at measuring 
this construct, it has been opted for using the instrument, so long as bearing 
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these problems in mind. All in all it appeared that the Italian translations of the 
two instruments that were devised for this study were adequate, so to be 
applicable also in future research, thus confirming that Maximization Scale and 
GDMS represent useful tools in assessing specific aspects of individual 
differences in decision-making process.  
As regards the pattern of relationships among the instruments employed in the 
study, it turned out that questionnaires are related one another in consistent 
ways. Specifically, correlations between Maximization Scale and the GDMS 
questionnaires showed that people with either a dependent or avoidant decision 
style encounter difficulties in choosing among different alternatives that are 
present at the moment of the choice, whereas people with a spontaneous or 
intuitive decision style tend to search for different options that are imagined and 
created by them. A possible explanation is that people who experience decision-
making as heavy and demanding, such as individuals with an avoidant decision 
style, feel uncomfortable when making a choice, all the more having a greater 
number of options at their own disposal to choose among which probably would 
make the decision-making process even more difficult. As for people with a 
dependent decision style, it could be the case that, not being proactive and 
resourceful and being in need of other people’s advice, they encounter 
difficulties when making choices, all the more when they are provided with a 
wide range of options. On the contrary, probably due to their tendency to be 
creative and enterprising, people with both a spontaneous and intuitive decision 
style prefer searching for and imagining different alternatives. Moreover, both 
people with a rational and an intuitive decision style are used to settle high 
standards of life. These relationships could be explained by the fact that, once 
the standards have been settled, they can be reached through different strategies. 
In any case, high standard are associated to the possession of a clear strategy to 
match them. The summed maximization scale turns out to be related to rational, 
dependent, and avoidant decision makers. These correlations could be predicted 
from Schwartz’s conceptualization of maximizing construct. In fact, according 
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to him, maximizers engage in more rational decision making which reflect their 
perception of systematic deliberation about their choices; they tend to rely more 
on others’ advice which indicates the interpersonal comparisons they usually 
activate; finally, they show a more avoidant decision making which reveals the 
their tendency to postpone decisions to search for more information and ponder 
the alternatives (see also Parker, Bruine de Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007).  
The patterns of relationships between the Maximization Scale and the SOLAT 
pointed out that people with a right thinking style tend to search for different 
alternatives during decision-making process. Being nonconformist and 
preferring to hunt for original solutions, right thinkers are used to search for 
alternatives that are not present at the moment of the decision. On the contrary, 
people with an integrated thinking style do not search for alternatives and 
usually experience difficulty when choosing among different alternatives. 
Integrated thinkers do not present a definite thinking style and, probably, they 
are not used to invent or imagine alternatives that are not available during 
decision-making process. The positive association between the summed scale 
and the left thinking style is in line with what emerged from the relationship 
between maximization scores and GDMS, thus confirming that maximizers tend 
to engage in an analytical and systematic decision making.  
Relationships between the GMDS and the SOLAT questionnaires showed that 
the rational decision style is associated with the left thinking style and, in the 
opposite direction, with the right thinking style. Conversely, the intuitive 
decision style is positively associated with the right thinking style  and 
negatively with the left thinking style. People who think in a logical and 
systematic way do not rely on intuitions, but rather tend to make decisions in a 
rational way. On the contrary, people who think in a associative and holistic way 
tend to decide in an intuitive way.  It appears that the tendency to apply a 
specific set of strategies (systematic analysis versus intuition) in decision-
making reflects a more general tendency to rely on one of the two kinds of 
thinking processes in cognitive tasks.  
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Furthermore, the present study found that the comparison between the scores 
obtained on the three questionnaires by the two subsamples pointed out that 
students and workers showed differences in various subscales of the 
instruments. In particular, as far as Maximization Scale was concerned, students 
showed higher scores than workers in the summed scale and in the two 
components representing behavioural examples of maximizing tendencies, that 
is, the one which concerns the difficulty to choose among different alternatives 
and the one which refers to being open to different options and actively 
searching for them. As for the GDMS, students obtained significantly higher 
scores than workers on the avoidant style subscale and, to a lesser degree, on the 
spontaneous and intuitive style subscales and lower scores on the rational and 
dependent style subscales. As far as the SOLAT was concerned, students 
obtained lower scores in the integrated thinking and learning styles.  
The students’ portrait that came out from these results highlighted that students 
tend to be curious, enquiring, and open to different alternatives. Probably, these 
characteristics lead them to wish to have many different alternatives at their own 
disposal to choose among. However, being even insecure and, at times, taking 
up extreme attitudes, on one hand they try to avoid decision-making whenever 
possible and, on the other hand, they show spontaneous and intuitive decision-
making styles and thinking style features that are typical of both left and right 
thinkers. Findings also highlight the existence of significant relationships 
between individual styles and age, supporting the idea of a general change in 
styles with maturation (Gurley, 1984). In accordance with other previous 
research (Furnham et al., 1999; Iannello & Antonietti, 2007), results of the 
present study suggest that as one ages, that is, gains in life experiences, one 
tends to rely less on intuitive and avoidant styles than younger people do. 
Furthermore, adults usually engage in more detailed analysis of the situation, 
ask other people for advice before making decisions, and present the thinking 
features that are typical of an integrated style. These results are consistent with 
the common-sense notion that older people are more reflective and take more 
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factors into account, whereas young people tend to be impulsive when making 
decisions. 
In conclusion, the present study pointed out that different decision styles’ 
classifications, such as tendencies to maximize as described by the 
Maximization Scale and the five decision styles as identified by the GDMS, 
show several points of overlapping, even though the value of the statistically 
significant correlation coefficients found were not so high. Presumably, being 
characteristics that are not independent one another, the distinct style labels 
emphasise different aspects of a single cognitive profile.  
Moreover, decision styles classifications present some features that are typical 
of certain thinking and learning style proving that, as highlighted by Thunholm 
(2004), decision-making style could not be regarded as a separate tendency to 
respond in a specific way in a certain decision-making context. On the contrary, 
decision-making styles involve other general cognitive mechanisms such as 
information processing, intentions maintaining, self-evaluation, and self-
regulation which lead to a wider and holistic definition of decision-making style 
that takes the whole person into account. Individual differences among decision 
makers also involve differences in basic cognitive abilities. The pattern of 
relationships that emerged in the study can help to identify decision-makers’ 
profiles rather than single and isolated features. In particular it is worth noting 
that, whereas stylistic aspects of decision-making that make reference mostly to 
attitudes (such as avoidance, dependence, standard setting) are independent on 
cognitive styles, aspects that concern more precisely the strategies applied in 
making decisions (for instance, considering the existing options versus searching 
new opportunities, considering thoroughly the possible choices versus choosing 
rapidly on the basis of impressions and feelings) are linked to more general 
thinking tendencies. Conclusively, decision styles can be considered as having 
both a common ground in general cognitive styles and autonomous features 
related to the specific field of decision-making. 
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2.2 STUDY 2 
A second study was carried out employing an higher size experimental sample 
and, in addition to the instrument used in Study 1, other inventories aimed at 
better defining the cognitive and decision profiles which emerged in Study 1. 
Moreover, it has to be specified that during the interval between the Study 1 and 
2, the validation of the Italian version of GDMS has been devised (Gambetti et 
al., 2008). Given the minor problems emerged in Study 1 with GDMS, a 
comparison between our and the other versions was possible. As a consequence, 
some adjustments has been made to our original version.  
 
2.2.1 Aims 
The specific aims of the second study were as follows. 
This second study had a confirmatory purpose since it was aimed at replicating 
the results obtained in the first study. It was intended as a confirmation of the 
internal structure of each instrument. Specifically, after making some changes in 
the Italian versions of one of the inventories (GDMS) and employing a broader 
experimental sample, the study was aimed at producing further evidence in 
support of the findings emerging in the first study and improving these results so 
that they could represent a confirmation of the findings reported in literature. 
We expected to find the same internal structure for each instrument as the 
original one reported in literature.  
The second aim of this study was to verify the existence of more comprehensive 
cognitive and decision profiles by adding to the inventories used in Study 1 a 
specific measure of intuitive and analytical individual style (Preference for 
Intuition and Deliberation Scale: Betsch, 2004) and a measure of cognitive 
ability (Cognitive Reflection Test, Frederick, 2005) and testing whether these 
measures correlate with the previous ones. We hypothesized that the PID- 
Intuitive Scale (PID-I) was positively associated with the intuitive and 
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spontaneous style (GDMS), the right style (SOLAT), and negatively with the 
summed maximization scale; as for the PID -Deliberative Scale (PID-D) we 
hypothesized that it was positively associated with the rational and dependent 
style (GDMS), the left style (SOLAT), and the summed maximization scale. As 
far as concerns the Cognitive Reflection Test we didn’t expect any correlation 
with the measures of individual styles. In fact, our conception of cognitive style 
did not include any ability dimension, since it was conceived as a preference, a 
habit, a tendency, and not as a measure of cognitive ability.  
The third aim was to further substantiate the evidence that cognitive and 
decision profiles vary depending on the occupational status of the participants as 
emerged in Study 1. In order to replicate the results obtained in Study 1, a 
comparison between subsamples of students and workers was made.  
The last aim was to identify subjects obtaining extreme scores on the 
questionnaires employed  in the study (in particular, on the inventories 
specifically intended to measure the individual intuitive and analytical styles, 
such as GDMS, SOLAT and PID). “Extreme” subjects were those whose scores 
were included in the first or fourth quartile or over specific thresholds. These 
subjects with “extreme cognitive profiles” constituted the sample of the Study 5 
(cfr. 3.3).  
 
2.2.2 Method 
2.2.2.1 Materials  
Maximization Scale 
The description of the instrument is reported in § 2.2.1 
Maximization Scale was employed without any adjustment had been made.  
GDMS (General Decision Making Style)  
The description of the instrument is reported in § 2.2.1  
As already explained, after the Italian version of GDMS has been first 
published in November 2007 (Gambetti et al., 2008), some changes were 
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made in our previous version. In particular, some items which were either 
problematic in our previous version or differently phrased in the published 
version (items 14, 17, and 24) were slightly modified accordingly. Starting 
from the results obtained in Study 1, those items which turned out to give 
different results if compared to the original English version (Scott & Bruce, 
1995) were changed. Then, these changes were compared to the Italian 
version published in the meanwhile (Gambetti et al., 2008), which provided 
support to our modifications. The revised version employed in Study 2 is 
reported in Appendix I.  
SOLAT (Style of Learning and Thinking) 
The description of the instrument is reported in § 2.2.1 
PID (Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale) 
PID (Betsch, 2004) is a scale developed to assess preferences in making 
decisions intuitively or deliberatively. The measurement consists of 18 
questions: nine items assessing the habitual preference for deliberation (PID-
D) and nine items assessing preference for intuition (PID-I). Subjects answer 
the questions on a 5-point Likert scale.  
CRT (Cognitive Reflection Task) 
CRT (Frederick, 2005) consists of three problems for which the intuitive 
default response is incorrect but that respondents can correctly answer 
through deliberate reconsideration. For each item subjects are requested to 
give an answer, if the answer is correct it suggests that the respondent 
engaged systematic processing to correct the intuitive response.  








GENERAL DECISION MAKING STYLE INVENTORY (Scott & Bruce, 1995) 
Subscales (number 
of items, reliability) 
Rational scale: 5 items, α =.70 (Italian version, Gambetti et al., 2008); ranging 
from .77 to .85 across different subsamples (original version, Scott & Bruce, 
1995) 
Intuitive scale:5 items, α =.76 (Gambetti et al.,2008);from.78 to.83 (Scott & 
Bruce, 1995)  
Dependent scale: 5 items, α =.84 (Gambetti et al., 2008); from .68 to .86 (Scott 
& Bruce, 1995) 
Avoidant scale: α =.80 (Gambetti et al., 2008); from .93 to .94 (Scott & Bruce, 
1995) 





Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fishhoff ( 2007)  
More positive decision outcomes in life, higher normative decision making 
competence, positively valuing physical activity, aesthetics, risk.  
GDMS-Spontaneous: 
Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fishhoff ( 2007)  
More negative decision outcomes in life, lower normative decision making 
competence, positively valuing independence, physical activity, creativity, 
life style, physical prowess, risk.  
GDMS-Rational: 
Bruine de Bruin, Parker & Fishhoff ( 2007)  
More positive decision outcomes in life, higher normative decision making 
competence, negatively valuing physical activity, risk, variety.  
Definition of 
stylistic dimensions  
Intuition is characterized by attention to details in the flow of information 
rather than systematic search for information and a tendency to rely on 
premonitions and feelings 
Rationality is characterized by a comprehensive search for information, 
inventory of alternatives and logical evaluation of alternatives 
MAXIMIZATION SCALE (Schwartz et al. 2002) 
Subscales (number 
of items, reliability) 





Schwartz et al. (2002) 
Less happiness, less optimism, less self-esteem, less life satisfaction, more 
depression, more perfectionism, more regret, less constructive decision-
making, more upward social comparisons 
Iyengar, Wells & Schwartz et al. (2006) 
More reliance on external information sources 
Satisficing tendencies: 
Schwartz et al. (2002) 
More happiness, more optimism, more self-esteem, more life satisfaction, 
less depression, less perfectionism, less regret, more constructive decision-
making, less upward social comparisons 
Iyengar, Wells & Schwartz et al. (2006) 
Less reliance on external information sources 
Definition of 
stylistic dimensions  
Maximizers seek only the best option and do not settle for good enough 
options. Satisficers tend to satisfice.  
STYLE OF LEARNING AND THINKING (Torrance et al., 1978;1987) 
Subscales (number 










Zenhausern & Gebhardt (1979):  
Preference for the visual channel 
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Torrance (1982):  
More creative than left-thinkers 
Fabbri et al. (2007):  
Circadian typology: evening-type 
Left-style: 
Zenhausern & Gebhardt (1979):  
Preference for the auditory channel 
Torrance (1982):  
Less creative than right-thinkers 
Fabbri et al. (2007):  
Circadian typology: morning-type 
Definition of 
stylistic dimensions  
Right style corresponds to the right hemispheric functioning whose tactics are 
characterized as open-ended, spatial, ideas, relationship, summary, intuitive. 
Left style corresponds to the left hemispheric functioning whose strategies are 
characterized as structured, verbal, facts, sequences, outline and logical. 
Integrated style implies the relative dominance of none. (Torrance, 1982) 
PREFERENCE FOR INTUITION AND DELIBERATION SCALE (Betsch, 2004) 
Subscales (number 
of items, reliability) 
Preference for Intuition, PID-Intuition (9 items, α = .77) 





Betsch (2004):  
Faith in intuition, Fast decision making, Need for closure (-), Personal need 
for structure (-), PID-Deliberation (-), Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Openness for new experiences, Perfectionism (-) 
Schunk & Betsch (2006):  
Less linear utility function in lottery choice for intuitive participants 
Witteman et al. (2007): 
Openness (Big Five) 
REI Experientiality  
Richetin et al. (2007): 
Intuitive people’s choice was better predicted by implicit measures than 
explicit measure 
PID-Deliberation: 
Betsch (2004):  
Need for cognition, Personal Need for structure, Maximizing, Regret, Faith 
in intuition (-), Fast decision making (-), Emotional stability, 
Conscientiousness, Perfectionism  
Schunk & Betsch (2006):  
Linear utility function in lottery choices for deliberative people 
Witteman et al. (2007): 
Consciousness (Big Five) 
REI Rationality  
Richetin et al. (2007): 




as given by the 
authors 
Intuition is defined as a basic decision mode that uses direct affective reactions 
towards the decision option as the decision criterion (affect-based decision 
making).  
Deliberation follows cognitions (beliefs, evaluations, reasons; cognition-based 
decision making).  
COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST (Frederick, 2005) 
Subscales (number 
of items, reliability) 





Low CRT scoring 
Frederick (2005 ): 
Lower score on the Need for Cognition Scale, large susceptibility to 
framing effect, great preference for small and immediate rewards over  large 
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delayed rewards, women 
High CRT scoring 
Frederick (2005 ): 
Higher score on the Need for Cognition Scale, scarce susceptibility to 
framing effect, low preference for small and immediate rewards over  large 
delayed rewards, men 
Definition of 
stylistic dimensions  
Measure of a cognitive ability, that is cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005) 
Fig. 2.1– Overview of the scales employed in the study 
 
2.2.2.2 Participants 
Two hundred and eighty-nine people (52 men and 237 women), aged from 18 to 
61 (mean = 22.7 yrs), were involved in the study. According to occupation, the 
total sample consisted of two different subsamples. The first subsample was 
composed of 238 undergraduates (40 men and 198 women); the mean age for 
this group was 21 yrs (SD = 5.37). The second subsample consisted of 51 
workers (12 men and 39 women); the mean age for this group was 30.5 yrs (SD 
= 9.9).  
All participants were volunteers. As for the undergraduates, they were recruited 
during university classes at the Catholic University of Milan and Brescia. One 
hundred and thirty-six undergraduates attended psychological courses, 61 
attended literature and foreign language courses, and 41 attended pedagogical 
education courses. As for the workers, they were contacted during training 
courses they attended.  
As in Study 1, the selection of two different subsamples was decided upon to 
ensure that the individual differences in terms of styles could be studied in 
people with different characteristics concerning age and occupation so allowing 
us to make comparisons between them. As for gender, the sample was not well-
balanced because differences in individual cognitive and decision style were not 
hypothesized. In fact, empirical findings regarding gender differences in 
cognitive styles are inconclusive only in appearance. Even though some results 
support the common belief that women are more intuitive than men (Parikh, 
1994), and others studies found the opposite results that women are more 
deliberative than men (Allison & Hayes, 1996), others concluded that any 
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differences between women and men did exist (Taggart et al., 1997). These 
inconsistencies have been explained by referring to different constructs which 
are measured in the studies, thus concluding that the use of intuition and 
deliberation is not affected by gender per se, but these incoherent findings 
should be considered as the consequence of the way of defining and measuring 
intuition and deliberation instead (Graham & Ickes, 1997).  
2.2.2.3 Procedure 
Data were collected in November 2007. As for the sample of students, the 
administration of the questionnaires took place in their school during lesson 
time; as for the workers, it took pace during the training courses they attended. 
Participants were asked to fill in the five questionnaires presented in a 
counterbalanced order in a single session. They were told that there were no 
right or wrong answers. No time limits were established. Participants took 40 
minutes to fill in the  questionnaires. In order to make it possible the subsequent 
identification of those people who showed an “extreme” intuitive or analytical 
cognitive and decision style, participants were asked to write down their email 
address and/or their mobile number.  
 
2.2.3 Results 
Analyses of the data proceeded as follows. For each instrument we first assessed 
the internal consistency reliability and the intra-correlations among subscales. 
Then, we verified the internal structure of the instruments so to corroborate the 
original structures as reported in literature (as already explained, for SOLAT this 
step was skipped since the properties of the Italian translation of the instrument, 
showing that it matches the original one, had already been assessed: Antonietti 
et al., 2005; this step was skipped also for CRT given that it is not intended as a 
questionnaire with a factorial structure, but it is a series of problems instead;). In 
order to overcome the weaknesses of exploratory factor analysis to distinguish 
between competing factor structures (Fosterlee & Ho, 1999), confirmatory 
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factor analyses were computed to compare alternatives models. Next, we 
investigated the relationships among the questionnaires. Then, we verified the 
existence of differences between the two subsamples on the instruments. Finally, 
a cluster analysis was  computed in order to identify participants with an 
analytical or an intuitive cognitive and decision profile.  
2.2.3.1 Descriptive, reliability and correlational statistics  
General Decision Making Style Inventory 
The univariant normal distribution of the data was assessed. The skewness 
values ranged from -.72  to .72 and the kurtosis values ranged from -.98 to .16.  
The descriptive statistics for GDMS are reported in Table 2.12, together with the 
internal-consistency reliabilities, which ranged from .72 to .84 across the five 
scales. The correlations among subscales revealed that the rational scale was 
negatively correlated with intuitive, avoidant, and spontaneous scales and it was 
positively correlated with the dependent scale. The intuitive scale was positively 
associated with avoidant and spontaneous scales. The dependent scale was 
positively related to the avoidant scale and negatively with the spontaneous 
scale. Finally, the avoidant scale was positive associated with the spontaneous 
scale.   













1 2 3 4 
1. Rational 3.75 .78 .72 .29 .45 - - - - 
2. Intuitive 3.24 .90 .77 .40 .54 -.27** - - - 
3. Dependent 3.43 1.02 .84 .52 .65 .16** .02 - - 
4. Avoidant 2.51 1.3 .83 .56 .63 -.17** .23** .26** - 
5. Spontaneous 2.40 1.02 .79 .47 .59 -.44** .51** -.17** .12* 
Tab. 2.12 – GDMS: descriptive, reliability statistics and inter-correlations among subscales 
 
Maximization Scale 
The descriptive statistics and the internal-consistency reliabilities for 
Maximization Scale are reported in Table 2.13. The correlations among 
subscales showed that the summed scale was positively correlated with the 
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“search for options” and “difficulty in choice” components. The “search for 
options” component was positively associated with the “difficulty in choice” 
one. The “high standards” component didn’t correlate with any of the other 
components. 
The univariant normal distribution of the data was assessed. The skewness 
values ranged from -.58 to .61 and the kurtosis values ranged from -1.03 to -.27.  













1 2 3 
1. Summed 
scale 
3.85 1.72 .70 .15 .32 - - - 
2. Search for 
options 
3.42 1.79 .64 .31 .43 .81** - - 
3. Difficulty in 
choice 
3.91 1.79 .63 .22 .36 .20** .23** - 
4. High 
standards 
4.29 1.47 .50 .15 .20 .09 .03 -.09 
Tab. 2.13 – Maximization Scale: descriptive, reliability statistics and inter-correlations among components 
 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale 
The assumption of univariant normal distribution of the data was tested. The 
skewness values ranged from -.97  to .44 and the kurtosis values ranged from -
.95 to .58.  
The descriptive statistics for PID are reported in Table 2.14, together with the 
internal-consistency reliabilities, which were .73 and .78 for the PID-I and PID-
D, respectively. The correlation between the intuitive and deliberative scales did 

















1. Deliberative 3.77 .93 .78 .29 .46 - 
2. Intuitive 3.53 .92 .73 .23 .40 -.10 
Tab. 2.14 – PID: descriptive, reliability statistics and inter-correlations among subscales 
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Style of Learning and Thinking Questionnaire 
The descriptive statistics for SOLAT are reported in Table 2.15. The correlations 
among subscales revealed that the left scale was negatively associated with both 
the right and the integrated scales. The right scale was negatively related to the 
integrated scale.  
The univariant normal distribution of the data was assessed. The skewness 
values ranged from -.08  to 1.03 and the kurtosis values ranged from -.79 to 
1.01.  






1. Left style 9.01 4.26 - - 
2. Right style 12.55 5.08 -.42** - 
3. Integrated style 6.33 4.95 -.39** -.62** 
Tab. 2.15 – SOLAT: descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among subscales 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test  
Prior to the statistical analysis, CRT responses were recoded as follows. It were 
counted: the correct answers to the three problems, the incorrect – intuitive 
answers (that is, the intuitive default response), and the incorrect – nonintuitive 
(that is, any incorrect response which is not the intuitive default one). Then, 
these three response categories were combined depending on the mode of 
thinking – reflective or intuitive – which was required. As a consequence, two 
synthetic indexes were computed: the reflective responses (the mean score 
obtained by summing correct and incorrect answers) and the intuitive responses 
(the mean score of intuitive default answers).   The descriptive statistics for CRT 
are reported in Table 2.16, together with the correlational statistics. The latter 
revealed that the two indexes were negatively correlated.  






1. Intuitive responses 1.43 1.13 - 
2. Reflective responses .60 .55 -.71** 




2.2.3.2 Confirmatory factor analysis  
General Decision Making Style Inventory 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy was 0.815, indicating that the data were 
appropriate for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ² = 
2864.622, p < .001), indicating that correlations existed among some items.  
Employing maximum likelihood estimation method (AMOS: Arbuckle, 1997), 
confirmatory factor analyses were computed on the 5-factor model originally 
hypothesized by Scott and Bruce (1995). Two alternative models were tested, 
the correlated and the uncorrelated 5-factors models. Even though from a 
theoretical point of view decision-making scales are correlated (Scott & Bruce, 
1995), and previous CFA showed a better fit to the data with a correlated than an 
uncorrelated model (Loo, 2000), other alternative perspectives highlighted the 
importance of considering the decision style, and specifically, the intuitive and 
the rational style, as independent (Isenberg, 1984; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Sauter, 1999). In fact, the pattern of correlation among subscales seems to vary 
quite a lot across different studies, thus inducing to conclude that findings are 
not univocal. Moreover, the uncorrelated model of GDMS has not been tested 
for the Italian version of the inventory yet.  
The goodness of the fit of the models was assessed using different indexes: 
X²/df, RMSEA, GFI, and CFI. The ratio of X²/df should be less than 3 (Bollen, 
1989), or less than 2.0 in a more restrictive sense (Premkumar & King, 1994); 
the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) was first proposed by 
Steiger (1990), who argued that values below .1 were good, while others have 
been more stringent in suggesting that a value of about .08 or less for the 
RMSEA would indicate a reasonable error of approximation (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993); the values of GFI (goodness of fit: Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996) 
and CFI (comparative fit index: Bentler, 1990) can range between 0 and 1 with 
higher values indicating a better fit. Moreover, the degree of parsimony of the 
models was calculated using the AIC index, with comparatively low values 
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indicating a better fit and parsimony of the model (Raykov & Marcoulides, 
2000).The fit indexes of both model are reported in Table 2.17.  
Models x² df X²/df RMSEA GFI CFI AIC 
5-factors 
unrelated 
910.538 275 3.311 .083 .754 .760 1060.538 
5-factors 
correlated 
633.046 263 2.410 .070 .853 .861 757.904 
Tab. 2.17 – GDMS: Confirmatory factor analyses, ML method, good fit indexes  
 
Results supported the original structure of the inventory (Scott & Bruce, 1995), 
confirming the correlated 5-factors model as found (even though only through 
an exploratory factor analysis) by the authors. In fact, the correlated model had 
the best fit to the data. Moreover, it had the lowest AIC index. Finally, in order 
to test whether the difference between the two models was statistically 
significant, the difference between the models’ X² was calculated (Δχ²12  = 
277.492, p < .001) proving that the correlated model was significantly better 






















































































Factorability of items was confirmed by using the Bartlett test of sphericity and 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. Bartlett’s test 
was statistically significant (χ²=510.955, p<.001) whereas KMO measure was 
0.72. 
Employing maximum likelihood estimation method (AMOS, Arbuckle, 1997), 
confirmatory factor analyses were computed on the 3-components model 
originally hypothesized by Schwartz et al. (2002). However, both in the original 
work (Schwartz et al., 2002) and in subsequent research employing the 
Maximization Scale (Diab et al., 2008; Highhouse & Diab, 2006; Nenkov et al., 
2008) this factor structure did not obtain a clear confirmation. Specifically, the 
original Schwartz et al. (2002) results were less than ideal with the respect to 
factor structure (e.g. there were items loading onto more than one factor) and 
other recent research suggested different and inconsistent factor structures (it 
were hypothesized both a unidimensional structure and a 5-factor solution, but 
findings are inconclusive). Since a univocal and definite factor structure was not 
identified in literature, we tested different alternative models. As suggested by 
Highhouse and Diab (2006), from a theoretical point of view the maximizer 
construct, defined as a general behavioural tendency (Simon, 1955; Schwartz et 
al., 2002), should be unidimensional.  For this reason we first tested the 
monofactorial model. Then, we evaluated the 3-factors model as suggested by 
the original Schwartz et al.’s (2002) results. Finally, the 4-factors model was 
tested as emerged from the results we obtained in the exploratory analysis in 
Study 1. The fit indexes of both model are reported in Table 2.18.  
Models X² df x²/df RMSEA GFI CFI ACI 
Monofactorial 181.264 64 2.832 .080 .722 .739 235.264 
3-factors 185.593 66 2.812 .080 .720 .733 261.593 
4 –factors 117.982 63 1.873 .055 .940 .877 173.982 
Tab. 2.18 – Maximization Scale: Confirmatory factor analyses, ML method, good fit indexes  
 
Results supported the 4-factors structure of the scale, confirming the results we 
obtained trough the exploratory factor analysis in Study 1. In fact, the 4-factors 
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model had the best fit to the data as compared to the other two models. 
Moreover, it had the lowest AIC index. Finally, in order to test whether the 
difference among the models was statistically significant, the difference between 
the 3-factors model and the monofactorial model’s X² was calculated (Δχ²2 = 
4.329, n.s.), thus proving that none of them is better than the other. Then, the 
difference between the monofactorial model and the 4-factors model’s X² was 
computed  (Δχ²1 = 63.282, p<.001), suggesting that the 4-factors model was 
significantly better than the other two.  





















Fig. 2.3 – Maximization Scale: the 4-factors model 
 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale 
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy were performed to determine whether he data could be 
factor analysed. Bartlett’s test was statistically significant (χ²=1205.942, 
p<.001). KMO measure was 0.79. 
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Confirmatory factor analyses using maximum likelihood estimation method 
(AMOS: Arbuckle, 1997) were performed on the 2-factors correlated model 
found in the original version of the instrument (Betsch, 2004) and, since no 
correlation between the factors was found in previous research (Richetin et al., 
2007), on the 2-factors uncorrelated model. The fit indexes of both model are 
reported in Table 2.19. 
Models X² Df x²/df RMSEA GFI CFI ACI 
2-factors uncorrelated 274.729 134 2.113 .063 .907 .857 356.729 
2-factors correlated 266.706 133 2.067 .061 .908 .864 350.706 
Tab. 2.19 – PID: Confirmatory factor analyses, ML method, good fit indexes  
 
Results supported the original (Betsch, 2004) correlated model. The correlated 
model had the best fit to the data as compared to the other one. Moreover, it had 
a slightly lower AIC index than the uncorrelated model. Finally, in order to test 
whether the difference between the models was statistically significant, the 
difference between model’s X² was calculated (Δχ²1 = 8.023, p<.001), thus 
proving that the correlated model was significantly better than the other one. 
The correlated model is reported in Figure 2.4. 














Fig. 2.4 – PID: the correlated model 
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2.2.3.3 Cognitive and decision profiles: How inventories are related  
In order to verify how all instruments were related, bivariate correlations among 
the scales employed in Study 2 were calculated. Results are reported in Table 
2.20. 
Tab. 2.20 – Correlations among instruments     **  p <  .01   *  p <  .05 
Scales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. GDMS –   
Rational 
- - - - - .12* -.29** -.03 .46** .28** .71** -.15** .27** -.35** .12* .11 -.11 
2. GDMS –       
Intuitive 
- - - - - .02 .47** .15** -.05 .12* -23** .70** -.28** .36** -.12* -.09 .15*
3. GDMS – 
Dependent 
- - - - - .17** .42** .11 .49** .13* .23** .01 -.02 -.02 .01 -.02 .05 
4. GDMS – 
Avoidant 
- - - - - .32** .63** .29** .25** -.07 -23** .08 -.06 .11 -.07 .04 .05 
5. GDMS – 
Spontaneous 
- - - - - .07 .44** .17** -.25** -.11 -.41** .44** -.26** .42** -.18** -.12* .13*
6. MAX –   
Summed scale 
     - - - - - .15** .05 .13* .04 -.16** -.04 .05 
7. MAX –  
Difficulty in choice 
     - - - - - -.29** .32** -.24** .29** -.09 -.11 .14*
8. MAX –     
Search for option 
     - - - - - -.01 .11 .06 .14* -.20** -.09 .06 
9. MAX –        
High standard 
     - - - - - .42** -.09 .06 -.18** .11 .11 .01 
10. MAX –  
Second choice 
     - - - - - .26** .15** .03 -.07 .05 -.01 -.02 
11. PID – 
Deliberative 
          - - .29** -.36** .10 .10 -.04 
12. PID –     
Intuitive 
          - - -.29** .37** -.11 -.11 .12*
13. SOLAT –    
Left style 
            - - - .01 -.02 
14. SOLAT –   
Right style 
            - - - -.04 .07 
15. SOLAT – 
Integrated style 
            - - - .06 -.03 
16. CRT – 
Reflective 
responses 
               - - 
17. CRT –  
Intuitive responses 
               - - 
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Correlational analyses revealed that the instruments showed several significant 
relationships.  
As for the relations between GDMS and Maximization Scale, results was as 
follows. The rational scale was positively associated with the summed 
maximization scale, the high standard, and the second choice components, and 
negatively with the difficulty in choice component. The intuitive scale was 
positively related to the difficulty in choice, the search for option, and the 
second choice components. The dependent scale was positively associated with 
almost all the maximization components, with the exception of the search for 
option one. Also the avoidant scale was positively related to all maximization 
components, except for the second choice one. Finally, the spontaneous scale 
showed a positive correlation with both the difficulty in choice and the search 
for option components, and a negative correlation with the high standard 
component.  
As for the relationships between GDMS and PID, it turned out that the rational 
scale was positively correlated with the deliberative scale and negatively with 
the intuitive scale. Conversely, both the intuitive (GDMS) and the spontaneous 
scales was positively associated with the intuitive scale (PID) and negatively 
with the deliberative scale. Lastly, the avoidant scale showed a negative 
correlation with the deliberative scale.  
Only some of the GDMS scales showed a relationship with SOLAT. Specifically, 
the rational scale was positively associated with the left and the integrated 
scales, and negatively with the right scale. Conversely, both the intuitive and the 
intuitive scales were positively related to the right scale, and negatively to the 
left and the integrated scales. 
As for the relationship between GDMS and CRT, it turned out that the intuitive 
and spontaneous scale showed a low positive correlation with the intuitive-
default responses on CRT, and the spontaneous scale showed also a negative 
correlation with the reflective responses.  
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Results pointed out that the Maximization Scale showed significant relationships 
with PID. In particular, the summed scale was positively associated with the 
deliberative scale. The difficulty in choice component showed a positive 
correlation with the deliberative scale, and a negative correlation with the 
intuitive scale. The opposite emerged for the second choice component, which 
was negatively associated with the intuitive scale, and positively with the 
deliberative scale. The high standard component was positively associated with 
the deliberative scale.  
As for the relationships between the Maximization Scale and SOLAT, it emerged 
that the summed scale was positively associated with the left scale, and 
negatively with the integrated scale. The difficulty in choice component showed 
a positive correlation with the right scale, and a negative correlation with the left 
scale. The search for option component was positively related to the right scale, 
and negatively with the integrated scale. The high standard component was 
negatively correlated with the right scale.  
Only the difficulty in choice component showed a negative correlation with the 
intuitive-default responses on CRT.  
As for the relationships between PID and SOLAT, it turned out that the 
deliberative scale was positively associated with the left scale, and negatively 
with the right scale. Conversely, the intuitive scale was positively related to the 
right scale, and negatively to the left scale.  
With the exception of intuitive scale and intuitive-default responses, significant 
correlations were found neither between PID and CRT , nor between SOLAT and 
CRT.  
The pattern of correlations which emerged from the analysis can be schematize 
as reported in Figure 5.  
The two pattern of correlation roughly correspond to the analytical and intuitive 
styles, even though these dimensions are richer than the single features 
identified by the usual intuitive-analytical inventories, thus providing  broader 
and more detailed profiles. Analytical people show a rational, deliberative, and 
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dependent decision making style. They usually strive for the best option and 
settle high standard for themselves. From the cognitive functioning point of 
view they show a logic and systematic style, but also an integrated thinking 
style. On the contrary, intuitive people show a global, holistic, immediate and 
spontaneous approach to decision making, and also to cognitive processing, in 
general. Furthermore, they tend to adopt a maximizing strategy in choosing 
among alternatives.  
  
 
Fig. 2.5 – Pattern of correlations among instruments 
 
2.2.3.4 Differences between subsamples 
In order to investigate the existence of differences in terms of decision-making 
styles, maximization tendencies, thinking styles and cognitive abilities 
depending on the participants’ occupational status (students and workers), mean 
scores obtained on each instrument by the two different subsamples were 
compared. Furthermore, as in Study 1, since the mean age of the two occupation 
subsamples are substantially different (21 years for the student group and 30.5 
for the worker one) the effect of age was controlled in order to exclude that any 
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General Decision Making Style 
The assumption of homogeneous variances was tested by using Levene’s test 
(Levene, 1960). For each subscale p-values were not statistically significant 
(values ranged from p=.132 to p=.825), thus indicating that the analysis of 
variance was possible.   
In order to compare scores obtained on GDMS by students and workers, a one-
way ANOVA was computed. Results are reported in Table 2.21. 
Subscales Occupation Mean SD F(1,288), P η2 
Students 3.69 0.61 
1. Rational 
Workers 3.74 0.63 
0.344 .558 .015 
Students 3.28 0.67 
2. Intuitive 
Workers 3.07 0.68 
4.193 <.05 .011 
Students 3.43 0.83 
3. Dependent 
Workers 3.44 0.68 
0.003 .954 .003 
Students 2.66 0.82 
4. Avoidant 
Workers 2.21 0.83 
12.110 <.001 .041 
Students 2.43 0.64 
5. Spontaneous 
Workers 2.21 0.56 
3.079 .080 .001 
Tab. 2.21 – GDMS: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences were found on the avoidant and the intuitive 
subscales in which students obtained significantly higher scores than workers. 
Nevertheless, even though differences on the other style subscales did not reach 
the statistical significance, students reported higher scores than workers also on 
the spontaneous subscale.  
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was computed in order to compare scores 
obtained on each subscale by the different age groups. The same procedure as in 
Study 1 was employed. Five different age groups were identified (18-19; 20-29; 
30-39; 40-49; 50-60).  






Subscales Age Mean SD F4,284) P η2 
18-19 3.67 0.61 
20-29 3.65 0.63 
30-39 3.85 0.59 
40-49 3.88 0.75 
1. Rational 
 
50-59 3.65 0.47 
1.082 .366 .015 
18-19 3.25 0.66 
20-29 3.27 0.68 
30-39 3.12 0.67 
40-49 3.28 0.88 
 
2. Intuitive 
50-59 3.21 0.67 
0.326 .861 .005 
18-19 3.46 0.83 
20-29 3.43 0.82 
30-39 3.43 0.74 
40-49 3.36 0.84 
3. Dependent 
50-59 3.17 0.71 
0.287 .887 .004 
18-19 2.68 0.80 
20-29 2.65 0.80 
30-39 2.23 0.94 




50-59 2.42 0.71 
3.168 <.05 .043 
18-19 2.43 0.81 
20-29 2.44 0.79 
30-39 2.10 0.73 
40-49 2.43 0.94 
5. Spontaneous 
50-59 2.31 0.59 
1.434 .223 .020 
Tab. 2.22 – GDMS: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples  
 
Statistical mean differences were found on the avoidant subscale. Specifically, 
post-hoc tests (LSD and Newman-Kreuls tests) showed that 18-19 and 20-29 
years people obtained significantly higher scores as compared to the older 
groups.  
Maximization Scale  
Prior to the application of the analysis of variance, Levene's test  was used to 
verify the assumption that variances were equal across samples. For each 
component the resulting p-value of Levene’s test was not statistically significant 
(p-values ranged from p=.103 to p=.975) 
As in Study 1 people’s scores on the maximization components were assessed in 
addition to their summed maximization score.  
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the factorial scores of the 
Maximization Scale obtained by the two different subsamples. Results are 
reported in Table 2.23 .  
Components Occupation Mean  SD F(1,288), p η2 
Students 3.94 .79 
1. Summed scale 
Workers 3.32 .67 
26.221 <.001 .095 
Students 3.90 1.10 
 2. Search for options 
Workers 3.04 1.13 
23.860 <.001 .034 
Students 3.89 .75                                       
3. Difficulty in choice Workers 3.52 .73 
9.982 <.005 .078 
Students 4.86 .95                                        
4. High standard Workers 4.90 .80 
0.063 .802 .001 
Students 3.99 .81                                         
5. Second best Workers 4.08 .75 
0.503 .479 .002 
Tab. 2.23 - Maximization Scale: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences emerged on both the summed scale and the two 
subscales representing behavioural examples of maximizing tendencies: the one 
which refers to the difficulty in choosing among different alternatives and the 
one which includes being open to different options and actively searching for 
them. In particular, students obtained significantly higher scores than workers in 
all these scales.  
On the contrary, statistical differences between scores obtained by students and 
workers did not emerged on the third and fourth components, which concern 
having high standards and never settling for the second best, respectively. 
In order to verify the effect of age on the maximization scores, a one-way 
ANOVA was computed on the scores obtained by the different age groups on 
the maximization subscales. Results are reported in Table 2.24. Statistical mean 
differences were found on the summed scale and the difficulty in choosing 
among alternatives subscale. In particular, LSD and Newman-Kreuls post-hoc 
tests highlighted that 30-39 and 40-49 years groups obtained significant lower 




Components Age Mean SD F(4,284), p η2 
18-19 4.03 0.84 
20-29 3.89 0.70 
30-39 3.33 0.79 
40-49 3.45 0.62 
1. Summed scale 
                            
50-59 3.26 0.78 
7.737 <.001 .092 
18-19 3.96 1.18 
20-29 3.87 0.97 
30-39 3.13 1.08 
40-49 3.06 1.37 
              
 2. Search for options 
50-59 2.94 0.97 
6.852 <.001 .081 
18-19 3.89 0.75 
20-29 3.87 0.74 
30-39 3.56 0.82 
40-49 3.64 0.74 
 
                                             
3. Difficulty in choice 
50-59 3.87 0.88 
1.653 .161 .023 
18-19 4.93 0.97 
20-29 4.80 0.88 
30-39 4.88 0.90 
40-49 4.93 1.01 
 
                                             
4. High standard 
                               
50-59 4.50 0.65 
0.642 .633 .009 
18-19 3.95 0.75 
20-29 3.97 0.85 
30-39 4.05 0.79 
40-49 4.31 0.70 
5. Second best 
50-59 4.37 0.91 
1.204 .309 .017 
Tab. 2.24 – Maximization Scale: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
 
Style of Learning and Thinking 
Levene’s test confirmed that the data met the criteria for the analysis of 
variances (p-values ranged from p=.060 to p=.900). 
Three one-way ANOVA were carried out to compare scores in the subscales of 
SOLAT obtained by the students and workers. Results are shown in Table 2.25. 
Subscales Subsamples Mean SD F(1,288), P η2 
Students 9.14 4.14 
1. Left  
Workers 8.38 4.81 
1.264 .262 .004 
Students 12.57 5.09 
2. Right  
Workers 12.48 5.06 
0.010 .920 .001 
Students 6.17 4.80 
3. Integrated  
Workers 7.12 5.61 
1.499 .100 .005 
Tab. 2.25 - SOLAT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
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Even though the differences between groups did not reach the significance level, 
the same trend as in Study 1 emerged. In fact, on the integrated scale workers 
obtained higher scores than students.  
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was computed in order to compare scores 
obtained on each subscale by the different age groups. Results are reported in 
Table 2.26.  
Subscales Age Mean SD F4,284) P η2 
18-19 9.09 3.98 
20-29 9.17 4.33 
30-39 8.68 4.75 
40-49 8.31 5.00 
1. Left 
 
50-59 8.50 4.53 
0.232 .920 .003 
18-19 12.14 4.54 
20-29 13.38 5.66 
30-39 11.77 4.86 
40-49 11.62 4.74 
2. Right  





18-19 6.54 4.48 
20-29 5.43 4.93 
30-39 7.54 5.75 
40-49 8.06 5.02 
3. Integrated  





Tab. 2.26 – SOLAT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
 
Even if it was not significant, the trend on the integrated scale among age groups 
was the same as in Study 1. The groups of 18-19 and 20-29 years scored lower 
than the older groups, with the exception of the  50-59 group which obtained 
scores that were similar to the ones obtained by the younger groups.  
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale 
To assess the equality of variance in different samples Levene’s test was used. 
The results confirmed that the samples met the criteria for the analysis (p-values 
ranged from p=.206 to p=.360).  
A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the scores obtained by the two 
different subsamples on the two scales.  




Subscales Subsamples Mean SD F(1,288), p η2 
Students 3.76 0.58 
1. Deliberative 
Workers 3.83 0.49 
0.663 .416 .003 
Students 3.55 0.52 
2. Intuitive 
Workers 3.41 0.50 
3.107 .079 .011 
Tab. 2.27 – PID: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences were not found. However, even though the 
difference did not reach the significance level, on the intuitive scale students 
scored higher than workers.  
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was computed in order to compare scores 
obtained on each subscale by the different age groups. Results are reported in 
Table 2.28.   
Subscales Age Mean SD F4,284) P η2 
18-19 3.72 0.57 
20-29 3.77 0.59 
30-39 3.93 0.45 
40-49 3.88 0.61 
1. Deliberative 
 
50-59 3.56 0.41 
1.338 .256 .019 
18-19 3.55 0.50 
20-29 3.54 0.52 
30-39 3.47 0.52 
40-49 3.51 0.67 
 
2. Intuitive 







Tab. 2.28 – PID: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
 
In none of the scales differences among scores obtained by the different age 
groups turned out to be significant.  
Cognitive Reflection Test 
The equality of variances was assessed by using Levene’s test. For each 
subscale p-values were not statistically significant (p-values ranged from p=.090 
to p=.301). 
A one-way ANOVA was computed to compare the scores obtained by the two 
different subsamples on the two indexes. Results are reported in Table 2.29. 
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Subscales Subsamples Mean SD F(1,288), p η2 
Students 0.54 0.53 
1. Reflective 
Workers 0.88 0.58 
15.784 <.001 .053 
Students 1.52 1.11 
2. Intuitive 
Workers 1.02 1.11 
8.460 <.005 .029 
Tab. 2.29 – CRT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by occupation subsamples 
 
Statistical mean differences emerged on both the reflective and intuitive indexes. 
In particular, students scored lower than workers on the reflective index, and, on 
the contrary, obtained higher scores than workers on the intuitive index.  
Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA was computed in order to compare scores 
obtained on each index by the different age groups. Results are reported in Table 
2.30. 
Subscales Age Mean SD F4,284) p η2 
18-19 0.52 .50 
20-29 0.55 .57 
30-39 0.84 .58 
40-49 0.78 .63 
1. Reflective 
 
50-59 0.87 .23 
3.453 <.01 .047 
18-19 1.55 1.10 
20-29 1.47 1.16 
30-39 1.02 1.02 
40-49 1.31 1.30 
 
2. Intuitive 







Tab. 2.30 – CRT: One-way ANOVA comparing scores obtained by age subsamples 
 
Only on the reflective index statistical differences emerged. Specifically, 18-19 
and 20-29 years groups scored lower than the older groups. 
2.2.3.5 Cluster analysis: identification of intuitive and analytical 
participants 
In order to identify the participants who showed an “extreme” intuitive or 
analytical profile, a K-means cluster analysis was performed. The K-means 
clustering method allows to groups cases based on their proximity to a 
multidimensional centroid. The output is simply an assignment of items to a 
cluster. It requires the number of clusters to be specified in advance. Starting 
from the results obtained through the correlational analyses (cfr. 3.3.2) that 
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identified two different pattern of correlations, the number of clusters was fixed 
at two. The variables included in the cluster analysis were the ones which turned 
out to be openly part of one of the two pattern as emerged in the previous 
correlational analyses (cfr. 3.3.2). All the components of the Maximization Scale 
were excluded because of the unclear dimensionality of the instrument. From a 
theoretical point of view, the maximizing construct should be unidimensional, 
but, as emerged in both Study 1 and 2, its different components, which are 
supposed to be just simple examples or facets of the unidimensional construct, 
showed a trend that is anything but univocal. Moreover, it emerged that not all 
the components have the same influence in determining the global maximizer 
score. As a consequence, the whole maximizing construct does not seem to 
clearly be in an univocal way on the side of either the intuitive or the analytical 
style and for that reason it was excluded by the cluster analysis  which was 
aimed at identifying only people with an extreme intuitive and analytical profile. 
Even if for a different reason, also CRT was not included in this analysis. In that 
case it was excluded because the instrument was not consistently related with 
the other scales. Table 2.31 reports the final cluster centres which shows the 
mean abundance of each variable in each of the clusters. Basing on the variables 
in each cluster it was possible to give to each cluster a descriptive name, which, 
specifically, corresponded to “analytical style” as for cluster 1, and “intuitive 
style” as for cluster 2.  
Clusters  
 1 2 
1. GDMS Rational 20.18 16.67 
2.GDMS Intuitive 14.61 18.04 
3. GDMS Dependent 17.49 16.91 
4. GDMS Avoidant 11.84 14.19 
5. GDMS Spontaneous 8.03 11.26 
6. PID Deliberative 36.93 30.84 
7. PID Intuitive 29.86 33.93 
8. SOLAT Left 11.05 6.76 
9. SOLAT Right 9.55 15.82 
Tab. 2.31 – Final clusters centers  
 88
Table 2.32 reported the number of samples in each cluster. Almost about half 
participants turned out to belong to the analytical style cluster, and the other half 
to the intuitive one.  
1 – analytical style 143 Clusters 
2 – intuitive style 146 
 289 
Tab. 2.32 – Number of cases in each cluster 
 
In order to test whether the variables included in cluster analysis are suitable to 
maximize the differences among cases in the different clusters F tests for each 
variable are computed. Results, which are reported in Table 2.33, supported this 
hypothesis.  
Cluster Error  
 Mean Square Df Mean Square Df 
F p 
1. GDMS Rational 868,994 1 6,689 281 129,905 <.001 
2.GDMS Intuitive 830,092 1 8,812 281 94,203 <.001 
3. GDMS Dependent 256,925 1 16,526 281 15,448 <.001 
4. GDMS Avoidant 386,776 1 16,369 281 23,628 <.001 
5. GDMS Spontaneous 737,589 1 7,437 281 99,177 <.001 
6. PID Deliberative 2623,088 1 16,134 281 162,578 <.001 
7. PID Intuitive 1172,498 1 17,781 281 65,942 <.001 
8. SOLAT Left 1300,398 1 13,664 281 95,169 <.001 
9. SOLAT Right 2773,897 1 16,094 281 172,360 <.001 
Tab. 2.33 –F-tests for each variable 
  
Through cluster analysis each participant of the whole experimental sample was 
assigned to one of the two clusters, the analytical or intuitive style cluster. 
However, we were interested in identifying, within the total sample, the 
subsample of participants showing either an extreme intuitive or analytical 
profile.  
We considered the results obtained through cluster analysis the first step of this 
identification procedure. In fact, after the splitting up of the total sample into 
two groups, the analytical and the intuitive ones, two distinct procedures were 
activated.  
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Firstly, the difference between the intuitive and rational GDMS scales, the 
intuitive and deliberative PID scales, and the right and left SOLAT scales were 
calculated. By sticking to the reference literature (Betsch, 2004; Schunk & 
Betsch, 2006), only those participants who obtained an absolute difference value 
higher than 8 on every instruments were identified as analytical or intuitive (e.g. 
PID-difference = -10, GDMS-difference = -9, SOLAT-difference = -12 : the 
participant was classified as analytical; but PID-difference = -3, GDMS-
difference = -9, SOLAT-difference = -12: the participant was classified neither 
as analytical, nor as intuitive).  
Secondly, the median values for each instrument were calculated (PID-D = 34; 
PID-I = 32; GDMS-Rational = 19; GDMS-Intuitive = 16; SOLAT-Left = 9; 
SOLAT-Right = 12). Only those participants who scored simultaneously above 
the analytical median value and under the intuitive median value on every 
instrument were classified as analytical. Conversely, those participants who 
scored simultaneously above the intuitive median value and under the analytical 
median value on every instrument were classified as intuitive.  
Lastly, only those participants whose scores met simultaneously both the above-
mentioned criteria were selected. Namely, the “extreme” analytical participants 
were those who, within the analytical group as identified through cluster 
analysis, were classified as analytical according both the difference and the 
median computation methods. Conversely, the “extreme” intuitive participants 
were those who, within the intuitive group as identified through cluster analysis, 
were classified as intuitive according both the difference and the median 
computation methods. Following this procedure 13 participants were classified 
as intuitive people (2 males and 11 females; ranged from 19 to 32 years, mean 
age = 22.9 yrs), whereas 16 participants as analytical people (2 males and 14 
females; ranged from 18 to 48 years, mean age = 27.1 yrs). These people 
constituted the experimental sample of the Study 5. 
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2.2.4 Discussion 
The data collected support, almost completely, the structures of the instruments 
originally described in literature. Specifically, as for the scales employed in 
Study 1, we found a confirmation, and, at some extent, an improvement of what 
emerged in Study 1. As for the scale which was not used in the previous study, 
the PID scale, it turned out that our data supported the original structure of the 
instrument, so allowing us to conclude that our Italian translation mirrors the 
corresponding original version.  In the following paragraphs each instrument is 
examined in details. 
The inter-item correlation and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for each 
subscale of GDMS show acceptable reliabilities of the GDMS. In fact, 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are higher, in almost all subscales, than the ones 
emerged in Study 1, and they are in line with both the original version of the 
instrument (Scott & Bruce, 1995) and the subsequent psychometric assessments 
of the inventory proposed in the original English version (Loo, 2000; Thunholm, 
2004), and also in the Italian language (rational subscale: .70; intuitive subscale: 
.77; dependent subscale: .84; avoidant subscale: .80; spontaneous subscale: .78; 
Gambetti et al., 2008). Except for the finding of a positive correlation between 
dependent and spontaneous styles, the pattern of inter-correlations among the 
subscales are in line with the pattern reported by Scott and Bruce (1995) 
supporting their conclusion that the styles are not mutually exclusive. The 
negative correlation between the rational and the intuitive styles indicates that 
people who express a stronger preference for one style show a lower perspective 
for the other one, meaning that, even though individuals tend to use more than 
one decision-making style, they probably, have a dominant style. Both the 
negative correlations between rational and spontaneous style and the strong 
positive correlation between intuitive and spontaneous style indicate that 
rational decision makers probably engage in accurate and detailed assessment of 
the alternatives and take much more time to make a decision as compared to the 
intuitive and spontaneous decision makers, who are more inclined to decide 
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under time pressure (Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005) and can be seen as a kind of 
high speed intuitive style (Thunholm, 2004). The negative correlation between 
rational and avoidant styles shows that the rational decision makers tend to 
approach rather than avoid problems (Scott & Bruce, 1995; Loo, 2000), whereas 
the positive correlation between dependent and avoidant styles suggests that 
dependent decision makers are more likely to avoid decisions, thus contrasting 
the findings by Loo (200), but supporting Harren’s (1979) conclusion that 
dependent decision makers are relatively passive and try to avoid making 
decisions and judgments. Moreover, from our data, it turned out that the 
avoidant style is positively correlated also with the intuitive and spontaneous 
styles (Thunholm, 2004; Gambetti et al., 2008). It seems that individuals who 
tend to avoid decisions, in addition to their dependency on others’ opinions, also 
tend to decide as quick as possible. It has been speculated that avoidant people 
feel insecure and, as a consequence, whenever they can, they look for guidance 
from other, and when it is not possible to consult others, they try to go through 
the decision rapidly so to end the uncertainty (Bensi & Giusberti, 2007; 
Gambetti et al., 2008). The positive correlation between rational and dependent 
styles and, conversely, the negative correlation between spontaneous and 
dependent styles, suggest that people who depend on other’s advice when 
making decisions tend to behave carefully analysing in details the situation and 
comparing all the alternatives rather than relying on their own hunches and 
feelings. It can be speculated that dependent decision makers feel uncertain as 
the avoidant decision makers, but, on the contrary, they tend to rely on a 
different strategy: instead of deciding as quick as possible, they meticulously 
labour the point in order to be sure about the quality of their decisions and, as a 
consequence, try to get over their sense of uncertainty.  
The confirmatory factor analysis support the correlated 5-factors model of the 
GDMS as originally proposed (Scott & Bruce, 1995) and as emerged with the 
Italian version of the instrument (Gambetti et al., 2008). As compared to the 
results obtained through the exploratory factor analysis in Study 1, the factorial 
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structure which emerged in Study 2 turned out to be improved and much more in 
line with the original structure (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Probably due to both the 
adjustments which have been made to the Italian translation of the instrument 
after Study 1 was completed and the ampler sample employed in Study 2, the 
factorial structure of the GDMS turned out to be the same as the original 
version. As predictable from the higher inter-correlations among the subscales, 
the correlated model resulted to have better fit indexes (even though not always 
optimal) than the unrelated model, thus confirming what found in the Italian 
validation of the instrument (Gambetti et al., 2008).  
The internal reliabilities of each of both the summed scale and the components 
of the Maximization Scale reached, only partially, the acceptability level. As in 
Study 1, the summed scale’s Cronbach alpha coefficient was acceptable, but not 
high, even though this result is in line with the original version validation 
(Schwartz et al., 2002) and with subsequent research (Diab, Gillespie & 
Highhouse, 2008; Nenkov et al., 2008; Parker, Bruine de Bruin & Fishhoff, 
2007). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the scales’ components, as emerged 
in other studies (Nenkov et al., 2008), can not be considered as acceptable. The 
pattern of inter-correlations among components highlight that only two of them, 
namely the search for option and difficulty in choice, correlate with the summed 
scale, whereas the high standard component seems to be unrelated to both the 
summed scale and the other components. This raises an important point, in fact, 
concerning the dimensionality of the Maximization Scale. Previous research 
(Nenkov et al., 2008) and the data collected in both these studies raise an 
important conceptual issue about the real meaning of “maximizing”. 
Specifically, data seem to suggest that maximizing could not be defined as the 
result of all components included in the scale, but only a subset of them instead. 
In fact, it remains unclear whether maximizing refers to the goals or to the 
strategy and process, or to both of them. In Simon’s (1995) conceptualization 
maximizing refers to both goals and search strategy and all these aspects are 
represented in Maximization Scale. However, previous research found out that 
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the one component of the Maximization Scale (“high standard”) is related to 
perfectionism, regret and need for cognition, but not to happiness, optimism, 
satisfaction with life even though they are supposed to be related. Moreover, our 
data highlight no relationships between the dimensions concerning the process 
and strategy (“search for options” and “difficulty in choice”) and the ones 
concerning the goals (“high standard” and “second best”). As already noted, 
only the formers show a high correlation with the summed scale, thus suggesting 
that maximizing, as measured by the Maximization Scale, is more about the 
process and search strategies which are required to seek the “best”. These 
findings, in addition to the results of the confirmatory factor analysis which, 
contrary to the original version, identifies a 4-components model as the best one 
to fit our data, on one side suggest that, probably, the Italian version of the 
Maximization Scale present a different internal structure, and, on a more general 
level, it confirms that the original 13-items version of the Maximization Scale 
could not be considered as a sound psychometric instrument (Diab, Gillespie & 
Highhouse, 2008; Nenkov et al., 2008; Parker, Bruine de Bruin & Fishhoff, 
2007), thus inducing some authors to work on a shorter form of the 
Maximization Scale (Nenkov et al., 2008), that is a 6-item version which 
possesses better pshychometric properties than the original 13-item version. In 
particular, it has been demostrated that this short version has superior reliability 
and validity and a more stable dimensional structure which encompasses the 
same dimensions as the original scale but has the advantage that the dimensions 
are equally weighed in the summed scale whereas in the original scale the 
number of items arbitrarily varies across domains.  
Both the two subscales of PID show acceptable reliabilities, even though 
slightly lower than the original version validation (Betsch, 2004) and with other 
research (Richetin et al., 2007). The pattern of inter-correlation between the two 
subscales show a tendency to negative correlation even if it does not reach the 
significance level, as previously found by Richetin et al. (2007). However, when 
the correlated and the unrelated models were directly compared using 
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confirmatory factor analyses, the correlated model obtained the best fit indexes, 
thus allowing to conclude that the deliberative and analytical subscales are 
negatively correlated, even the correlation is very low, as emerged from the 
original validation of the instrument (Betsch, 2004). As for the GDMS, a 
negative correlation between the analytical and the intuitive dimensions, could 
be considered as a confirmation that one of the two styles is the predominant, 
even though they can not considered as mutually exclusive. Once again, 
different styles could be thought as alternative ways of thinking and deciding.  
As for SOLAT the inter-correlations among subscales highlighted that all the 
styles are negatively related to one another. Also in this case, it seems that styles 
are alternative way of behaving and, probably, one of them dominates the 
others.  
The pattern of relationships among the instruments employed in the study 
highlights that questionnaires are related one another in consistent way. 
Specifically, correlations between Maximization Scale and the GDMS 
questionnaires showed that maximizers tend to be rational, dependent and 
avoidant decision makers. As predictable by Schwartz’s accounts (2002), 
maximizers engage in more rational decision making which reflect their 
perception of systematic deliberation about their choices, more dependence on 
others which indicates the interpersonal comparisons and the quest for 
information they usually activate, and more avoidant decision making which 
reveals the their tendency to postpone decisions to search for more information 
and ponder the alternatives (Parker, Bruine de Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007). The 
correlation between dependent style and maximizing tendencies is consistent 
with previous findings (Schwartz et al., 2002; Iyengar et al., 2006; Parker, 
Bruine de Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007) and with the naïve image of maximzers 
agonizing over the best option and trying to reach this outcome by all means, 
including the search for advice and guidance from others. The relationship 
between avoidant style and maximizing tendencies could be also explained by 
the fact that maximizers always try to reach the best solution and experience a 
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greater feeling of regret after the decision has been made as compared to the 
satisficers. As showed by previous research (Beattie et al., 1994), the main 
sources of “decision aversion” are anticipated regret and fear for blame for less-
than-optimal outcomes. It could be the case that maximizers, who are not 
content with a less-than-optimal choice, tend to be “decision averted” in order to 
prevent themselves from experiencing regret and from being blamed for their 
possible poor decisions. As for the intuitive and spontaneous styles, it turned out 
that only two components of the Maximization Scale, that is the “difficulty of 
choice” and “search for option” ones concerning maximizing strategy and 
process, are related to these styles. It could be the case that intuitive and 
spontaneous decision makers adopt a maximizing strategy in choosing among 
alternatives, even though the aim of this searching is not to seek the best option. 
It seems that they take into account different alternatives when deciding, but this 
does not necessarily imply that the objective is to reach the best choice. 
Probably due to their tendency to be enterprising, people with both a 
spontaneous and intuitive decision style prefer searching for different 
alternatives even if they can encounter some difficulties in choosing among 
them, rather than having a few alternatives among to choose which.   
As expected, the pattern of relationship between GDMS and PID suggests that 
the rational and the deliberative scales, and the two intuitive scales are positively 
correlated among them, whereas the two couples are negatively related. The 
spontaneous style is positively associated with the intuitive style and negatively 
with the deliberative style, which, in turn, is negatively associated with the 
avoidant style. The strong correlation between the “analytical” scales on one 
side, and the “intuitive” scales, on the other side, indicates that GDMS and 
PID’s measures of analytical and intuitive styles shows a great overlapping, 
even though they do not coincide. From a theoretical point of view, it was 
expected to find an almost total coincidence, but it did not happen. A possible 
explanation could refers to the fact that, on a closer inspection, the two 
instruments, even though both the two instruments claim to measure analytical 
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and intuitive decision making styles, what is measured by the scales is partially 
the same. On a closer inspection, in fact, it emerges that intuition and analysis 
are operationalized in different way. Whereas in GDMS items are only phrased 
as expression of habits (e.g. “When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my 
intuition”), in PID items are conceived also as personal beliefs (e. g. “With most 
decisions it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings”), liking (e.g. “I 
prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance”), besides 
habits (e.g. “When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut 
feelings”), thus allowing to conclude that the two instruments make reference to 
different level of analysis. It can be speculated that GDMS refers to a first level 
which concerns the individual habits of people, that is the way they usually 
behave when making decisions. The PID, on the contrary, place itself also on 
other levels of analysis, such as the personal preferences and liking, that is not 
how they really behave, but, rather, how they would like to behave; and the 
individual beliefs, that is what people believe should be the best way of making 
decisions, the values, and the decision behaviour which is ideally the best. These 
levels of analysis may coincide, but, also may not. In fact, while individuals may 
have an ideal or preferred decision-making style, it could be the case that their 
actual decision behaviours are totally different from this ideal one (Leonard, 
Scholl & Kowalski, 1999).    
The only correlations between GDMS and SOLAT confirm that the rational 
decision style is positively associated with the left and integrated thinking styles, 
and negatively with the right thinking style. The intuitive and spontaneous 
decision style are positively related to the right thinking style, and negatively 
with the left and integrated thinking styles. Also in this case, the correlations 
suggest an overlapping between the two “analytical” and the two “intuitive” 
scales. However, in this case, the correlations are so low that it is not possible to 
think to a total correspondence between constructs. This further substantiates the 
idea that cognitive and decision styles share a common ground, but place 
themselves into different levels of explanations. In fact, decision –making styles, 
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even if present distinctive specificities, can not be considered as something 
different from thinking styles. In fact, decision-making implies general cognitive 
mechanisms, so that the two types of style have necessarily to show some 
considerable overlapping.  
The relationships between Maximization Scale and PID highlight that the 
summed maximization scale, the high standard and the second choice 
components are positively associated with the deliberative scale, thus 
confirming that the maximizing tendencies are typical of people with an 
analytical decision style, as found in the pattern of relationships between 
Maximization Scale and GDMS.  Another confirmation of this finding emerges 
from the pattern of correlation between Maximization Scale and SOLAT, which 
highlights the positive association between the summed maximization scale and 
the left thinking style, and the negative association between the summed scale 
and the right thinking style. In both the pattern of correlation between 
Maximization Scale-PID and Maximization Scale-SOLAT only the components 
concerning the maximization strategy are positively connected with the intuitive 
decision style and the right thinking style, thus allowing to conclude that 
intuitive-right individuals adopt a maximizing strategy in choosing among 
alternatives, even though the aim of this searching is not to seek the best option.  
The pattern of relationships between PID and SOLAT reveals that the 
deliberative decision style is positively associated with the left, and negatively 
with the right thinking style. Conversely, the intuitive decision style is positively 
connected with the right, and negatively with the left thinking style.  However, 
the correlation coefficients are not so high to suggest a total overlapping 
between the constructs. As noted for the pattern between GDMS and SOLAT, it 
supports the idea that cognitive and decision styles share a common ground, but 
place themselves into different levels of explanations.  
A different point altogether is the relationship between the CRT and all the 
stylistic measures. In fact, CRT shows a few marginal correlations with the other 
measures. This represents a fundamental finding emerging from the present 
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study since it can count as evidence for the claim that style is different from 
ability. Even though in literature some relationships between styles and abilities 
are reported (MacLeod, Jackson & Palmer, 1986; Myers & McCaulley, 1985), 
our findings strengthen the prevailing idea that styles can not be conceived as 
abilities, but rather as preferred ways of using abilities (Antonietti, 2003). 
Starting from this considerable number of correlations among the instruments 
employed, two distinct pattern of relationships has been identified. They roughly 
correspond to the analytical and intuitive styles, even though these dimensions 
are enriched and qualified by other aspects which contribute to better define the 
analytical and intuitive styles providing a multifaceted profile, rather than only 
single dimensions, of these constructs. It turned out that the analytical people, a 
part form showing a rational, deliberative, and systematic approach to decision 
making, tend to rely on others’ advice and guidance before making important 
decisions, probably in order to be sure that they can reach the best outcome. In 
fact, analytical people prove to be particularly aiming at the best option. They 
have clear in mind the goal of their decision-making: striving for the best. They 
settle high standard for themselves and are never satisfied with what they 
consider a “second choice”. At a more general level of cognitive functioning, 
they also show a logic and systematic thinking and learning style, thus 
confirming that cognitive and decision styles can not be treated as single and 
isolated aspects, but as fundamental determinants that contribute to provide a 
more comprehensive and holistic profile that takes the whole person into 
account. Analytical people, in addition, show an integrated thinking style. This 
could be explained by the fact that “integration” can be considered as a kind of 
mental balance which is very similar to rationality and analysis.  Conversely, the 
intuitive people show a global, holistic, immediate and spontaneous approach to 
decision making, and also to cognitive processing, in general. They do not strive 
for the best option, since the attainment of the maximum is not the goal of their 
decision making, but, however, they tend to adopt a maximizing strategy in 
choosing among alternatives. It could be speculated that intuitive and 
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spontaneous, probably because of their enterprising attitude, tend to search for 
different options in order to have the possibility to choose what they prefer, even 
if this option does not represent the best one.   
These two pool of characteristics turned out to be good predictors for the cluster 
analysis which, in fact, succeeded in identifying those participants whose 
cognitive and decision profiles corresponded either to the analytical or intuitive 
one. 
Finally, the present research provided the opportunity to compare different 
subsamples’ scores on this instrument. Specifically, the comparison between 
students and workers showed differences in a considerable number of subscales 
of the instruments employed. Results lead to the identification of different 
profiles for students and workers, even though these profiles do not precisely 
coincide with the analytical/intuitive distinction, but rather with other something 
different. In fact, students turned out to have a more avoidant and, at some 
extent, intuitive decision-making style as compared to the workers. Moreover, 
they result to have higher maximizing tendencies, in particular as concerns the 
search for options and difficulty in choice. Then, they have a less integrated 
thinking and learning style, whereas they show a lower number of reflective 
responses on the ability instrument as compared to the workers who, on the 
contrary, seem to adopt a more reflective strategy when asked to answer a query. 
From these results it emerged a students’ portrait that describe students as open 
to different alternatives, in search for them, and striving for the best options. It 
seems that they like having different options among which to choose, even 
though, probably being insecure and novices in decision making, they try to 
avoid decision-making whenever possible. Compared to the workers, they are 
less able to balance and integrated in a coherent way different approaches, 
which probably required more experience to be reached. This kind of 
impulsivity prevent students from adopting a reflective strategy also when asked 
to reconsider the default incorrect answer that first comes to mind.  A similar 
trend came out from the comparison among age groups, thus making it difficult 
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to clearly separate the effect of occupational status  from the effect of age on 
these results. Since the occupational status distinguish between students and 
workers, and this distinction roughly coincide with the distinction between 
younger and older groups, it could be speculated that either only one of the two 
variables affect the individual style, or both of them have an influence on the 
individual style. Probably further investigations are needed in order to separate 
the effect of age from occupational status. However, the comparison between 
different occupational samples were an ancillary aim, being the main purpose to 
have a heterogeneous experimental sample, instead of the more common 





























INTUITION AND ANALYSIS IN ACTION:                          
MINDREADING STRATEGIES AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES  




The Ultimatum Game can be considered as an interactive strategic context 
where players are required to assume the opponent’s perspective and think about 
his/her mental states (Singer & Fehr, 2005). The activation of mindreading 
processes, that is this ability to attribute feeling and thoughts to others, seems to 
be indispensable and really influential during the course of the game (Hoffman 
et al., 2000). In fact, far from behaving like rational maximizing agents who 
only care about monetary gain, people have been shown to be responsive to the 
other players’ intentions and behaviours (Rilling et al., 2004; Sally & Hill, 
2006).  
Taking into account the other’s perspective can be either an immediate and 
holistic process or a slower and analytical one. Specifically, mindreading 
processes can develop alternatively through a rapid and synthetic apprehension 
or a detailed and systematic analysis of the person and the situation at hand. 
When reading the other’s mind in the Ultimatum Game, in fact, a person can 
form a global idea of the other player and try to imagine his/her reaction to an 
unfair offer. On the contrary, a person can take into consideration every piece of 
information about the other player and engage in a minute deliberation which 
leads him/her to an analytical and detailed outline. Whereas in the first case the 
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process resembles the formation of impression, in the second one a logical 
evaluation is involved. As a consequence, it is possible to figure out that in the 
Ultimatum Game, players activate either an “immediate, intuitive” or “detailed, 
analytical” mindreading processes to take into consideration the other’s player 
perspective. In this respect, intuition and analysis can be conceived as different 
strategies employed in the course of the game.  
However, as already discussed in the second chapter, intuition and analysis can 
also be conceived as individual cognitive and decision styles. Although 
Ultimatum Game has been widely studied, few attempts have been made to 
understand to what extent psychological factors can influence subjective 
behaviour in this game. Some studies introduced experimental factors in 
Ultimatum Game, such as structural changes to the game (Hoffman, McCabe & 
Smith, 2000; Huck, 1999), methodological manipulations (Camerer & Hogarth, 
1999; Sutter, Kocher & Strauss, 2003), and demographic variables like gender 
(Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999), race and culture (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001; Roth et al., 1991: Hoffman & Tee, 2006), age (Murnighan & 
Saxon, 1998; Harbaugh, Krause & Liday, 2003; Harbaugh, Krause & 
Vesterlund, 2007; Hoffman & Tee, 2006), genetic aspects (Wallace et al., 2007), 
and the presence of non-human beings (Jensen, Call & Tomasello, 2007). 
However, a part from few studies exploring the role of emotions (Haselhuhn & 
Mellers, 2005), selfishness (Brandstätter & Königstein, 2001), some personality 
traits (Scheres & Sanfey, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2008), and specific brain disorder 
(Agay et al., 2008), there have been no studies researching into the role of 
cognitive and decision styles in Ultimatum Game. Moreover, another important 
aspect which has been almost neglected so far, or at least scarcely investigated, 
is the bridging between the stylistic individual differences and the decision-
making outcomes. In fact, few attempts have been made to study how specific 
styles result in different decision-making performance. A part form some 
contributes which relate styles to the speed of decision (Wally & Baum, 1994) 
and action radicalness (Stumpf & Dunbar, 1991), very few studies connect 
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individual style and decision quality or effectiveness (Hough & Ogilvie, 2005; 
Pretz, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2008; Shiloh, Salton & Sharabi, 2002). 
The general purpose of Study 3, 4, and 5 is to investigate, within a strategic 
context requiring the reading of the other player’s mind, the role of intuition and 
analysis intended as both strategies and individual styles. Specifically,  even 
though all three studies involved the Ultimatum Game as experimental setting, 
the aims of the subsequent three studies were different and nested, in that each 
subsequent study aimed at providing further support to what found in the 
previous study and, in addition, at investigating a specific aspect which 
distinctive of that study. The specific aims were as follows.  
The proper aim of Study 3 was to assess whether, within a general mindreading 
attitude, different psychological features of the responder, which the proposer 
was induced to take into account, affected the amount of money that the latter 
offers to the former. This should provide good evidence that the focus on the 
presumed mental states of the other player induced the proposer to differentiate 
the way in which he/she conceived the reciprocal financial advantage in a social 
interactive game.  
Study 4 aimed at assessing whether reciprocity in social interactive games based 
on mindreading was influenced by the way in which the psychological portraits 
of the responders were processed – the intuitive or analytic modes of thinking. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that the intuitive or analytic way of processing 
information about the responders affected the sums of money offered by 
subjects. Starting from the findings obtained by Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) 
concerning the superiority of intuitive thinking when dealing whit complex and 
multiattributed decision, it was expected that in the intuitive task participants 
would make offers that were consistent with the psychological portraits of the 
responders. On the contrary, requiring the consideration of multiple aspects, the 
offer proposal would be less consistent with the responders’ psychological 
portraits.   
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Finally, in Study 5 it was hypothesized that the individual intuitive vs. analytical 
style modulated the effect of the two way of processing information (activated 
by the intuitive or analytical task) on the sums of money offered by participants. 
Specifically, we expected that a fit between individual style and mode of 
thinking (e.g. a participant with an intuitive style who is presented with the 
intuitive task) resulted in an optimization of the offers (see Schunk & Betsch, 
2006), that is a better ability to differentiate the offers according to the 
psychological features of the responders.  
Then, in case it would emerge behavioural differences between intuition and 
analysis, as we expected, it would be interesting to control for the participants’ 
physiological activation corresponding to both intuitive and analytical strategies 
and styles. Hence, in order to clarify whether these behavioural differences 
depend either on the tension, effort, and general arousal or on the specific 
quality of each type of elaboration process, we control for the physiological 
activation components in relation to intuition and analysis. According to 
traditional dual-process models, intuition is affectively charged (Epstein, 1994; 
Hassin et al., 2005; Sinclair, 2003), thus following this assumption we should 
expect a higher physiological activation for both the intuitive people and for the 
intuitive thinking as compared to the analytical people and the analytical 
thinking. However, as already clarified in the Introduction, since our conception 
and operationalization of intuition does not include an emotional component, we 
expect that the pattern of autonomic activation do not differ depending on the 
intuitive and analytical thinking and style.  
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3.1 STUDY 3  
 
3.1.1 Aims 
In a study carried out by Hoffman et al. (2000) it turned out that, when 
proposers were explicitly hinted at activating mentalizing processes which 
induced the proposer to assume the responder’s perspective and think to his 
expectations and feelings, the sum of money offered to the responder was 
higher. This lead the authors to the conclusion that mindreading, that is 
assuming the  responder’s mental perspective, is influential in deciding how 
much to reciprocate in the Ultimatum Game. Starting from this finding, we were 
interested in assessing whether, not only assuming a general mindreading 
attitude (as shown by Hoffman et  al., 2000), but taking into account the specific 
different psychological features of the responder affects the amount of money 
that the proposer offers to the responder. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
the activation of mindreading processes led subjects to modulate their offers 
according to the psychological portrait of the responders. In particular, it was 
expected that the sums of money participants proposed to the responders varied 
consistently by considering features of the responders such as honesty, sense of 
justice and personal dignity. 
A second aim of Study 3 was to verify whether distinct instructions stressing in 
a different way the goal of the Ultimatum Game might affect the proposers’ 
offers. To our knowledge no specific studies have been conducted in order to 
test the effect of particular instruction given to the participants on the amount of 
offers made by proposers. Except for a study (Binmore, Shaker & Sutton, 1985) 
in which, even though experimenters explicitly induced participants to maximize 
their monetary gain, the study was not specifically intended to control the effect 
of instruction on the Ultimatum Game results and, as a consequence, it did not 
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lead to conclusive explanations, no other contributions were found on this issue. 
Relying on logic, we hypothesized that the more the instructions stressed the 
maximizing gain goal, the more participants did not differentiate their offers 
depending on the responders’ psychological features, and, as a consequence, 
offered the same low amount of money to all responders.    
To summarize, the goals of the study were: 
- to verify that the psychological portraits of the responders led to differences in 
term of offers made  by the proposers; 





Four different descriptions of fictitious responders were devised. Responders 
were described focusing on specific characteristics such as the sense of justice, 
personal dignity, and honesty. The  four responders differed from each other 
depending on these characteristics. Two of them (Marco and Grazia) were 
portrayed so to convey the idea that they would refuse unfair offers and, for this 
reason, were labelled as “rejecters”. The other  two (Gianni and Marina) were 
portrayed so to induce people to believe that they would accept even unfair 
offers, so they were called “acceptors”. 
Moreover, in order to test whether different constraints might affect the 
proposers’ offers, three kinds of instructions were devised. Instructions stressed 
in a different way the aim of the Ultimatum  Game. In the spontaneous 
condition no precise instructions were given concerning the aim of the  game. In 
the maximizing condition participants were told that the aim was to gain as much 
as possible. In the threshold condition participants were informed that the aim 
was to gain at least 25  euros at the end of the game. 
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The study presents a mixed 2X3 experimental design. The type of responder 
variable is a within-subjects variable with two levels corresponding to acceptors 
and rejecters responders; the instruction variable is between-subject and shows 
three levels corresponding to the spontaneous, maximizing, and threshold 
constraints. 
3.1.2.2 Pretests 
Prior to the experimental stage, it was held it necessary to have an evaluation of 
the four responders’ descriptions in order to be sure that the descriptions were 
actually rated as different only as for the features we intended to be distinctive 
of each description. A series of pre-tests were carried out to verify that the four 
descriptions of the fictitious responders were homogeneous as for some 
characteristics (such as likableness and attractiveness), but not homogeneous as 
for the psychological features which contributed to define the distinctive profile 
of each responder. In fact, the aim of these three pre-tests was to make sure that 
the descriptions differed only in the features which were distinctive for each 
psychological portrait. Specifically, the pre-tests were aimed at verifying that the 
4 responders’ descriptions were:  
  homogeneous as for “external” features (likeableness, attractiveness, 
friendliness and humbleness); 
  different as for “internal” features which contribute to define the 
distinctive profile of each character (altruism, sense of justice, honesty, 
personal dignity, unselfishness, generosity) 
In each of the following pre-tests the procedure was the same. After reading 
each character’s description participants were requested to evaluate the character 
with regard to the above-mentioned ten bodily and psychological features on a 
semantic differential scale.  
 In the following paragraphs the series of pre-tests we carried out to test the four 




3.1.2.2.1 Pretest 1 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 69 undergraduates aged from 18 to 
28 (mean age = 22.5). 
Analyses and Results 
Before running the analysis the assumption of univariant normality was assessed 
on each item of the differential scale by getting skewness and kurtosis and 
dividing these by the standard errors. Both skewness and kurtosis were within 
the +1 to -1 range, so allowing to conclude that data were normally distributed 
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). Specifically, the skewness values ranged 
from -1.01 to .97, whereas the kurtosis values ranged from -1.02 to .91.  
On each of the features considered, a repeated measure ANOVA was computed 
in order to compare the mean ratings obtained by the different responders. Prior 
to ANOVAs the assumption of sphericity, which implies the equality of the 
variances of the differences between levels of the repeated measures factor, was 
assessed through the Mauchly’s sphericity test. Mauchly’s test was not 
significant only for two features, altruism and friendliness (Mauchly's W(5) = 
0.856, p = .057; Mauchly's W(5) = 0.881, p = .122, respectively). A part from 
these two features, Mauchly’s test turned out to be significant (likeableness: 
Mauchly's W(5) = 0.695, p <.001; sense of justice: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.728, p 
<.001; honesty: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.584, p <.001; attractiveness: Mauchly's 
W(5) = 0.789, p <.05; humbleness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.811, p <.05; personal 
dignity: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.820, p <.05; unselfishness: Mauchly's W(5) = 
0.782, p <.005; generosity: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.710, p <.001; ), then sphericity 
couldn’t be assumed and, as a consequence, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
for violation of sphericity was used. ANOVAs’ results are reported in Table 3.1. 
Since for most ANOVAs the sphericity assumption was not confirmed, the 
degrees of freedom were different for each ANOVA and, thus, are reported in 
brackets after each F-value.  
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Features Responders Mean SD F P η2 
Marco 5.80 1.19 
Grazia 4.75 1.05 




Marina 3.75 1.09 
4.689 
(df 2.401, 168.037) 
<.05 .244 
Marco 5.86 1.20 
Grazia 4.78 1.13 








Marco 5.04 1.41 
Grazia 6.53 0.91 
Gianni 3.21 1.23 
 
Sense of justice 
 
Marina 3.61 1.56 
16.923 
(df 2.513, 175.935) 
<.001 .579 
Marco 4.46 1.13 
Grazia 3.95 0.97 




Marina 4.24 1.07 
2.643 
(df 2.612, 182.825) 
.074 .073 
Marco 4.89 1.49 
Grazia 4.43 1.42 




Marina 3.13 1.36 
2.748 
(df 2.699, 188.897) 
.065 .080 
Marco 5.32 1.19 
Grazia 6.06 0.91 




Marina 3.58 1.14 
15.309 
(df 2.243, 154.786) 
<.001 .588 
Marco 5.63 1.37 
Grazia 6.22 1.01 




Marina 4.51 1.28 
8.438 
(df 2.686, 185.326) 
 
<.05 .431 
Marco 5.37 1.25 
Grazia 5.07 1.29 




Marina 3.01 1.31 
12.643 
(df 2.486, 174.021) 
<.001 .549 
Marco 4.62 1.42 
Grazia 4.44 1.20 




Marina 3.79 0.99 
1.687 
(df 3, 204) 
.147 .060 
Marco 5.59 1.22 
Grazia 4.51 1.13 




Marina 3.83 1.03 
6.445 
(df 2.586, 181.014) 
<.05 .444 
Tab.3.1Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s description on each feature 
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Results showed that, as we expected, the four responders’ descriptions were 
rated as different as for those features which were intended to be typical of the 
portraits (altruism, sense of justice, honesty, personal dignity, unselfishness, 
generosity). More in details, all these features were rated higher for Marco and 
Grazia’s descriptions than Gianni and Marina’s ones, thus allowing to conclude 
that the verbal descriptions we devised actually convey the ideas that we 
intended to give. However, three out of four features which were expected to be 
rated as homogeneous turned out to be so, whereas likeableness was rated as 
different within the descriptions. Specifically, Marco’s description was judged 
to be more likeable as compared to the other characters whereas Marina’s 
description was rated as less likeable than all other responders (mean difference 
between Gianni and Grazia was not significant (p = .054), whereas Marco’s 
rating was significantly higher than the others (p <.001) and Marina’s rating was 
significantly lower than the others (p<.001)). In addition, it’s worth noticing 
that, even though no differences emerged as for friendliness, Marina’s rating 
was lower than the other ones.  
As a consequence, some adjustments were made to both Marco and Marina’s 
descriptions in order to make all descriptions homogeneous as for the 
likeableness feature, and, to a lesser extent, also for friendliness. In particular, in 
Marco’s description two adjectives aimed at conveying the idea of a less 
likeable person were included, and, moreover, some expressions were added to 
Marina’s description so to give the picture of a kinder and less off-putting 
woman. The modified versions of the descriptions are reported in Appendix II 
 
3.1.2.2.2 Pretest 2 
Participants 
Forty-nine undergraduates aged from 19 to 29 (mean age = 22.9 yrs) were 
involved.   
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Analyses and Results 
Prior to the analyses, the assumption of univariant normality was checked for 
each feature of the differential scale. The skewness and kurtosis values turned 
out to be within the +1 and -1 range, so confirming the normal distribution. In 
particular, the skewness values varied from -.98 to .54, and the kurtosis values 
ranged from -1.00 to .88.  
Before carrying out the ANOVA, Mauchly’s sphericity test was used to test the 
assumption of sphericity. Mauchly’s test resulted to be not significant for all 
features ((likeableness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.455, p = .070; altruism: Mauchly’s 
W(5) = 0.122, p = .322; sense of justice: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.237, p = .122; 
attractiveness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.521, p = .065; humbleness: Mauchly's W(5) 
= 0.211, p = .344; honesty: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.347, p = .234; personal dignity: 
Mauchly's W(5) = 0.480, p = .090; unselfishness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.423, p = 
.076; friendliness: Mauchly’s W(5) = 0.444, p = .074; generosity: Mauchly's 
W(5) = 0.333, p = .133;  ), thus allowing to conclude that the sphericity could be 
assumed. A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for each features to 















Features Responders Mean SD F (3,144), P η2 
Marco 4.31 1.85 
Grazia 6.12 0.95 




Marina 4.93 1.18 
4.832 <.005 .235 
Marco 5.06 1.52 
Grazia 4.68 1.62 




Marina 3.75 1.48 
6.051 <.005 .342 
Marco 4.81 1.32 
Grazia 5.81 1.97 
Gianni 3.81 1.47 
 
Sense of justice 
 
Marina 3.87 1.45 
7.277 <.001 .354 
Marco 4.00 1.26 
Grazia 3.18 1.27 




Marina 4.50 1.63 
2.513 .100 070 
Marco 4.68 1.66 
Grazia 4.70 1.38 




Marina 3.52 1.20 
3.154 .080 .080 
Marco 5.27 1.16 
Grazia 6.06 0.85 




Marina 3.66 1.31 
17.204 <.001 .598 
Marco 4.87 1.70 
Grazia 5.81 1.55 




Marina 4.62 1.74 
4.701 <.005 .265 
Marco 4.46 1.01 
Grazia 4.93 1.23 




Marina 2.53 1.19 
15.903 <.001 .561 
Marco 3.56 1.66 
Grazia 5.13 1.44 




Marina 4.93 1.43 
2.921 <.05 .092 
Marco 4.75 1.39 
Grazia 5.25 1.06 




Marina 3.31 1.19 
10.464 <.001 .365 
Tab. 3.2 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s description on each 
feature 
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Results confirmed what emerged in Pre-test 1, thus highlighting that characters 
were not homogeneous as for the features that we intended to highlight in 
profiling them (as we expected Marco and Grazia’s descriptions were rated 
higher on altruism, sense of justice, honesty, personal dignity, unselfishness and 
generosity), and homogeneous as for two of the others (attractiveness and 
humbleness). As emerged in Pre-test1, it turned out that characters were not 
rated as homogeneous as for likeableness and, in this Pre-test, also for 
friendliness.  However, as compared to Pre-test 1, the mean ratings of the 
descriptions seemed to show an opposite trend, that is, whereas Marco’s 
likeableness and friendliness ratings were the highest one in Pre-test 1, in Pre-
test 2 they were the lowest. This is probably due to the addition of the two 
“negative” adjectives to Marco’s description which were supposed to reduce the 
excessive positivity of his portrait. In fact, the two adjectives probably reduced 
too much this positive image, thus leading participants to the opposite tendency 
to rate Marco’s likeableness and friendliness significantly lower as compared to 
the other characters’ ratings. For this reason, only one of the two added 
adjectives was kept so to avoid an excessive negative ratings and, moreover, an 
expression, which conveyed the idea of a too peculiar person, was eliminated. 
The modified version was reported in Appendix II. 
 
3.1.2.2.3 Pretest 3 
Participants 
Forty undergraduates aged from 20 to 25 (mean age = 23.8 yrs) were involved.  
Analyses and Results 
Prior to the analyses, the assumption of univariant normality was assessed for 
each feature of the differential scale. All the skewness and kurtosis values were 
within the +1 and -1 range. Specifically, the skewness values ranged from -.67 
to .87, and the kurtosis values ranged from -.90 to .77.  
Before carrying out the ANOVA, the assumption of sphericity was checked 
employing Mauchly’s sphericity test. It turned out to be not significant for all 
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features ((likeableness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.333, p = .135; altruism: Mauchly’s 
W(5) = 0.189, p = .222; sense of justice: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.245, p = .189; 
attractiveness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.675, p = .077; humbleness: Mauchly's W(5) 
= 0.232, p = .433; honesty: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.376, p = .301; personal dignity: 
Mauchly's W(5) = 0.898, p = .066; unselfishness: Mauchly's W(5) = 0.768, p = 
.076; friendliness: Mauchly’s W(5) = 0.498, p = .101; generosity: Mauchly's 
W(5) = 0.353, p = .175;  ), thus allowing to conclude that the sphericity could be 
assumed.  
On the data a repeated-measure analysis of variance was carried out for each 
feature to verify that the characters were not homogeneous as for the features 
that we intended to be distinctive of each portrait, but homogeneous as for the 
others which were not aimed at identifying the distinctive characters. Results are 



















Features Responders Mean SD F(3, 117), P η2 
Marco 4.48 1.22 
Grazia 4.82 0.98 




Marina 4.21 1.15 
0.503 .681 .055 
Marco 5.70 1.43 
Grazia 4.83 1.54 




Marina 3.79 1.47 
21.544 <.001 .676 
Marco 4.79 1.28 
Grazia 6.58 1.68 
Gianni 3.16 1.25 
 
Sense of justice 
 
Marina 3.75 1.34 
23.882 <.001 .699 
Marco 4.12 1.35 
Grazia 3.83 1.23 




Marina 4.91 1.57 
2.899 .060 .085 
Marco 3.75 1.66 
Grazia 4.50 1.38 




Marina 3.63 1.20 
1.494 .224 .040 
Marco 5.41 1.13 
Grazia 6.12 1.01 




Marina 4.41 1.23 
17.998 <.001 .544 
Marco 6.04 1.26 
Grazia 6.37 1.23 




Marina 4.87 1.68 
10.343 <.001 .423 
Marco 5.12 1.09 
Grazia 4.92 1.21 




Marina 3.62 1.18 
16.012 <.001 .523 
Marco 4.93 1.36 
Grazia 4.58 1.35 




Marina 3.58 1.10 
3.983 .058 .255 
Marco 5.45 1.28 
Grazia 4.50 1.05 




Marina 4.16 1.13 
9.125 <.001 .353 
Tab. 3.3 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s description on each 
feature  
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Results highlighted that no significant differences emerged as for the features 
which were expected to be homogeneous (likeableness, attractiveness, 
friendliness and humbleness), whereas differences came out as for the other 
features (altruism, sense of justice, honesty, personal dignity, unselfishness and 
generosity). As in both previous studies, Marco and Grazia’s descriptions were 
rated higher than Gianni and Marina’s ones on all features which were supposed 
to be distinctive of each psychological profile.  
In conclusion, the subsequent pre-tests lead to the identification of four 
responders’ descriptions meeting the settled criteria and, as a consequence, 
employable in Study 3. 
3.1.2.3 Participants 
Fifty-seven undergraduate students attending different faculties were recruited at 
the Catholic University of Milan. Their age ranged between 20 and 27 years 
(mean age = 23.7 yrs). They were volunteers who neither were paid nor received 
course credits. A short interview allowed the experimenter to assess that they 
had never attended any cognitive psychology or economics course and that they 
had no notions  about the Ultimatum Game.       
3.1.2.4 Procedure 
The four descriptions of the pretended responders were reported onto a sheet of 
paper. The portraits  were preceded by one of the three type of instructions 
(spontaneous,  maximizing,  threshold) concerning the specific goal of the 
Ultimatum Game. 
Participants were divided into three groups under the three different instruction 
they received. Twenty-one participants received the spontaneous instruction, 
nineteen the maximizing instruction, and eighteen the threshold instruction.  
They were asked to play four rounds of a single-shot Ultimatum Game. 
Participants played the role of the proposer who had to split 10 euros with a 
different responder in each round. After reading the description of the 




Analyses of the data proceeded as follows. We first verified the existence of 
differences among the offers made by participants to the different responders. 
Then, we investigated whether different constraints affected the amount of 
money offered by participants.  
3.1.3.1 Activation of mindreading processes 
On the data collected a one-way repeated measure ANOVA was carried out in 
order to verify whether participants made significantly different offers 
depending on the psychological features of each responder.  
Before running the analysis the assumption of univariant normality was assessed 
on the offers made to each responder by getting skewness and kurtosis and 
dividing these by the standard errors. Both skewness and kurtosis were within 
the +1 to -1 range, so allowing to conclude that data were normally distributed 
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). Specifically, as for the offers made to 
Marco the skewness was -.89, whereas the kurtosis was 46; for the offers made 
to Grazia the skewness was – 1.05 and the kurtosis from -.53; for the offers 
made to Gianni the skewness value was .09 and the kurtosis .88; for the offers 
made to Marina the skewness value was .56 and the kurtosis value -.77. 
The mean values of the sums of money that the proposers offered to each 
responder by collapsing the three instruction conditions are reported in Table 
3.4. 
Responder Mean SD 
Marco 5.39 2.45 
Grazia 4.28 1.62 
Gianni 3.69 1.67 
Marina 3.68 1.86 
Tab. 3.4 – Mean values of money offered to each responder 
 
Prior to the ANOVA, the assumption of sphericity, which implies the equality of 
the variances of the differences between levels of the repeated measures factor, 
was assessed by using the Mauchly’s sphericity test. Since Mauchly’s test was 
significant (Mauchly's W(5) = 0.517, p <.001) then sphericity couldn’t be 
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assumed and, as a consequence, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation 
of sphericity was used.  
Then, the analysis of variance assuming the four responders as the levels of the 
independent variable was computed. It showed that offers were significantly 
different according to the psychological portrait of the other player (F(2.052, 
114.898) =  9.61, p <.001). More precisely, contrast analyses allowed us to 
maintain that the amount of money offered to Marco was higher than the 
amounts offered to the other three responders, and that the amount offered to 
Grazia was higher than the amount offered to Gianni and Marina, who received 
mean amounts of money not significantly different each other (see Table 3.5). 
 
Responders Mean difference F (1,56) P η2 
Gianni – Grazia  -0.588 3.888 .054 .059 
Gianni – Marco -1.702 7.929 <.001 .146 
Gianni –Marina 0.009 .001 .972 .001 
Grazia – Marco -1.114 13.842 <.005 .194 
Grazia – Marina 0.596 3.481 .067 .065 
Marco – Marina 1.711 13.476 <.001 .199 
Tab. 3.5 – Contrast analyses comparing each couple of responder under the mean offered amount of money 
 
Then, the mean value of money offered to the couple of responders who were 
described as “acceptors” (Gianni and Marina) and to the “rejecters” (Marco and 
Grazia) was calculated. The acceptors and rejecters’ unified mean values were 
reported in Table 3.6.  
Type of responder Mean SD 
Acceptors 3.69 1.50 
Rejecters 4.84 1.57 
Tab. 3.6 – Mean values of money offered to “acceptors” and “rejecters” 
  
By assuming the two types of responders as the levels of the independent 
variable a one-way repeated measure ANOVA was carried out. Results showed 
that offers significantly varied depending on the responders’ characterization  
(F(1,56) = 12.457,  p <.001). Participants offered higher sum of money to those 
responders who were supposed to reject low offers.  
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Results showed that participants were able to spontaneously activate 
mindreading processes which permitted them to effectively differentiate their 
offers in order to increase the likelihood of having their offers accepted.  
 
3.1.3.2 Influence of instruction’s type  
The influence of the instruction’s type was tested both on the total amount of 
money offered by the proposers (collapsing the four different responders) and, 
then, on the offers made to each different responder. As a consequence, it was 
first calculated the total mean value of money offered by the proposer by 
collapsing the four different responders. Then, before running the analyses, the 
assumption of univariant normality was assessed on the total offers by getting 
skewness and kurtosis and dividing these by the standard errors. Skewness and 
kurtosis values turned out to be within the +1 to -1 range.  
The assumption of homogeneous variances was tested by using Levene’s test. P-
value was not statistically significant (p = .152), thus indicating that the analysis 
of variance was possible.   
In order to compare the offers obtained under the three types of constraints, a 
one-way ANOVA was computed. Results are reported in Table 3.7. 
Tab. 3.7 - One-way ANOVA comparing offers made under the three constraints   
 
Results showed that offers were different under the three constraints. In 
particular, LSD and Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests highlighted that offers made 
under spontaneous and maximizing constraints were not significantly different 
(p = .177), whereas the offers made under the threshold constraint were 
significantly lower than the ones under the other constraints (p <.001).  
Instruction Mean SD F(2,55) P η2 
Spontaneous 4.67 1.07 
Maximizing 4.30 0.93 
Threshold 3.71 0.17 
5.957 <.005 .181 
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Then, the influence of the different constraints on the offers made to each single 
responder was tested through four one-way ANOVAs which were carried out on 
the sums of money offered to  each responder by distinguishing among the 
spontaneous, maximizing and threshold conditions. Results are reported in Table 
3.8.    
Responder Instruction Mean SD F(2,55) P η2 
Spontaneous 6.71 2.35 
Maximizing 5.15 2.69 Marco 
Threshold 4.02 1.30 
6.983 .002 .205 
Spontaneous 4.38 2.18 
Maximizing 4.31 1.33 Grazia 
Threshold 4.11 1.11 
0.126 .882 .050 
Spontaneous 3.71 1.85 
Maximizing 3.78 2.12 Gianni 
Threshold 3.55 0.70 
0.008 .919 .030 
Spontaneous 3.88 2.49 
Maximizing 3.94 1.71 Marina 
Threshold 3.14 0.78 
1.017 .369 .130 
Tab. 3.8 - One-way ANOVAs comparing offers made under the three constraints to each responder  
 
Results showed that only in the case of Marco significant differences occurred. 
In any case, also with the other players the same trend emerged: the offers were 
lower in the threshold condition as compared to the other two conditions, which 
were, except for Marco, approximately the same. It emerged that the type of 
instructions played a minor role in modulating the offers, with the exceptions 
that in the spontaneous condition some higher sums of money were offered to 
the character (Marco) who, working with poor and indigent people, could have 
driven participants to make him higher offers as compared to the other 
characters.   
In order to verify the existence of an interaction effect between the 
characterization of the responders (acceptors vs. rejecters) and the type of 
constraints (spontaneous, maximizing, threshold) a mixed ANOVA assuming 
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the responders’ types as within-subjects variable and the constraints’ types as 
between-subjects variable. Since the assumption of sphericity (Mauchly’s 
W(5)=0.578, p <.001) was not verified, it was used the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction for violation of sphericity. Results highlighted that the interaction 
between responders’ type and constraints’ type factors was not significant 
(F(2.000,54.000) = 1.010, p < .371). Given the absence of interaction between 
responders’ and constraints’ types, we were induced to conclude  that  
participants,  irrespectively  of  the  constraints  embedded  in  the  instructions,  
activate  relevant  mindreading  processes  which  induce  them  to  reciprocate  
in  a  different  way  according  to  the  presumed  psychological  features  of  
their  counterparts.  
However, since it was held it necessary to identify the type of instruction that 
would have been employed in the next studies, we chose to use the maximizing 
instruction. In fact, we exclude the spontaneous instruction because it emerged 
that people, without any monetary gain constraint, showed an exaggerated 
altruistic attitude, above all toward Marco, whose life could actually induce a 
hyper-altruistic behaviour. On the contrary, it seemed that the threshold 
constraint led people to an excessive concern about money, keeping them from 
taking into the right account the psychological features of their opponents. So, 
given the importance of some type of monetary constraint, we opted for the 
maximizing instruction which turned out to allow people to avoid offering to the 
extremes, both high (spontaneous) and low (threshold) sums of money.  
 
3.1.4 Discussion 
The specific aim of Study 3 was to investigate the role of mindreading processes 
in Ultimatum Game, which can be considered an interactive and strategic 
context where the ability to assume the other’s perspective and think about his 
expectations, feelings and thoughts are fundamental (Singer & Fehr, 2005). 
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In particular, we focussed on the figure of the proposer, since we believe that his 
role in the game, a part from being underestimated by most research in this field, 
appeared more interesting from a psychological point of view than the figure of 
the responder. Making his offer to the responder, the proposer has to take into 
consideration various aspects on which the success of the task depends. Firstly, 
the proposer always experiences uncertainty about the outcome of his decision 
since he can never be sure of his offer being accepted. Secondly, the proposer 
does not make the decision alone, in an isolated context, but, rather, in a 
strategic interactive environment which induces him to consider the responder’s 
reaction to his own offer and, as a consequence, leads him to activate 
mindreading processes and to assume the responder’s mental perspective. 
Finally, the offer made by the proposer consists of an open choice since it ranges 
through a continuous series of values and it is not constrained in given options, 
as it occurs for the responder who could only accept or reject the offer.  
We employed the Ultimatum Game as a setting useful to shed light on how 
people face the conflict arising by the opposite tendencies of maximizing self-
interest and of considering the other persons' perspective. Specifically we were 
interested in assessing whether individual can apply relevant mindreading 
processes in order to identify the psychological features of their partners, so to 
realize when they can risk to offer low sums of money by  presuming that the 
counterpart will accept them. 
The effectiveness of mindreading processes activation is now well-known 
thanks to contributions coming from other field of research, above all the social 
psychology, which proved that taking into consideration others’ perspectives 
increases the likelihood of helping people in need (Batson, 1994), the success in 
negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1983) and in conflict resolution (Paese & 
Yonker, 2001), and decreases the likelihood of egocentric biases in making 
judgments (Savitsky et al., 2005). However, since in experimental economics 
research on the role of mindreading processes have recently developed and, in 
particular, in Ultimatum Game research have rarely been investigated, we 
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believe that establishing the importance of these processes in economic 
interactions represents a further step in this field of research. In fact, we found 
that participants can modulate their offers by considering aspects of the 
responders such has honesty, sense of justice, and personal dignity. The sums of 
money they proposed to their partners varied in a systematic and consistent way 
according to the psychological portraits they have been provided with. It is 
worth noticing that this happened in an experimental procedure where no direct 
and explicit hints at mindreading were provided, and not when, as in Hoffman et 
al.’s (2000) study, participants were explicitly instructed to think about the 
counterparts' mental states. Compared to Hoffman et al.’s (2000), who 
concluded that by taking the other’s perspective people were induced to make 
higher offers, we found that mindreading processes do not lead to a general 
increase in the absolute amount of the offers (which may increase the likelihood 
of having the offers accepted, but at the expense of a greater possible personal 
gain), but rather to a strategic and functional differentiation of the offers (which 
increases the likelihood of ending up with a certain amount of money by 
inducing proposers to renounce considerable sums of money only if it is really 
necessary). A possible speculation could be that the study by Hoffman et al.’s 
(2000) and our study induced different type of processes. While in the former 
the ability to share the feelings of others, the so-called “emphaty” was involved, 
in the latter the capacity to represent others’ intentions, beliefs and expectations, 
the so-called “theory of mind” was implicated. In fact, in Hoffman’s study, 
people were hinted at thinking about their opponent, who was not presented with 
specific psychological features, so that we could easily suppose that people tried 
to imagine an abstract character who may have induced them to feel emphatic 
with this character. Not being characterized in a psychological way, proposers 
were free to imagine whatever responder, and, as a consequence, they could 
imagine a general person to whom they probably feel close. On the contrary, in 
our study proposers were explicitly induced to take into consideration the 
specific psychological portraits of their opponents who were negatively or 
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positively characterized. This have probably led people not to share the others’ 
feeling, but, rather, to represent their intentions and expectations. In fact, even if 
empathizing and mentalizing have a common ground, they are not exactly the 
same process. Whereas empathy is likely to render people less selfish and 
motivates other-regarding behaviours because it allows the sharing of feelings 
with others (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), mindreading could also be useful for 
making self-interested choice because it permits people to anticipate and predict 
others’ behaviour accurately (Singer & Fehr, 2005).  
Being understood that proposers were able to differentiate their offers depending 
on the type of responder they played with, an issue which is worth deepening is 
trying to clarify why proposers, generally speaking, made equal and fair offers 
(mean offers were never below 35% of the entire sum of money). The question 
is: which motives are behind their offers? Two possible explanations have been 
suggested in literature (Scheres & Sanfey, 2006). One, people may equally split 
money because they care about equity and fairness (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). 
Two, proposers may anticipate that responders will reject too low offers (Roth et 
al., 1991). Whereas in the first case people would be fair and other-regarding, in 
the second case people would be simply strategic by making a decision which 
would increase the likelihood of having their offers accepted. Far from being 
altruistic, they would care above all about their own personal gain. If people in 
our study were purely altruistic, they would offer always the same high amount 
of money, regardless of the specific portraits of each responder. A mere other-
regarding attitude would have led proposers to make equally fair offers to all 
responders, instead of differentiating the proposals. On the contrary, they seem 
to adopt a behaviour which is altruistic only in appearance (Croson, 1996; 
Kagel, Kim & Moser, 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995), since, as a matter of 
fact, they show a self-oriented, functional, and strategic behaviour. In fact they 
are prone to renounce their maximum possible gain in order to be sure, or at 
least more certain, that their offers would be accepted. It could be defined as a 
form of “sophisticated” selfishness which derives from the awareness of the 
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“irrationality” of their opponent. It could be the case that proposers realize when 
low offers may be rejected, so they maximize their gain by acting “as if” they 
are fair (Weg & Zwick, 1994). This finding is in line with what Scheres & 
Sanfey (2006) found. By employing both Ultimatum Game (where offers are a 
relatively pure measure of altruism)  and Dictator Game (where offers are a 
mixture of fairness and strategy) they could determine the motivations behind 
the offers in these tasks. It turned out that Dictator Game offers were lower than 
the Ultimatum Game offers, thus reflecting the strategic component of the offers 
made.  
Moreover, the present showed that people can activate relevant mindreading 
processes which allows them to make appropriate offers to each type of 
responders even when they are forced to explicitly care about their personal 
monetary gain. In fact, regardless of the type of instruction they were presented 
with, people keep on differentiating their offers even if they were told to focus 
on a monetary threshold. This further substantiate the conclusion that people, 
rather than being altruistic, show a strategic and functional behaviour. Not even 
if, but exactly because of the strict monetary constraint people differentiate their 
offers, so to be sure that they will be accepted and to reach the established 
threshold.    
 
 
3.2 STUDY 4  
 
3.2.1 Aims 
In Study 3 participants were not hinted at applying a specific mode of thinking 
to decide how much money they should offer to the respondent in order to 
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succeed in the Ultimatum Game by considering the psychological characteristics 
of the responders. 
The goal of Study 4 was to assess whether reciprocity in strategic interactive 
games based on mindreading is influenced by the way in which the 
psychological portraits of the responders are processed. We hypothesized that 
the analytical way of processing information leads participants to make offers 
that were less consistent with the psychological portraits of the responders as 
compared to the intuitive mode of thinking, which allows people to process a 
great amount of information simultaneously and globally, led people to make  




Two different tasks were devised in order to induce the intuitive or the analytical 
mode of processing the information about the four fictitious responders. The 
tasks presented specific aspects that were typical of the two modes of thinking. 
According to literature, the extent to which intuitive or analytical processes (or 
both) are activated will be affected by characteristics of the stimulus. The  
visualization hypothesis (Hogarth, 2001) states that tasks promoting visual 
reasoning induce more intuitive reasoning. Moreover evidence suggest that 
individuals are likely to rely on intuitive thought processes when they face time 
pressure (De Dreu, 2003;  Suri & Monroe, 2003). Thus, in order to induce two 
different modes of thinking we devised two tasks which were different in terms 
of: 
-  characteristics of the stimuli relevant to perform the task; the intuitive task 
required focussing on information conveyed by stimuli presented in a visual 
form, whereas the analytical task required focussing only on verbal information; 
 127
-  time constraints; in the intuitive task participants were given a very short time 
to process information (3 sec), whereas in the analytical task they had a longer 
time to process information (30 sec); 
-  type of request; in the intuitive task the instructions which were given to 
participants invited them to trust their first impression in completing the task, 
whereas in the analytical task they were induced to engage in a deeper analysis 
of the characteristics.   
The tasks were carried out after the description of the responder and before 
splitting money (see par. 4.2.4., and Figure 1 and 2 for a detailed description of 
the tasks). In this way  the tasks represented a sort of intrinsic prime as 
compared to the ones employed in literature which can be described as extrinsic 
priming (Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Tesch & Sanfey, 2008). In order to introduce an 
experimental manipulation of the proposer the majority of studies employed 
priming effects, either emotional (e.g. movies) or rational (e.g. spatial memory 
task) (Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Tesch & Sanfey, 2008). Primes are based on the 
idea that an induced mood can influence decision making, and in particular 
social decision making (Forgas, 2003; Zajonc, 2000). Several research showed 
that positive mood is associated with higher confidence and greater cooperation 
(Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 1990), more creative and divergent thinking, and 
higher task satisfaction (Clapham, 2001; Gasper, 2004; Isen & Shalker, 1982). 
On the contrary, negative mood is associated with lower confidence and more 
risk-averse behaviour (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Daubman, 1984). However 
all this sort of primes can be described as “extrinsic” priming. In fact, they occur 
before the experimental task is presented and are not part of the task itself, they 
are something different and separate from the task Conversely, our task are part 
of the core experiment being carried out during the experimental task and being 
constituent part of it.  
In fact, the task, as already said, induced the activation of either intuitive or 
analytical processing of the information concerning the portraits of the 
responders. Specifically, participants, after reading the verbal description of the 
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responder, were asked to match the description they had just read with the photo 
that, among the three photo presented, was the one portraying the responder in 
question. In the intuitive condition participants were asked to rely on their first 
impression in completing the task, they had few seconds (3 sec) to do that, and 
were mainly presented with the photo only. Conversely, in the analytical 
condition they were hinted at engaging in a deeper analysis of the responder’s 
characteristics, they had more time (30 sec), and were presented with both the 
verbal description and the photos simultaneously.  
To devise the tasks, the photos corresponding to each responder were identified. 
Specifically, for each responder a correct photo and two wrong photos were 
chosen. The photo which was identified as the “correct” one was that in which 
all the details reported in the verbal description were present. In each “wrong” 
photo, on the contrary, one of the detail reported in the verbal description was 
missing. All the details which were taken into account for each responder were 
reported as follows. 
a. Marco’s details: casual clothes; beard.  
In the correct photo they were both present. In the first wrong photo the casual 
clothes only were present, and in the second one the beard only.  
b. Grazia’s details: glasses;  pearl necklace. 
In the correct photo they were both present. In the first wrong photo the glasses 
only were present, and in the second one the pearl necklace only.  
c. Gianni’s details: greying hair; wedding ring.  
In the correct photo both details were present. In the first wrong photo the 
greying hair only was present, in the second one the wedding ring only.  
d. Marina’s details: blond hair; smoker. 
In the correct photo both details were present. In the first wrong photo the blond 
hair only was present, in the second one the cigarette only. The complete set of 
material is reported in Appendix III. 
This study presents a within-subject 2X2 experimental design. The type of 
responder variable consists of two levels corresponding to acceptors and 
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rejecters, whereas the mode of thinking variable shows two levels 
corresponding to the intuitive and analytical processing.  
3.2.2.2 Pretests 
Before the experimental stage could start, the responders’ photos which were 
included in the experimental task were evaluated across a series of pretests. The 
aim of these pretests was twofold. First, they aimed at verifying that the three 
photos corresponding to each responder were homogeneous as for specific 
features, such as likeableness, attractiveness, humbleness, and friendliness. 
Second, they aimed at assessing whether the four correct photos (one for each 
character) were rated as homogeneous as for the same four features.  In fact, it 
was held it necessary to make sure that within the three photos corresponding to 
each responder the ratings were not different as for the features which could be 
defined as “external” (not distinctive of each psychological portrait) and, at the 
same time, that the four correct photos were rated as equivalent as for these 
features. This was necessary to make sure that the four photos did not differ as 
for the features which were not supposed to be distinctive for each responder’s 
portrait.  
In each pre-test the procedure was the same. Participants were presented with 12 
photos (4 correct and 8 wrong photos). After looking at each photo, subjects 
were requested to evaluate the photo with regard to the four features just 
mentioned (likeableness, attractiveness, friendliness and humbleness) on a 
semantic differential scale.  
In the following paragraphs the series of pre-tests we carried out to test the 
photos are reported.  
 
3.2.2.2.1 Pretest 1 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 16 undergraduates aged from 19 to 
26 (mean age = 23.5 yrs). 
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Analyses and Results 
The assumption of univariant normality was assessed before the analyses. The 
skewness values were within -.95 and .56 and kurtosis values ranged from -.77 
to .25. Then, Mauchly’s test was used to assess the assumption of sphericity. 
Results allowed to assume the sphericity. On each of the features considered a 
repeated measure ANOVA was computed in order to compare the mean ratings 
of the three photo proposed for each responder. Results are reported in Table 
3.9. For each responder, the photo marked with 1 is the correct photo, whereas 
the photo 2 and 3 are the wrong photos.  
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Tab. 3.9 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s photo on each feature 
Features Responder Photo Mean SD F(2,30), P η2 
1 5.18 1.08 
2 5.68 1.54 
Marco 
3 5.67 1.07 
2.143 .135 .088 
1 5.37 1.18 
2 5.50 1.54 
Grazia 
3 4.93 1.34 
1.236 .305 .065 
1 3.81 1.02 
2 4.37 1.33 
Gianni 
3 3.06 1.46 
4.098 <.05 .233 
1 4.12 0.95 












3 3.50 1.35 
1.647 .209 .178 
1 4.25 0.96 
2 4.18 1.67 
Marco 
3 4.19 1.21 
0.015 .985 .001 
1 3.06 1.43 
2 3.76  1.56 
Grazia 
3 3.02 1.53 
4.936 <.005 .266 
1 3.43 1.42 
2 3.93 1.03 
Gianni 
3 3.75 1.26 
6.103 <.05 .198 
1 5.81 1.30 












3 5.35 1.18 
3.075 .061 .201 
1 4.81 0.80 
2 5.25 1.37 
Marco 
3 5.25 1.38 
1.485 .243 ..159 
1 4.37 1.75 
2 4.62 1.56 
Grazia 
3 4.35 1.36 
0.313 .734 .077 
1 2.62 1.58 
2 3.12 0.98 
Gianni 
3 2.31 1.31 
2.329 .115 .097 
1 2.87 1.34 












3 3.00 1.46 
0.758 .477 .085 
1 5.18 1.14 
2 5.68 1.09 
Marco 
3 5.25 1.56 
1.467 .247 .153 
1 5.31 1.19 
2 5.32 1.24 
Grazia 
3 5.06 1.42 
0.205 .701 .075 
1 3.25 1.65 
2 3.37 1.25 
Gianni 
3 3.00 1.26 
5.061 <.05 .164 
1 3.81 1.42 












3 3.50 0.97 
0.535 .591 .054 
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Results showed that within the photos proposed for each responder both Marco 
and Marina’s photos turned out to be homogeneous for all features. On the 
contrary, Grazia’s photos were homogeneous for all features with the exception 
of attractiveness since photo 2 was rated higher than the other two. As for 
Gianni’s photos it emerged that photo 3 was rated less likeable and friendly as 
compared to the other two, and photo 1 was evaluated as being less attractive 
than the other two photos.   
Then, in order to compare the ratings of each correct photo on each feature four 
repeated measure ANOVAs were computed. Results are reported in Table 3.10. 
 
Features Responders Mean SD F(3,45), P η2 
Marco 5.18 1.08 
Grazia 5.37 1.18 




Marina 4.12 0.95 
3.727 <.05 .165 
Marco 4.25 0.96 
Grazia 3.62 1.43 




Marina 5.81 1.30 
3.751 <.05 .153 
Marco 4.81 0.80 
Grazia 4.37 1.75 




Marina 2.87 1.34 
5.411 <.05 .322 
Marco 5.18 1.14 
Grazia 5.31 1.19 




Marina 3.81 1.42 
2.856 <.05 .088 
Tab. 3.10 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings of the correct photos on each feature 
 
Results highlighted that the correct photos were not rated as homogeneous as for 
none of the feature considered. Specifically, Gianni’s correct photo turned out to 
be different form the others’ correct photos. It was rated as less likeable, 
attractive, humble and friendly than the others.  
Given these results, it was decided to change some of the photos. Grazia’s photo 
2, which turned out to be more attractive than the other two photos, was 
changed. A photo of a less attractive and older lady was employed.  Then, since 
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all Gianni photos’ ratings diverged from the others’, we decided to replace all 
three photos. Photos of younger and more smiling men were selected (see 
Appendix III).  
 
3.2.2.2.2 Pretest 2 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 27 undergraduates aged from 18 to 
27 (mean age = 24.5 yrs). 
Analyses and Results 
Before computing the analyses the assumption of univariant normality was 
assessed. The skewness values ranged from -.93 to 1.02 and kurtosis values 
ranged from -1.06 to .43.  
Then, the assumption of sphericity was checked through Mauchly’s test which 
turned out to be not significant for all feature considered. A repeated measure 
ANOVA was carried out on every feature to compare the mean ratings obtained 


















Features Responder Photo Mean SD F(2,52), P η2 
1 4.07 1.43 
2 1.78 0.75 
Marco 
3 4.30 1.48 
23.493 <.001 .678 
1 4.37 1.04 
2 4.96 1.12 
Grazia 
3 4.44 1.25 
2.537 .089 .075 
1 2.74 1.16 
2 2.93 1.43 
Gianni 
3 2.85 1.81 
0.109 .897 .023 
1 2.96 1.40 












3 2.74 1.65 
0.314 .762 .035 
1 4.22 1.18 
2 3.84 1.01 
Marco 
3 2.48 1.05 
19.433 <.001 .598 
1 3.63 1.54 
2 2.33 1.41 
Grazia 
3 3.67 1.34 
4.165 <.05 .266 
1 2.75 1.13 
2 4.48 1.57 
Gianni 
3 2.84 0.90 
23.237 <.001 .693 
1 3.04 0.94 












3 4.56 0.67 
5.331 <.05 .288 
1 4.15 1.46 
2 2.89 1.45 
Marco 
3 4.85 1.09 
17.373 <.001 .512 
1 3.93 1.23 
2 4.96 1.48 
Grazia 
3 4.26 1.55 
5.827 <.05 .244 
1 2.59 1.36 
2 3.07 1.17 
Gianni 
3 3.07 1.26 
1.371 .276 .132 
1 3.78 1.36 












3 3.04 1.28 
3.166 <.05 .354 
1 4.70 1.26 
2 3.70 1.48 
Marco 
3 5.81 1.03 
23.102 <.001 .786 
1 5.48 1.69 
2 5.81 1.38 
Grazia 
3 5.63 1.57 
0.453 .638 .042 
1 4.04 1.55 











3 3.89 1.82 
0.079 .924 .009 
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1 3.89 1.28 
2 4.07 1.59 
Marina 
3 3.85 1.35 
0.230 .795 .013 
Tab. 3.11– Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s photo on each feature 
 
Results showed that Marco’s photos were not rated as homogeneous. 
Specifically, photo 1 was rated as more attractive than the other two; photo 2 
was rated as less humble and friendly as compared to the other two; and, finally, 
photo 3 was rated as more likeable and friendly than the other two photos. 
Grazia’s photo 2 was rated as less humble than the other two photos, probably 
because photo 2 was the only photo portraying a woman who did not look at the 
watcher. Gianni’s photo 2 was evaluated as more attractive than the other two 
photos, probably because the man in photo 2 looked like a younger man. Finally, 
Marina’s photo 1 was rated as more humble than the other tow, probably 
because of her modest clothes.  
Next, four repeated measure ANOVAs were computed in order to compare the 
ratings of each correct photo on each feature. Results are reported in Table 3.12.  
 
Features Responders Mean SD F(3,78), P η2 
Marco 4.07 1.43 
Grazia 4.37 1.04 




Marina 2.96 1.40 
9.710 <.001 .213 
Marco 4.22 1.18 
Grazia 3.63 1.54 




Marina 3.04 0.94 
21.426 <.001 .677 
Marco 4.15 1.46 
Grazia 3.93 1.28 




Marina 3.78 1.36 
7.348 <.001 .198 
Marco 4.70 1.26 
Grazia 5.48 1.69 




Marina 3.89 1.28 
7.115 <.001 .176 
Tab. 3.12 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings of the correct photos on each feature 
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Results highlighted that the photos were rated as not homogeneous as for all the 
features considered. In particular, Gianni and Marina were rated as less likeable 
than the other two responders’ photos. Marco was evaluated as more attractive 
and humble than the others. Finally, Marina was rated as less friendly as 
compared to the others.   
Given these results, Grazia’s photo 2, in which it was portrayed the only woman 
not looking at the observer, was replaced with another photo of the same person, 
who, this time, is looking at the watcher. Gianni’s photo 2 was changed because 
the man in the photo was perceived as more attractive than the others, so it was 
replaced with a photo of an less attractive and older man. Lastly, since Marco’s 
ratings were different from the others, in that they were more attractive and 
humble, all Marco’s photos were replaced with photos of less attractive and 
humble men.  
 
3.2.2.2.3 Pretest 3 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 12 undergraduates aged from 18 to 
25 (mean age = 21.5 yrs). 
Analyses and Results 
The skewness values ranger from -1.01 to .45 and the kurtosis values ranger 
from -.55 to .66, thus confirming the assumption of univariant normality.  
Then, prior to the analyses of variance, Mauchly’s test was used to test the 
assumption of sphericity, Since Mauchly’s test was not significant in all cases, 
the sphericity could be assumed.  On each of the features considered, a repeated 
measure ANOVA was computed in order to compare the mean ratings obtained 





 Tab. 3.13– Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s photo on each feature 
 
Features Responder Photo Mean SD F(2,22), p η2 
1 4.91 1.67 
2 4.75 1.65 
Marco 
3 4.83 1.58 
0.116 .891 .043 
1 4.25 1.35 
2 4.66 1.55 
Grazia 
3 4.75 1.81 
0.826 .451 .067 
1 4.58 1.78 
2 3.41 1.67 
Gianni 
3 3.91 1.62 
1.403 .267 .093 
1 5.16 1.40 












3 4.50 1.00 
0.685 .514 .055 
1 4.83 1.26 
2 4.08 1.56 
Marco 
3 4.33 1.37 
1.571 .230 .101 
1 3.83 1.33 
2 3.50 1.56 
Grazia 
3 3.08 1.55 
1.000 .359 .089 
1 4.41 0.96 
2 3.58 1.56 
Gianni 
3 4.33 1.37 
1.505 .244 .105 
1 5.16 1.40 












3 5.91 1.44 
4.915 <.05 .263 
1 4.25 1.48 
2 4.83 1.19 
Marco 
3 4.58 1.62 
0.576 .571 .044 
1 4.33 1.07 
2 3.91 1.62 
Grazia 
3 4.41 1.88 
0.277 .760 .022 
1 3.83 1.26 
2 2.91 1.62 
Gianni 
3 3.33 0.78 
2.229 .131 .073 
1 3.91 1.37 












3 3.58 1.73 
0.127 .881 .010 
1 4.50 1.83 
2 5.00 1.65 
Marco 
3 5.08 1.56 
1.296 .294 .122 
1 4.58 1.78 
2 5.00 1.89 
Grazia 
3 5.41 1.79 
0.733 .492 .083 
1 4.75 1.28 
2 3.58 1.56 
Gianni 
3 4.33 1.49 
1.994 .160 .154 
1 4.00 1.53 












3 4.58 1.56 
1.000 .384 .086 
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Results showed that all responders’ photos were rated as homogeneous, except 
for Marina’s photo 1 which turned out to be more attractive than the others and 
Marina’s photo 3 which was rated as less attractive than the others. 
Then, in order to compare the ratings of each correct photo on each feature four 
repeated measures ANOVAs were computed. Results are reported in Table 3.14. 
 
Features Responders Mean SD F(3,33), P η2 
Marco 4.91 1.67 
Grazia 4.25 1.35 




Marina 4.16 1.40 
0.869 .467 .082 
Marco 4.83 1.26 
Grazia 3.83 1.33 




Marina 5.16 1.40 
2.262 .100 .066 
Marco 4.25 1.48 
Grazia 4.33 1.07 




Marina 3.91 1.37 
0.447 .721 .008 
Marco 4.50 1.83 
Grazia 4.58 1.78 




Marina 4.00 1.53 
0.587 .628 .014 
Tab. 3.14 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings of the correct photos on each feature 
 
Even though results highlighted that all responders’ photos were rated as 
homogeneous as for all features considered, Marina photo’s rating value for 
attractiveness was higher than the others’ ratings. As a consequence, all 
Marina’s photos were replaced with photos of women who were less attractive 
and less young in order to make even more homogeneous the evaluations.  
 
3.2.2.2.4 Pretest 4 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 16 undergraduates aged from 20 to 
25 (mean age = 24.3 yrs). 
Analyses and Results 
 139
The skewness values varied from -.87 to .33, whereas the kurtosis values varied 
from -.76 to .89. These values allowed to confirm the assumption of univariant 
normality. Before carrying out the ANOVAs, Mauchly’s test was used to assess 
the assumption of sphericity. Since Mauchly’s test was not significant for all 
variables, the sphericity was assumed. A repeated measure ANOVA was carried 
out on each of the features to compare the mean ratings obtained on the three 

























Tab. 3.15– Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s photo on each feature 
 
Features Responder Photo Mean SD F(2,30), P η2 
1 4.85 1.35 
2 4.40 1.29 
Marco 
3 4.10 1.03 
1.575 .229 .103 
1 4.75 1.23 
2 4.90 1.34 
Grazia 
3 4.80 1.33 
0.098 .907 .002 
1 4.13 1.20 
2 3.70 1.29 
Gianni 
3 4.45 1.07 
3.498 .060 .283 
1 4.25 1.48 












3 3.81 1.36 
1.932 .162 .135 
1 4.60 1.32 
2 3.85 1.56 
Marco 
3 4.45 1.41 
3.067 .058 .310 
1 4.05 1.22 
2 3.35 0.83 
Grazia 
3 3.30 1.45 
2.319 .112 .189 
1 4.30 1.74 
2 3.90 0.98 
Gianni 
3 4.20 1.32 
1.901 .310 .154 
1 5.31 1.07 












3 4.81 1.32 
2.913 .087 .203 
1 4.20 1.33 
2 4.00 1.55 
Marco 
3 4.20 1.41 
0.329 .729 .064 
1 4.25 1.03 
2 4.30 1.49 
Grazia 
3 4.05 1.29 
0.243 .785 .043 
1 3.10 0.85 
2 2.55 1.07 
Gianni 
3 3.40 0.98 
3.033 .077 .213 
1 3.56 1.41 












3 2.75 1.39 
0.161 .694 .052 
1 4.95 1.02 
2 4.45 1.37 
Marco 
3 4.70 0.89 
1.610 .213 .312 
1 4.20 1.08 
2 4.35 1.52 
Grazia 
3 3.80 1.48 
3.895 .063 .258 
1 3.98 0.85 
2 4.10 0.99 
Gianni 
3 3.30 1.06 
2.345 .113 .231 
1 3.37 1.40 












3 3.81 1.10 
1.118 .307 .299 
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Results showed that the ratings of all responders on each feature were 
completely homogeneous, thus allowing to conclude that the three photos 
corresponding to each responder were not different in terms of those features, 
such as likeableness and attractiveness, which could interfere in the subsequent 
experimental stage.  
Next,  in order to compare the ratings of the correct photos four repeated 
measure ANOVAs were computed. Results are shown in Table 3.16. 
Tab. 3.16 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings of the correct photos on each feature 
 
Also the correct photos of each responder were rated as homogeneous as for the 
features considered. Making sure that the photos did not differ in terms of 
features that were not intended to be distinctive of each responder’s portrait, we 
could employ the set of photos in the experimental stage. However, prior to this 
application, we decided to test both verbal descriptions and the corresponding 
photos simultaneously to ensure that also the assembled material obtained the 
same ratings.  
 
 
Features Responders Mean SD F(3,45), P η2 
Marco 4.85 1.35 
Grazia 4.75 1.23 




Marina 4.25 1.48 
4.315 .085 .277 
Marco 4.60 1.32 
Grazia 4.05 1.22 




Marina 5.31 1.07 
3.751 .055 .177 
Marco 4.20 1.33 
Grazia 4.25 1.03 




Marina 3.56 1.41 
2.143 .135 .121 
Marco 4.95 1.02 
Grazia 4.20 1.08 




Marina 3.37 1.40 
2.838 .058 .153 
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3.2.2.2.5 Pretest 5  
Once both verbal descriptions (cfr.3.2.2.) and corresponding photos have been 
tested and found out to be employable in the subsequent experimental stage, 
they were assembled and evaluated together. Participants were presented with 
the four responders’ verbal descriptions and their corresponding correct photos 
and were requested to rate them on a differential scale as for the same features 
which were evaluated in the pre-tests (cfr. 4.2.2.). The four responders’ portraits 
were expected to be homogeneous as for “external” features (likeableness, 
attractiveness, friendliness and humbleness), but different as for “internal” 
features which contribute to define the distinctive profile of each character 
(altruism, sense of justice, honesty, personal dignity, unselfishness, generosity). 
Participants 
The experimental sample was composed of 30 undergraduates aged from 19 to 
28 (mean age = 23.6 yrs). 
Analyses and Results 
The univariant normality could be assumed since all skewness values ranged 
from -.88 to .55 and kurtosis values ranger from -1.01 to .46.  
Then, prior to the analysis of variance, Mauchly’s test was employed to test the 
assumption of sphericity. All tests were not significant, thus allowing to assume 
the sphericity.  
On each of the features considered, a repeated measure ANOVA was computed 
in order to compare the mean ratings obtained by the different responders. 









Features Responders Mean SD F(3,87), P η2 
Marco 4.75 1.42 
Grazia 4.64 1.24 




Marina 4.10 1.32 
0.758 .477 .050. 
Marco 5.43 1.07 
Grazia 4.98 1.34 




Marina 3.57 1.14 
4.098 <.05 .235 
Marco 5.25 1.28 
Grazia 6.32 1.68 
Gianni 2.98 1.25 
 
Sense of justice 
 
Marina 3.13 1.34 
18.972 <.001 .601 
Marco 4.67 1.55 
Grazia 3.52 1.05 




Marina 4.91 1.42 
3.077 .080 .172 
Marco 4.25 1.43 
Grazia 4.50 1.39 




Marina 3.68 1.09 
2.154 .167 .088 
Marco 5.71 1.04 
Grazia 6.22 1.00 




Marina 4.01 1.21 
23.907 <.001 .682 
Marco 5.87 1.60 
Grazia 6.08 1.34 




Marina 4.12 1.23 
12.435 <.001 .402 
Marco 6.12 1.12 
Grazia 5.57 1.23 




Marina 3.43 1.24 
24.675 <.001 .701 
Marco 4.89 1.44 
Grazia 4.77 1.53 




Marina 3.66 1.11 
4.008 .076 .257 
Marco 5.79 1.00 
Grazia 4.40 1.03 




Marina 3.44 1.31 
7.674 <.001 .358 
Tab. 3.17 – Repeated-measure ANOVAs comparing ratings obtained by each responder’s portrait on each 
feature 
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Results were in line with what was expected. In fact, all responders’ portraits 
(resulting from the verbal description and the photo assembled) were rated as 
not homogeneous as for the features which contribute to define each distinctive 
profile (altruism, sense of justice, honesty, personal dignity, unselfishness, 
generosity ) and homogeneous as for the “external” features (likeableness, 
attractiveness, friendliness and humbleness). 
Given these results, all material could be employed in the subsequent 
experimental phase.  
3.2.2.3 Participants 
Participants were 65 undergraduate students, 20 males and 45 females, recruited 
from the Catholic University of Milan. Their age ranged between 20 and 27 
years (mean age = 22.9 yrs). They were volunteers who neither were paid nor 
received course credits. Before recruiting participants the experimenter ensured 
that they did not attend any cognitive psychology or economics courses and had 
no notions about the Ultimatum Game.  
3.2.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were asked to play the role of the proposer in a four rounds of one-
shot Ultimatum Game. 
Each participant was requested to complete four rounds Ultimatum Game 
playing the role of the proposer with each of the four fictitious responders and 
splitting the sum of 100 euros. As in classic versions of the Ultimatum Game 
(Camerer & Thaler, 1995) in Study 3 participants had to split 10 euros. 
However, there was evidence that raising the size of the stakes from 10 to 100 
euros had little effect on proposers’ offers (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996). 
Starting from this work and in order to avoid participants not taking the task 
seriously enough, the sum given to the proposer was raised to 100 euros.  
In two out of four rounds participants were induced to process information about 
the responder in  an intuitive way, in the other two rounds in an analytical way. 
The order of the two thinking modes  were counterbalanced across rounds. 
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After reading the instructions of the game, participants were told that they would 
have not known responders personally, but they would have read some 
information about them in order to become acknowledged of the other player 
before making him/her on offer. Information consisted of the psychological 
portraits. Afterwards proposers were asked to match the description they had 
just read with a photo that, in their opinion, was the one portraying the 
responder. To do that, in the intuitive condition participants were asked to trust 
their first impression in completing the task, they had few seconds (3 sec), and 
were mainly presented with the photo only. Conversely, in the analytical 
condition they were hinted at engaging in a deeper analysis of the responder’s 
characteristics, they had more time (30 sec), and were presented with both the 
verbal description and the photos simultaneously. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 schematize 
the entire sequence of both the intuitive and analytical tasks.  
In order to counterbalance the order and the sequence of both the intuitive vs. 
analytical condition and the type of responder 8 different sequences were 
devised. One out of the 8 sequences employed in the study is entirely reported in 
Appendix III. 
Each participant was presented with a sequence which was randomly assigned to 
him/her. The entire sequence was presented on a computer screen through 





Fig. 3.1.  Scheme  of  the  analytical  task 
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3.2.3 Results 
Analyses proceeded as follows. The first analyses we carried out aimed at 
corroborating what emerged in Study 3, so we verified the existence of 
differences among the offers made by participants to the different responders. 
Next, we investigated whether the intuitive vs. analytical modes of thinking 
affected the amount of money offered by participants.   
3.2.3.1 Activation of mindreading processes 
A one-way repeated measure ANOVA was carried out on the data collected to 
confirm that participants were able to differentiate their offers according to the 
psychological portraits of each responder.   
Prior to the analysis the assumption of univariant normality was assessed on the 
offers made to each responder by getting skewness and kurtosis and dividing 
these by the standard errors. The skewness value was .-75, whereas the kurtosis 
value was .-87 as for the offers made to Marco; for the offers made to Grazia the 
skewness was -.55 and the kurtosis .53; for the offers made to Gianni the 
skewness value was .87, whereas the kurtosis -.11; for the offers made to Marina 
the skewness was -1.10 and the kurtosis -.10. 
In Table 3.18 the mean values of money that the proposers offered to each 
responder are reported. 
Responder Mean SD 
Marco 49.31 14.43 
Grazia 49.13 9.45 
Gianni 40.34 15.86 
Marina 40.51 12.63 
Tab. 3.18 – Mean values of money offered to each responder 
 
Prior to the ANOVA, the assumption of sphericity was assessed by using the 
Mauchly’s sphericity test. Since Mauchly’s test did not turn out to be significant 
(Mauchly's W(5) = 0.699, p = .059) the sphericity could be assumed.   
A one-way repeated measure ANOVA showed that mean offers proposed to the 
four responders were significantly different (F (3,192) = 6.479, p <.001). 
Responses confirmed the findings resulting from our previous study. Proposers 
offered larger amount of money to those responders (Marco and Grazia) who 
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were supposed to  reject  low  offers  and  smaller  sum  of  money  to  those  
(Gianni  and  Marina)  who  were  supposed  to  accept  even  low  offers   
Contrast analyses allowed us to conclude that Marco and Grace, who received 
mean offers not significantly different, obtained higher sums of money than the 
other two players (see Table 3.19).  
 
Responders Mean difference F (1,64) P η2 
Gianni – Grazia  -8.793 8.119 <.010 .225 
Gianni – Marco -8.966 7.534 <.010 .212 
Gianni –Marina -.172 0.008 .928 .000 
Grazia – Marco -.172 0.005 .946 .000 
Grazia – Marina 8.621 10.066 <.005 .264 
Marco – Marina 8.793 8.038 <.010 .223 
Tab. 3.19 – Contrast analyses comparing each couple of responder under the mean offered amount of money 
 
Thus, both Study 3 and 4 showed that the characters who were described by 
attributing them psychological features which are supposed to induce them 
either to accept (Gianni and Marina) or to refuse (Grazia and Marco) unfair 
offers actually received, respectively, lower and higher sums of money, so 
proving that mindreading allowed undergraduates to figure out the possible 
reactions of their counterparts. 
3.2.3.2 Intuitive and analytical modes of thinking 
Considering the effects produced by the two modes of thinking on how 
participants split money, we  calculated the mean values of money offered under 
the analytical and the intuitive thinking by collapsing the four different 
responders. As reported in Table 3.20, a one-sample t-test showed that intuitive 
and analytical processing did not lead participants to give significantly different 
sums of money to the responders.  
Tab. 3.20 -  Mean offers under the two modes of thinking and one-sample t-test 
 
Mode  of  thinking Mean SD t (64) p 
Intuitive 44.45 12.34 
Analytical 43.59 11.94 
0.418 .679 
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However, if we consider the offers received by each responder separately under 
the two modes of thinking, it turned out that the offers coherently varied 
according to the different types of responders (see Table 3.21). In fact, even 
though the differences did not reach the significance level except for Marco’s 
offers, results highlighted that intuitive thinking led participants to give higher 
offers than analytical thinking to those responders who could be defined as 
“rejecters” (Marco and Grazia), whereas analytical processing induced them to 
make higher offers than intuitive processing to “acceptors” (Gianni and Marina). 
Responder Instruction Mean SD F(1,64) P η2 
Intuitive 54.66 15.05 
Marco 
Analytical 43.57 11.67 
4.868 <.05 .153 
Intuitive 52.14 9.74 
Grazia 
Analytical 46.33 8.54 
2.921 .099 .098 
Intuitive 35.35 14.99 
Gianni 
Analytical 45.00 15.69 
2.853 .103 .096 
Intuitive 37.85 11.21 
Marina 
Analytical 43.00 13.73 
1.209 .281 .043 
Tab. 3.21  - One-way ANOVAs comparing mean offers given to each responder under the two modes of 
thinking 
 
Starting from these results in order to verify the existence of an interaction effect 
between these two factors, a repeated measure ANOVA assuming the type of 
responder (acceptors vs. rejecters) and the mode of thinking (intuitive vs. 
analytical) as independent within-subject variables was computed. Before 
carrying out the analysis of variance the aggregated means of acceptors (Gianni 
and Marina) and rejecters (Marco and Grazia) were calculated. Mean values are 
reported in Table 3.22.   
Type of responder Modes of thinking Mean SD 
Intuitive 39.31 14.62 
Acceptors 
Analytical 41.55 13.95 
Intuitive 53.44 12.61 
Rejecters 
Analytical 45.00 10.08 
Tab. 3.22 -  Mean offers made to acceptors and rejecters under the two modes of thinking  
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Since Mauchly’s sphericity test was not significant (Mauchly’s W = 0.778, p  = 
.098) the sphericity was assumed. The repeated measure ANOVA confirmed 
that the main effect of the types of responder factor was significant (F(1,64) = 
14.702, p <.001), whereas it showed that the main effect of modes of thinking 
factor was not significant (F (1,64) = 1.255, p =.272). However, interestingly, 
the interaction effect between the two factors reached the significance level 











Fig. 3.3.  Interaction effect type of responder * mode of thinking 
 
Figure 3 clarifies the meaning of the interaction effect between the two factors. 
When people are induced to think intuitively they are better at distinguishing 
their offers according to the psychological features of the opponents. That is, 
intuitive thinking leads people to behave in a more strategic way as compared to 
analytical thinking, which, in turn, results in a less prominent differentiation of 
the offers with regard of the responders’ portraits. In fact, only in the intuitive 
condition the difference between the offers made to the acceptors and rejecters 
turned out to be statistically significant, whereas under the analytical thinking 
offers to acceptors and rejecters, even they were consistent with the 
psychological profiles of the responders, did not differ significantly.  
In order to exclude a possible effect due to the fact that in the processing task 
participants matched the description of the other player with a wrong photo (that 
 Acceptors       Rejecters 
Intuitive 
Analytical 
F=18.865 p <.001 
F=1.021 n.s 
 150
is a photo which did not correspond to the features mentioned in the verbal 
description), and consequently based their offers on different visual cues, we 
counted the right and wrong photo identifications for each character under the 
two conditions. Table 3.23 showed that the distributions of the right and wrong 
responses were similar in the intuitive and analytical conditions, so allowing us 
to maintain that decisions were influenced only by the way in which the 
psychological portrait of the responder was processed.  
Responder Mode  of  thinking Right Wrong 
Intuitive 21 11 
Marco 
Analytical 23 10 
Intuitive 25 6 
Grazia 
Analytical 28 6 
Intuitive 13 19 
Gianni 
Analytical 17 16 
Intuitive 22 15 
Marina 
Analytical 27 11 
Tab. 3.23  - Distribution of right and wrong photo identification for each responder under the two modes of 
thinking 
 
These results were confirmed by two-way ANOVAs carried out for each 
responder by considering the right vs wrong photo identification and the 
intuitive vs. analytical mode of thinking as independent variables: in no case 
significant interaction effect emerged (see Table 3.24). 
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Tab. 3.24 - Mean  offers  given  to  each  responder  by  participants  who  matched  the  right  or  wrong  photos  
to  the  verbal  description  under  the  two  modes  of  thinking 
 
Results indicates that the right vs. wrong photo identification did not interact 
with the intuitive vs. analytical mode of thinking in determining the amount of 
money offered by participants to the responders.  
 
3.2.4 Discussion  
The aims of Study 4 were to deepen both the role of mindreading and the modes 
of thinking in a strategic interactive context. By employing the Ultimatum Game 
as a setting useful to shed light on  how people face the conflict arising by the 
opposite tendencies of maximizing self-interest and of considering the other 
persons' perspective, we were specifically interested in: 
- corroborating the evidence coming out from Study 3 regarding the fact 
that individuals can apply relevant mindreading processes in order to 
identify the psychological features of their partners so to realize when 
they can risk to offer low sums of money by presuming that the 
counterpart will accept them; 
Interaction effect                        
(mode of thinking * photo identification) Responder Mode of thinking 
Photo 
identification Mean SD F(1,64) P η2 
Right  54.28 15.11 Intuitive 
Wrong 55.00 16.03 
Right 42.14 15.23 
Marco 
Analytical 
Wrong 45.00 7.63 
0.042 .839 .002 
Right 52.30 10.12 Intuitive 
Wrong 50.00 9.74 
Right 45.43 8.54 
Grazia 
Analytical 
Wrong 47.22 9.78 
0.057 .813 .003 
Right 38.33 16.02 Intuitive 
Wrong 33.12 14.86 
Right 47.72 14.32 
Gianni 
Analytical 
Wrong 39.50 18.92 
0.167 .687 .070 
Right 38.75 16.63 Intuitive 
Wrong 47.85 8.09 
Right 40.00 11.54 
Marina 
Analytical 
Wrong 32.50 9.57 
2.933 .099 .105 
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- verifying whether different modes of thinking affect how persons share 
given money with another player. 
As for the first issue, Study 4 confirmed what we found in the previous study, 
thus confirming that people can modulate their monetary offers strategically in 
order to be sure that their proposals would have been accepted. Relying on the 
responders’ psychological portraits people could vary their behaviour 
accordingly, thus indicating that the activation of relevant and consistent 
mindreading processes occurred. The findings of the present study provide 
further support to the conclusion we drew in Study 4, that is proposers probably 
realize when low offers may be rejected, so they maximize their gain by acting 
“as if” they are fair. This apparent taste for fairness conceals in reality a great 
ability to be strategic by making those specific decisions which imply a 
renounce to the maximum “impossible” gain in favour of a less-than-maximum 
“possible” one.  
As for the two modes of thinking, it turned out that in the intuitive task 
proposers made offers which were clearly different in relation to the type of 
responder they were playing with. Specifically, under both intuitive and 
analytical conditions proposers offered more money to those responders who 
were supposed to reject low offers and less money to those who were supposed 
to accept even low offers, but, this differentiation sharpened in the intuitive 
condition. It seems that intuitive thinking can lead people to a more strategic and 
functional behaviour when making monetary decisions which imply the 
consideration of the opponent’s psychological features.   
Intuition intensifies the ability, that people already possess, of behaving 
strategically when making economic decisions. Some possible explanations 
could be found by turning to the specific features of the task that people were 
asked to deal with in the present experiment. In fact, it has to be kept in mind 
that the efficiency of analytical and intuitive mode of thinking should not to be 
evaluated in  an absolute way since their accuracy is modulated by the properties 
of the task that they face  (Hammond et al., 1987; McMackin & Slovic, 2000). A 
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first characteristic which is worth taking into account is the amount of 
information people have to process during the task. Specifically, participants 
were requested to “picture” the other player by dealing with and then putting 
together a considerable amount of information presented trough different forms, 
verbal and visual together, in order to complete the task. In fact, they got 
information both reading the detailed responder’s description and looking at 
his/her photo, so that they had to handle information set in  two different codes, 
the verbal and the visual ones. According to some recent studies (Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) these stimuli characteristics, that is the presence 
of numerous relevant attributes to be processed should lead to an optimization of 
the decision at hand under the intuitive mode of thinking. The relative 
superiority of intuition under this circumstances could be explained through the 
limited processing capacity of the brain (Miller, 1956). In fact, when dealing 
with a large amount of relevant information, people run into a low processing 
capacity which did not allow them to take all information into account. This 
could be the case of the present work: the sheer amount of information involved 
in the task may be too much for deliberate analysis to tackle. Conversely, 
instead of a careful and detailed analysis of all information, it could be more 
efficient and functional employing a rapid integration of the information into 
global and holistic “impressions”. Further evidence comes from other studies 
(Pelham & Neter, 1995) which found that the inferiority of a deep analytical 
thought in making decisions with large amount of information can be explained 
by the fact that analytical processing reduces the chance that people take crucial 
information into consideration. Ironically, when information are too much, 
engaging into a precise and accurate analysis allows people neither to 
concentrate on all information at hand, nor to pick up and focus on those 
information which would be necessary and crucial to make that decision 
adequately. 
A part from the large amount of information, another characteristic of the task 
which is worth considering is the object of the elaboration (intuitive or 
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analytical) processes, that is the other player whom people were playing with. 
The “picturing” of other people is a common activity which probably is quite 
familiar to everyone. Previous research have shown that people can make 
affective judgments involving inferences others’ traits from photos quickly and 
almost automatically (Willis & Todorov, 2006). The importance of this ability is 
testified by the fact that people learn very early to understand others’ 
psychological characteristics and predict others’ behaviours. In fact, from the 
ability to grasp the essence of the people surrounding us, from the capacity to 
rapidly catch the psychological features of the people whom we continuously 
interact with, it depends the probability of living serenely and successfully. For 
this reason, people are quite used to “deal with” others’ psychological portraits, 
thus making the task of processing others’ psychological profile a quite habitual 
task. People are probably very familiar with this kind of task, and, as a 
consequence, they have developed across years a relevant expertise. Once 
people become familiar with and expert in picturing other people, this expertise 
could lead, to some extent, to automaticity. It could be the case that people are 
used to form an opinion about another person rapidly, almost automatically, 
without engaging in a detailed analysis of each single feature, but, rather, taking 
into account the entirety of that person. People have an implicit learning, 
accumulated across years, concerning the evaluation of others’ features. As a 
consequence, the intuitive thinking, which stems from implicit learning, could 
represent a better way of picturing the person we are interacting with as 
compared to the analytical thinking. Intuition could be the result of the 
experience that people have gained which allows them to form holistic, and 
complete impression of the other, in considerable low amount of time. For this 
reason, in our experiment, intuitive thinking could have led to a better 
differentiation of the responder types because this mode of elaboration is the 
most familiar and habitual way employed when picturing the others. Moreover, 
given the intrinsic quality of intuitive thinking, that is allowing to grasp the 
object to be evaluated in its entirety, it constitutes a better way to capture the 
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essence of a person as compared to the analytical thinking which, conversely, 
breaks up the object into details that makes it difficult to form a global 
impression going beyond each single particular (Stephen & Pham, 2008).  
A further explanation for the superiority of intuition in our studies could be 
found if considering the output of intuitive processing. Different studies 
highlighted that intuition-based decisions tend to be more “gist-based” (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995), that is relying on intuition leads to invoke condensed 
representations of the situation than relying on analysis which, conversely, 
induces to invoke more intricate representations of the situation (Epstein & 
Pacini, 1999; Stephen & Pham, 2008). The reliance on intuitive thinking should 
lead to simpler, clearer (Stephen & Pham, 2008), more unambiguous (van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2006) and polarized (Dijksterhuis, 2004) representation of the 
situation at hand as compared to the reliance on analytical thinking. Ambiguity 
and uncertainty are poor represented in intuition (Kahneman, 2003), thus 
making intuitive thinking result in dichotomous representations. On the 
contrary, analytical thinking produces more elaborate construals that also 
include various implications and considerations resulting in less clear defined 
representations of the situation. In our experiment, this could have led people to 
clearly distinguish the different types of responder under the intuitive thinking, 
whereas they were induced to represent them in a less polarized way under the 
analytical thinking. This could explain why proposals made under the intuitive 
thinking were clearly differentiated in low or high offers, whereas proposals 
made under the analytical thinking were in-between.  
Finally, an additional explanation for our results could derive from some studies 
carried out in the field of mindreading and empathy. An important finding 
concerns the fact that efficient mindreading abilities mostly rely on automatic 
processes. It seems that people represent the others’ mental states in terms of 
their own states, almost without being aware of it (Singer & Fehr, 2005). This 
mechanism could be explained by turning to the fact that, without thinking, the 
perceived intentions and expectations of other automatically activate brain 
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networks that also represent our own intentions and expectations. Some authors 
suggest that the so-called “mirror neurons”, which are supposed to represent the 
neural basis for mindreading and empathy, might provide people with an 
automatic simulation of others’ actions, intentions, and expectations (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002). For this reason it could be argued 
that the intuitive thinking, which implies a rapid and automatic evaluation of the 
situation at hand, is more suitable for dealing with the attribution of mental 
states to the others. This could further accounts for intuition being the best way 
of processing information about others’ psychological portraits.  
In  conclusion,  we  are  induced  to  believe  that  the  activation  of  
mindreading  processes  leads  to  behaviours  which  change  depending  on  the  
psychological  characteristics  of  the  responders.  Furthermore  we  can  
conclude  that  these behaviours  are modulated  by  the joint effect of the other 
player’s psychological portrait and the mode of thinking employed in processing 
the information concerning him/her.  
 
3.3 STUDY 5  
 
3.3.1 Aims 
Study 5, a part from corroborating the findings coming out from both Study 3 
and 4, was specifically aimed at verifying whether the individual style (intuitive 
vs. analytical) affect the amount of money offered by participants. We did not 
expect an effect of the individual style per se, but, rather a modulation of the 
effect of the thinking mode (activated by the intuitive vs. analytical task) we had 
previously found (see Study 4) on the offers made to the responders. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that the existence of a fit between individual style 
and mode of thinking (e.g. both intuitive) led to a more strategic decisional 
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behaviour, that is a greater differentiation of the offers depending on the 
psychological portraits of the opponents. 
Additionally, even though it could be considered as a secondary aim, and not the 
main goal of Study 5, we were interested in investigating whether participants’ 
physiological activation varied depending on both the intuitive vs. analytical 
individual style and the intuitive vs. analytical modes of thinking during the 
Ultimatum Game. In fact, in case it would emerge behavioural differences 
between intuition and analysis, it would be interesting to control for the 
participants’ physiological activation corresponding to both intuitive and 
analytical strategies and styles. This could be necessary in order to clarify 
whether these behavioural differences depend on a different level of arousal and 
physiological activation or on the specific quality of each type of elaboration 
process. We expected that the physiological activation was higher as for the 
intuitive people and for the intuitive thinking as compared to the analytical 




The version of the Ultimatum Game employed in Study 4 was used (cfr. 4.2.2.). 
In the present study, however, stimuli were presented through STIM-II software 
in order to make it possible to simultaneously register the physiological indexes 
with Biofeedback.  
The study presents a mixed 2X2X2 experimental design. The type of responder 
variable is within-subject and shows two levels corresponding to the acceptors 
and rejecters. The mode of thinking is a within-subject variable which involves 
two levels corresponding to the intuitive and analytical processing. The 
individual style is between-subject with two levels corresponding to the intuitive 




The experimental sample consisted of the 29 participants who, in Study 2, were 
identified as people showing either an “extreme” analytical or “extreme” 
intuitive cognitive and decision profile (cfr. 3.3.4). Specifically, 13 participants 
were classified as intuitive people (2 males and 11 females; ranged from 19 to 
32 years, mean age = 22.9 yrs), whereas 16 participants as analytical people (2 
males and 14 females; ranged from 18 to 48 years, mean age = 27.1 yrs).  
3.3.2.3 Procedure 
Data were collected in January 2008. The procedure was the same used in Study 
4. Participants were requested to play the role of the proposer in four rounds 
Ultimatum Game, each round with one of the four different fictitious 
responders. In each round they were asked to split 100 euros with the other 
player. As in Study 3, in two out of four rounds participants were induced to 
process information about the responder in an intuitive way, in the other two 
rounds in an analytical way. The order and the sequence of the two thinking 
modes and the type of responders were counterbalanced across rounds. Each 
participant was randomly assigned one out of the 8 sequences.  
In the present study while participants were playing Ultimatum Game, the 
physiological indexes of were continuously recorded. Before starting the 
Ultimatum Game 1 minute of baseline was recorded. Presentation of the stimuli 
in the Ultimatum Game and pressing a response key were synchronized with the 
sampling computer. All testing was done in a quite and dimly-lit room on a 
computer. Stimuli were presented through STIM-II software and physiological 
indexes were simultaneously recorded with Biofeedback. 
Since the experimental procedure was quite long and complex, including also 
the physiological registration, participants received a breakfast voucher after the 
experimental session took place.  
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3.3.3 Results  
Statistical analysis were as follows. First, we tested the existence of differences 
among the offers made by participants to the different types of responder, thus 
providing further confirmations to the  findings coming out from Study 3 and 4. 
Then, we verified the effect of the mode of thinking (intuitive vs. analytical) on 
the amount of money offered by participants, so to corroborate what emerged 
from Study 4. Next, we investigated how individual style (intuitive vs. 
analytical) affected the sums of money offered to the responders, and, more in 
details, the possible interaction effect between individual style and mode of 
thinking employed. Finally, we controlled for the physiological pattern of 
activation depending on the individual style and mode of thinking.  
3.3.3.1 Activation of mindreading processes  
Before carrying out the analyses it was assessed the assumption of univariant 
normality on the offers made to each responder by getting skewness and kurtosis 
and dividing these by the standard errors. The skewness value was -.01, whereas 
the kurtosis value was -.41 as for the offers made to Marco; for the offers made 
to Grazia the skewness was -.52 and the kurtosis 1.84; for the offers made to 
Gianni the skewness value was -.79, whereas the kurtosis value was .05; for the 
offers made to Marina the skewness was 1.35 and the kurtosis 1.45. Since 
kurtosis and skewness values of the offers made to marina and the kurtosis value 
of the offers made to Marina were out of standard parameters (+1 to -1 range; 
Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997), the outlier analysis was computed in order 
to identify any possible outlier for these two variables. Two outliers were After 
deleting the outliers, the skewness and kurtosis values were calculated again. All 
skewness and kurtosis values turned out to be included between +1 and -1, thus 
allowing to conclude that the assumption of normality was kept. Specifically, 
the skewness values ranged from -.82 to .20, whereas the kurtosis values ranged 
from -.53 to .85.  As a consequence, the experimental sample was then 
constituted of 27 participants.  
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After assessing the assumption of univariant normality, a repeated measure 
ANOVA was carried out in order to verify whether participants could 
differentiate their offers depending on the responders’ psychological portraits. 
Prior to the analysis, the sphericity assumption was checked by using Mauchly’s 
sphericity test. It turned out to be not significant (Mauchly’s W(5) = 0.946, p 
=.927), thus indicating that the assumption was not violated.   
In Table 3.25 the mean values of money offered to each responder were 
reported. 
Responder Mean SD 
Marco 54.03 18.11 
Grazia 50.55 14.95 
Gianni 38.66 15.51 
Marina 33.33 11.51 
Tab. 3.25 – Mean values of money offered to each responder 
 
A one-way repeated measure ANOVA confirmed that the offers proposed to the 
four responders were significantly different (F (3,78) = 16.697, p <.001). As 
emerged in both Study 3 and 4, responses confirmed that proposers could 
differentiate their offers depending on the psychological portrait of the specific 
responder they were playing with.  
Contrast analyses provided further evidence that, as already emerged in both 
previous studies, proposers offered more money to potentially “rejecters” 
responders (Marco and Grazia) as compared to “acceptors” responders (Gianni 
and Marina) (see Table 3.26).  
 
Responders Mean difference F (1,26) P η2 
Gianni – Grazia  -11.889 21.669 < .005 .455 
Gianni – Marco -15.370 20.929 < .001 .446 
Gianni –Marina 5.333 2.916 .100 .101 
Grazia – Marco -3.481 1.253 .273 .046 
Grazia – Marina -17.222 23.961 < .001 .479 
Marco – Marina -20.704 35.023 < .001 .574 





3.3.3.2 Intuitive and analytical modes of thinking 
In order to test the effect of the two different modes of thinking on the offers 
made by participants to the responders, the mean values of money offered under 
the two modes of thinking were calculated by collapsing the four different 
responders. Table 3.27 shows the results of the one-sample t-test computed on 
the offers under the intuitive and analytical thinking.  
Tab. 3.27 -  Mean offers under the two modes of thinking and one-sample t-test 
 
As in Study 4, the t-test was not significant, thus confirming that the offers made 
under the two modes of thinking were not significantly different. However, as 
previously found, considering the offers received by each responder separately 
under the two modes of thinking, it turned out that, even if the differences did 
not reach the significance level, intuitive thinking induced participants to offer 
larger amount of money than analytical thinking to those responders who could 
be defined as “rejecters” (Marco and Grazia), whereas analytical processing 
induced them to make higher offers than intuitive processing to “acceptors” 
(Gianni and Marina). Results of the one-way ANOVAs are reported in Table 
3.28.  
Responder Mode of thinking Mean SD F(1,26) P η2 
Intuitive 54.35 21.55 
Marco 
Analytical 53.20 14.22 
0.025 .875 .008 
Intuitive 51.78 12.50 
Grazia 
Analytical 46.00 17.30 
0.203 .656 .008 
Intuitive 34.66 16.48 
Gianni 
Analytical 42.42 12.16 
1.998 .169 .062 
Intuitive 31.78 11.02 
Marina 
Analytical 35.00 12.24 
1.665 .208 .061 
Tab. 3.28  - One-way ANOVAs comparing mean offers given to each responder under the two modes of 
thinking 
 
Mode  of  thinking Mean SD t (26) P 
Intuitive 43.14 15.14 
Analytical 44.97 15.54 
-0.919 .366 
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Given these results, in order to verify the existence of an interaction effect 
between the type of responder and the mode of thinking variables, a repeated 
measure ANOVA was carried out. After calculating the aggregated mean values 
of the type of responder and modes of thinking (see Table 3.29), a repeated 
measure ANOVA was computed assuming the type of responder (acceptors vs. 
rejecters) and the mode of thinking (intuitive vs. analytical) as within-subjects 
factors.   
Type of responder Modes of thinking Mean SD 
Intuitive 33.20 8.48 
Acceptors 
Analytical 38.38 6.44 
Intuitive 52.07 8.31 
Rejecters 
Analytical 49.37 15.64 
Tab. 3.29 -  Mean offers made to acceptors and rejecters under the two modes of thinking 
 
The assumption of sphericity was verified through Mauchly’s sphericity test 
which was not significant (Mauchly’s W = 0.655, p =.101). The repeated 
measure ANOVA confirmed that the main effect of the types of responder factor 
was significant (F(1,26) = 63.527 p <.001), whereas it showed that the main 
effect of modes of thinking factor was not significant (F (1,26) = 0.382, p 
=.539). However, interestingly, the interaction effect between the two factors 












 Rejectors     Acceptors 
F = 10.420 p <.005 
F = 68.145 p <.001 
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As already found in Study 4, it turned out that the intuitive mode of thinking 
induced people to a better differentiation of their offers according to the 
characteristics of the responders. These results highlight that intuition makes 
people behave in a more strategic way compared to analysis which results in a 
less pronounced difference between the offers made to the two types of 
responders. Even if, contrary to Study 4, in the present study also in the 
analytical condition people can make different offers according to the 
opponent’s features, the same trend emerges. In fact, also in this study the 
intuitive thinking leads to a more pronounced differentiation between the offers 
as compared to the analytical condition. The slight difference is probably due to 
typology of experimental sample employed in this study, whose components 
have been accurately selected as compared to the previous study’s sample which 
was randomly chosen.   
As in Study 4, the right and wrong photo identifications for each character under 
the two conditions were counted in order to exclude a possible effect due to the 
fact that an incorrect matching photo-verbal description would have influenced 
the participants’ offering behaviour.  As shown in Table 30, the distributions of 
the right and wrong responses were similar in the intuitive and analytical 
conditions. Both this distribution and the results of two-way ANOVAs 
computed for each responder by considering the right vs. wrong photo 
identification and the intuitive vs. analytical thinking as independent factors 
allowed us to conclude that offers were influenced only by the way in which the 
psychological portrait of the responder was processed. In fact, as in Study 4, no 
interaction effect between photo identifications and modes of thinking emerged 







Tab. 3.30– Distribution of right and wrong identifications (frequencies are reported in brackets in the “photo 
identification" column), mean  offers  given  to  each  responder  by  participants  who  matched  the  right  or 
wrong  photos  to  the  verbal  description  under  the  two  modes  of  thinking, and ANOVAs’ results 
 
3.3.3.3 Intuitive and analytical style 
First, we verified whether the participants’ individual style affected the total 
amount of money they offered, regardless to both the type of responder and the 
mode of thinking employed.  
Before comparing the mean values of money offered by intuitive and analytical 
participants through  a one-way ANOVA, the assumption of homogeneous 
variances was tested by using Levene’s test (Levene, 1960). Since p-value was 
not significant (p = .422), the analysis of variance was possible.  
In Table 3.31 ANOVA’s results are reported.   
Individual style Mean SD F P η2 
Intuitive 43.25 13.22 
Analytical 44.76 9.28 
0.123 .729 .070 
Tab. 3.31 -  Mean offers given by intuitive and analytical participants and one-way ANOVA 
  
Results showed that the mean values of offered made by intuitive and analytical 
people were almost the same, thus revealing that the individual style did not 
influence the total amount of money  offered to the responders. 
Interaction effect                        
(mode of thinking * photo identification) Responder Mode of thinking 
Photo 
identification Mean SD F(1,26) p η2 
Right (11) 54.63 11.24 Intuitive 
Wrong (11) 40.00 28.28 
Right (3) 51.63 22.46 
Marco 
Analytical 
Wrong (2) 65.00 7.07 
2.039 .167 .085 
Right (12) 52.08 13.04 Intuitive 
Wrong (12) 52.29 12.05 
Right (2) 49.00 14.49 
Grazia 
Analytical 
Wrong (1) 55.00 21.21 
2.135 .158 .088 
Right (11) 33.63 18.04 Intuitive 
Wrong (3) 35.00 21.21 
Right (8) 45.00 13.09 
Gianni 
Analytical 
Wrong (5) 38.80 12.23 
0.250 .622 .011 
Right (10) 30.50 11.65 Intuitive 
Wrong (11) 33.30 11.54 
Right (3) 34.50 12.12 
Marina 
Analytical 
Wrong (3) 36.66 15.27 
0.003 .954 .001 
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Next, we investigated whether the offers varied depending on both the 
participants’ individual style and the mode of thinking employed. Prior to the 
application of the analysis of variance, Levene's test  was used to verify the 
assumption that variances were equal across samples. For each variable the 
resulting p-value of Levene’s test were not statistically significant (p =.981 as 
for intuitive and p =.105 for analytical).Then two one-way ANOVAs were 
carried out assuming the individual style as independent variable and the total 
amount of offer made under the two modes of thinking as dependent variables. 
Results are reported in Table 3.32.  
Individual style Mode of thinking Mean SD F p η2 
Intuitive 41.36 16.17 
Intuitive 
Analytical 45.13 21.61 
.144 .707 .059 
Intuitive 43.15 15.05 
Analytical 
Analytical 47.00 10.29 
.132 .718 .060 
Tab. 3.32 -  One-way ANOVAs comparing mean offers given by intuitive and analytical participants under the 
two modes of thinking 
 
No significant differences emerged, thus highlighting that intuitive or analytical 
people did not make different offers when they process information about the 
responders in an intuitive or analytical way.  
Then, we verified whether the offers varied as a function of both the 
participants’ individual style and the type of responder to whom the offers were 
made.  
Before running the analyses of variance, the assumption of homogeneous 
variances was tested by using Levene’s test. Since p-value were not significant 
(p = .452 as for the acceptors and p =.132 for the rejecters), the analysis of 
variance was possible. Two one-way ANOVAs were carried out assuming the 
individual style as independent factor and the amount of offers given to 





Type of responder Individual style Mean SD F P η2 
Intuitive 33.18 9.55 
Acceptors 
Analytical 37.93 11.77 
1.231 .278 .047 
Intuitive 53.31 20.55 
Rejecters 
Analytical 52.21 9.64 
.035 .853 .010 
Tab. 3.33 -  One-way ANOVAs comparing mean offers given by intuitive and analytical participants to the 
different types of responder 
 
The analysis showed that no significant differences emerged. However, in line 
with what we found in Study 4, it turned out that intuitive people showed a 
greater differentiation of the offers than analytical people depending of the other 
players’ features. These results suggested that, rather than being influential on 
the offers per sè, the participants’ individual style probably interacted with the 
other variables, such as the type of responder, in modulating the amount of 
money offered by participants.  
As a consequence, in order to verify the existence of possible interaction effects 
among the variables considered, a mixed ANOVA was carried out by assuming 
the participants’ individual style as between-subject variable, the type of 
responder and the mode of thinking as within-subject variables. Prior to the 
ANOVA, the Mauchly’s test was used to assess the assumption of sphericity. 
Since it was not significant (Mauchly’s W = 0.587, p  = .121), the sphericity 
could be assumed. Table 3.34 reports the mean values of money offered by 
intuitive and analytical participants under the two modes of thinking to the 
different types of responder. 
 
Type of responder Individual style Mode of thinking Mean SD 
Intuitive 33.75 5.68 
Intuitive 
Analytical 32.50 10.15 
Intuitive 33.12 8.18 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 42.75 4.11 
Intuitive 51.31 12.39 
Intuitive 
Analytical 52.59 14.07 
Intuitive 52.69 16.55 
Rejecters 
Analytical 
Analytical 47.12 15.11 
Tab. 3.34 - Mean offers by intuitive and analytical participants under the two modes of thinking to the different 
types of responder 
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The mixed ANOVA’s results are reported in Table 3.35.  
 
Effects F(1,26) p η2 
Type of responder 86.449 <.001 .776 
Mode of thinking 0.661 .424 .026 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 2.989 <.05 .074 
Type of responder * individual style 1.766 .196 .066 
Mode of thinking * individual style 0.059 .811 .020 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * 
individual style 
1.561 .223 .059 
Tab. 3.35 -  Mixed ANOVA comparing mean offers given by intuitive and analytical participants under the two 
modes of thinking to the different types of responder 
 
Results confirmed the main effect of the type of responder and the interaction 
effect between the type of responder and the mode of thinking on the offers, 
whereas no other significant effects emerged. Nevertheless, comparing the mean 
offers made by intuitive and analytical people under the two modes of thinking, 
it came out that intuitive people offered almost the same amount of money to 
either acceptors or rejecters when they think intuitively or analytically. 
Conversely, analytical people offered the same money as the intuitive people 
only when they think intuitively, whereas they offered sums of money which 
slightly diverged from all the other offers when they think analytically. 
Specifically, when analytical people were induced to think analytically they 
offered less money to the rejecters and more money to the acceptors as 
compared to all the other experimental conditions. This behaviour can be 
defined as inadequate, since it leads people to make the choices that do not 
allow them to gain as much as possible given the psychological portraits of the 
responders. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 visually represents the mean offers to acceptors 
and rejecters under the “match” condition (intuitive people thinking intuitively; 
analytical people thinking analytically) and the “mismatch” condition (intuitive 
people thinking analytically; analytical people thinking intuitively). The 
“match” condition scheme shows that in the analytical case (style and thinking) 
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the difference between offers made to acceptors and rejecters are less prominent 
as compared to the intuitive one. In both “mismatch” conditions, conversely, 
offers are exactly the same, and, in addition, they are similar to the intuitive-
match condition. It seems that the combination of analytical style and analytical 
























Fig. 3.6.  “Mismatch condition”:  non-correspondence between individual style and mode of thinking  
 
     Acceptors                  Rejecters 
     Acceptors                  Rejecters 
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3.3.3.4 Learning effect 
If Ultimatum Game has been played more than once, it can be the case the some 
order effects can rise (Roth & Erev, 1995). In addition, a certain form of 
learning can develop across rounds representing an intervenient variable whose 
influence should be detected. In fact, however, the order and the sequence of all 
experimental conditions have been counterbalanced across participants, it held it 
necessary to control these possible effects.  
As a consequence, the mean values of money offered in the 1st round of the 
game to each responder were compared to both the total mean offers made to the 
same responder and to the offers made in all the other rounds (2nd, 3rd, and 4th 
rounds).   
Before running the one-sample t-tests, the assumption of univariant normality 
was assessed. All the skewness values ranged from -.89 to .37, and the kurtosis 
values ranged from -.65 to .99, thus normality could be assumed. In Table 3.36 
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Tab. 3.36-  Mean offers (SD in brackets) to each responder for each round and t-test comparing the mean offers 
of the first round with the other rounds and the total mean offers for each responder 
 
Results highlighted that no differences between the offers made in the 1st round 
and the offers made in all the other rounds to each responder were signifcant, 
thus allowing to exclude any possible order and learning effects. 
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Then, the offers made in the 1st round under either the intuitive or the analytical 
mode of thinking were compared to the total mean offers made under the same 
mode of thinking and to the offers made in all the other subsequent rounds.  
Prior to the analyses, the skewness and kurtosis values were calculated. All 
values were within the +1 and -1 range, thus allowing to assume the univariant 
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 p =.996 
1.472 
 p =.167 
1.372  
p =.195 
Tab. 3.37-  Mean offers (SD in brackets) under the two modes of thinking for each round and t-test comparing 
the mean offers of the first round with the other rounds and the total mean offers under each mode of thinking 
 
In conclusion, results allowed to conclude that the offers made in the 1st round 
were not different from the total mean offers and the offers made in all other 
subsequent rounds both with respect to the type of responder and the mode of 
thinking.   
3.3.3.5 Physiological activation 
Most neurobiological studies identified a correspondence between specific 
mental process and neural events. This correspondence (or non-correspondence) 
can contribute to deepening the understanding of the mental processes in  hand.  
The series of subsequent analyses reported below was carried out in order to 
verify the existence of different pattern of physiological activation depending on 
the participants’ individual style, the mode of thinking, and the type of 
responder. The Ultimatum Game literature has recently been extended to the 
investigation of the neurobiological bases of the game. However, neuroimaging 
techniques (Sanfey et al., 2003) and ERP methodology (Polezzi et al., 2008) 
have been mainly employed (Sanfey et al., 2003), whereas, to our knowledge, 
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only one study implied the registration of the autonomic activity connected to 
decisions in the Ultimatum Game as a measure of emotional and attentional 
arousal (van’t Wout et a., 2006). However, this study measured the responder’s 
autonomic activity associated with the rejection of unfair offers. Hence, no 
previous studies have been conducted to investigate the proposer’s autonomic 
activation, and no other studies researched into the autonomic activity connected 
with intuition and analysis, neither intended as mode of thinking, nor as 
individual style.  
In particular, in the present study, since previous studies indicating which 
physiological measure was particularly suitable for the scope were lacking, it 
was decided to register a broad range of indexes. Specifically, the following 
indexes of autonomic activation were registered: skin conductance level (SCL), 
skin conductance response (SCR), electromyography (EMG), blood pressure 
volume (BVP), pulse volume amplitude (PVA), and pulse frequency (PF).  
Before comparing the mean physiological indexes depending on the 
participants’ individual style, the mode of thinking, and the type of responder, 
we verified that, as predictable, the physiological activation varied across the 
different phases of the experimental task. In particular, the mean values of the 
autonomic indexes recorded in the following phases were compared: a. reading 
of the responder’s verbal description; b. explanation of the task to be completed 
(matching the description and the photo); c. presentation of the three photos; d. 
identification of the correct photo; e. proposal of offer.  
Before carrying out the repeated measure ANOVAs, the assumption of 
sphericity was assessed by using Mauchly’s tests. For each physiological index 
Mauchly’s test turned out to be significant   (scl: Mauchly’s W(9) = .101, p 
<.001; scr: Mauchly’s W(9) = .260, p <.001; emg: Mauchly’s W(9) = .031, p 
<.001; bvp: Mauchly’s W(9) = .359, p <.005; pva: Mauchly’s W(9) = .196, p 
<.001; pf: Mauchly’s W(9) = .319, p <.005), thus inducing us to use the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violation of sphericity. ANOVAs results are 




Physiological index Phase  Mean SD F p η2 
Description reading 23.71 15.09 
Task explanation 23.11 14.68 
Photos presentation 23.38 14.78 
Photo identification 24.06 15.12 
SCL 
Offer proposal 24.58 15.12 
14.213 
(df 2.319, 57.979) <.001 .362 
Description reading -0.03 .04 
Task explanation -0.01 .03 
Photos presentation 0.02 .08 
Photo identification 0.02 .08 
SCR 
Offer proposal 0.01 .09 
4.352 
(df 3.018, 75.438) <.05 .148 
Description reading 13.42 13.60 
Task explanation 13.36 13.91 
Photos presentation 13.32 13.99 
Photo identification 13.20 13.84 
 
EMG 
Offer proposal 13.09 13.65 
1.422 
(df 1.715, 42.885) .229 .054 
Description reading 74.68 9.18 
Task explanation 74.63 9.21 
Photos presentation 74.74 9.24 
Photo identification 74.32 9.12 
BVP 
Offer proposal 74.68 9.24 
5.127 
(df 2.927, 73.173) <.05 .170 
Description reading 17.63 12.70 
Task explanation 18.10 13.13 
Photos presentation 17.78 12.97 
Photo identification 16.82 12.05 
PVA 
Offer proposal 15.55 11.06 
10.529 
(df 2.204, 55.103) <.001 .296 
Description reading 91.07 13.69 
Task explanation 90.62 13.89 
Photos presentation 89.31 13.28 
Photo identification 90.51 13.71 
PF 
Offer proposal 92.30 14.11 
6.282 
(df 2.446, 61.162) <.005 .133 
Tab. 3.38-  Repeated measure ANOVAs comparing mean values of each physiological index registered 
depending on the different phases of the UG 
 
Results showed that, as we expected, most physiological indexes varied across 
the different phases of the experimental task. In particular, it turned out that the 
autonomic activation was higher in those specific phases which implied an 
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active involvement of the participants, such as the “photo identification” and the 
“offer proposal”.  
Then, a series of one-way ANOVAs was computed in order to verify the 
existence of different pattern of physiological activation in intuitive and 
analytical people regardless of every other factors. Before running the analyses, 
the skewness and kurtosis values were calculated. The skewness values varied 
from -.57 to 1.02 and the kurtosis values ranged from -.38 to .02. So, the normal 
distribution of the data was assumed. The assumption of homogeneous variances 
was tested by using Levene’s test. Since p-values were not significant (p-values 
varied from .27 to .98), the analysis of variance was possible. ANOVAs results 
are reported in Table 3.39.  
 
Physiological index Individual style Mean SD F(1,26) P η2 
Intuitive 26.22 19.60 
SCL 
Analytical 20.75 5.34 
0.876 .359 .013 
Intuitive 0.02 0.04 
SCR 
Analytical -0.02 0.05 
3.552 .072 .120 
Intuitive 14.34 13.23 
EMG 
Analytical 11.78 13.67 
0.233 .634 .007 
Intuitive 75.20 9.70 
BVP 
Analytical 73.83 9.13 
0.134 .717 .004 
Intuitive 14.61 10.49 
PVA 
Analytical 18.96 14.89 
0.758 .392 .011 
Intuitive 90.16 15.22 
PF 
Analytical 92.72 12.96 
0.209 .652 .005 
Tab. 3.39-  One-way ANOVAs comparing mean values of each physiological index registered depending on the 
individual style 
 
Results highlighted that intuitive and analytical people did not differ in terms of 
any physiological index, thus indiciating that the individual style did not result 
in distinct autonomic pattern of activation.   
Next, we investigated whether the different modes of thinking (intuitive vs. 
analytical) gave rise to difference in physiological activation. One-sample t-tests 
were computed for each index. Prior to the analyses, the skewness and kurtosis 
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values were calculated. Since the skewness values varied from -.55 to .87 and 
the kurtosis values ranged from -.20 to .12, the normal distribution of the data 
was assumed. Then, the assumption of homogeneous variances was tested by 
using Levene’s test. Since p-values were not significant (p-values varied from 
.10 to .48), the analysis of variance was possible. T-tests’ results are reported in 
Table 3.40.  
 
Physiological index Mode of thinking Mean SD t(26) P η2 
Intuitive 25.92 19.85 
SCL 
Analytical 21.26 5.39 
0.617 .440 .025 
Intuitive 0.01 0.02 
SCR 
Analytical -0.01 0.05 
2.763 .109 .103 
Intuitive 14.64 14.31 
EMG 
Analytical 11.69 13.61 
0.286 .598 .012 
Intuitive 75.13 9.59 
BVP 
Analytical 74.01 9.09 
0.092 .764 .004 
Intuitive 16.42 11.56 
PVA 
Analytical 18.06 13.63 
0.110 .744 .005 
Intuitive 89.37 14.41 
PF 
Analytical 92.38 13.02 
0.307 .585 .013 
Tab. 3.40-  One sample t-tests comparing mean values of each physiological index registered under the two 
modes of thinking 
 
No differences between intuitive and analytical thinking emerged on any of the 
physiological index considered, thus leading us to conclude that the autonomic 
activation was not affected by the specific mode of elaboration employed.  
The effect of the responder type on the values of physiological indexes was 
verified through a  series of one-sample t-tests. Since both the assumption of 
univariant normal distribution (skewness and kurtosis values varied from -.95 to 
.77 as for the skewness and from -.34 to .52 as for the kurtosis) and sphericity 
(Mauchly’s W(9) = .572, p =.102) were confirmed, we proceeded with the 






Physiological index Type of responder Mean SD t(26) P 
Acceptors 23.97 14.82 
SCL 
Rejecters 23.57 15.17 
0.812 .424 
Acceptors 0.006 0.04 
SCR 
Rejecters 0.001 0.04 
0.719 .479 
Acceptors 12.96 13.17 
EMG 
Rejecters 13.59 14.57 
-0.967 .343 
Acceptors 74.55 9.21 
BVP 
Rejecters 74.65 9.18 
-1.130 .269 
Acceptors 17.22 13.14 
PVA 
Rejecters 17.13 11.73 
0.119 .976 
Acceptors 90.68 13.51 
PF 
Rejecters 90.84 13.98 
-0.251 .804 
Tab. 3.41-  One sample t-tests comparing mean values of each physiological index registered while playing UG 
with the different type of responder 
 
Since no differences emerged in any case, results showed that the physiological 
activation was not affected by the type of responder the participants were 
playing with.  
Finally, a mixed ANOVA was carried out for each physiological index  to 
compare the mean values of each index depending on the specific responder 
who received the sum of money (acceptros vs. rejecters), the mode in which the 
responders’ information were processed (intuitive vs. analytical) and the 










Physiological index Type of responder Individual style Mode of thinking Mean SD 
Intuitive 19.12 3.75 Intuitive 
Analytical 25.11 15.51 
Intuitive 22.40 5.96 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 27.51 23.22 
Intuitive 19.15 3.82 Intuitive 
Analytical 23.03 14.59 





Analytical 27.09 24.46 
Intuitive -0.02 .09 Intuitive 
Analytical 0.03 .04 
Intuitive -0.01 .02 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 0.01 .02 
Intuitive -0.01 .07 Intuitive 
Analytical 0.01 .03 




Analytical 0.01 .03 
Intuitive 12.37 14.93 Intuitive 
Analytical 24.92 13.25 
Intuitive 11.18 13.44 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 5.93 5.45 
Intuitive 12.70 15.49 Intuitive 
Analytical 26.01 15.51 




Analytical 7.10 10.03 
Intuitive 70.42 10.87 Intuitive 
Analytical 76.59 9.32 
Intuitive 76.44 7.44 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 74.02 10.32 
Intuitive 70.67 10.96 Intuitive 
Analytical 76.47 9.20 





Analytical 74.14 10.33 
Intuitive 24.66 21.11 Intuitive 
Analytical 16.72 13.06 
Intuitive 15.03 9.63 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 14.85 10.49 
Intuitive 20.72 14.96 Intuitive 
Analytical 19.17 14.53 




Analytical 15.70 10.48 
Intuitive 90.29 10.99 Intuitive 
Analytical 87.14 10.54 
Intuitive 93.00 14.27 
Acceptors 
Analytical 
Analytical 91.54 17.67 
Intuitive 90.41 10.03 Intuitive  
Analytical 86.78 11.39 






Analytical 90.82 16.69 
Tab. 3.42 – Mean values of each physiological index depending on the individual style under the two modes of 
thinking while playing with the different types of responder 
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Prior to the mixed ANOVAs, Mauchly’s test was used to verify the assumption 
of sphericity. All tests were not significant, thus confirming the assumption of 
sphericity. ANOVAs’s results are reported in Table 3.43. 
 
Physiological index Effects F(1,22) P η2 
Type of responder 0.305 .586 .014 
Mode of thinking 0.577 .456 .026 
Individual style 0.781 .386 .034 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 2.835 .106 .114 
Type of responder * individual style 1.507 .232 .064 
Mode of thinking * individual style 0.010 .974 .001 
SCL 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 0.236 .632 .011 
Type of responder 0.442 .513 .020 
Mode of thinking 2.902 .103 .117 
Individual style 0.120 .733 .005 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 1.308 .265 .056 
Type of responder * individual style 0.142 .710 .006 
Mode of thinking * individual style 0.519 .479 .023 
SCR 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 0.833 .371 .037 
Type of responder 0.763 .392 .034 
Mode of thinking 0.699 .412 .031 
Individual style 4.166 .053 .159 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 0.586 .452 .026 
Type of responder * individual style 0.024 .877 .001 
Mode of thinking * individual style 3.065 .094 .122 
EMG 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 0.050 .825 .002 
Type of responder 1.374 .254 .059 
Mode of thinking 0.224 .641 .010 
Individual style 0.213 .649 .010 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 1.368 .255 .059 
Type of responder * individual style 0.050 .825 .002 
Mode of thinking * individual style 1.230 .279 .053 
BVP 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 2.109 .161 .087 
Type of responder 0.243 .627 .011 
Mode of thinking 0.172 .682 .008 
Individual style 1.093 .307 .047 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 10.077 <.05 .314 
Type of responder * individual style 0.516 .480 .023 
Mode of thinking * individual style 0.270 .608 .012 
PVA 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 4.064 .056 .156 
Type of responder 0.066 .800 .003 
Mode of thinking 0.283 .600 .013 
Individual style 0.460 .505 .020 
Type of responder * mode of thinking 1.100 .306 .048 
Type of responder * individual style 0.186 .670 .008 
Mode of thinking * individual style 0.004 .948 .001 
PF 
Type of responder * mode of thinking * individual style 0.475 .498 .021 
Tab. 3.43 -  Mixed ANOVAs comparing mean values of physiological indexes depending on the individual style 
under the two modes of thinking while playing with the different types of responder 
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Results highlighted that no differences emerged. Neither main effects, nor 
interaction effects were found, thus  confirming that the occurrence of different 
mental activities as revealed from the behavioural data did not correspond to the 
activation of different pattern of physiological events.  
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The goals of Study 5 were manifold.  
The first aim was to corroborate the findings from Study 3 and 4 concerning the 
role of mindreading processes in Ultimatum Game. Specifically, it was aimed at 
further substantiating the fact that individuals can apply relevant mindreading 
processes in order to identify the psychological features of their partners so to 
realize when they can risk to offer low sums of money by presuming that the 
counterpart will accept them. 
The second aim was to provide further support to the finding coming out from 
Study 4 which claimed that different modes of thinking affect how people split 
money with the other player. In particular, it was intended to corroborate the 
conclusion that intuitive thinking leads people to better differentiate their offers 
depending on the psychological features of the responders they were playing 
with. 
A part from corroborating the findings of Study 3 and 4, Study 5 was 
specifically aimed at verifying the effect of the individual style on the offers 
made by proposers. More in details, it was intended to investigate whether a fit 
between the individual style and the mode of thinking can improve the 
strategicity of the offers.   
Finally, Study 5 was aimed at verifying whether the pattern of autonomic 
activation varied according to the individual style and the mode of thinking 
employed.  
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As for the first issue, Study 5 confirmed what emerged in the previous study, 
that is that people are able to vary their monetary offers strategically in order to 
minimize the probability that they would be rejected. The activation of relevant 
mindreading processes leads people to differentiate their offers consistently with 
the psychological portraits of the responders they are playing with. This finding 
provides further support to the capacity people possess of being strategic in that 
they make less-than-maximum possible offers in order to increase the 
probability of having these offers accepted. In conclusion, we can maintain that 
our studies provide evidence that people are capable of predicting others’ 
actions and viewing the Ultimatum Game from the other players’ perspectives. 
Putting themselves into others’ shoes represents an ability that people clearly 
exert even when they are explicitly required to take care their personal economic 
gain.  
As for the second issue, Study 5 confirmed the findings of our previous study. 
Results supported the outcome that intuitive thinking leads to clearly 
differentiated offers in relation to the responders’ psychological portraits. Even 
though under both intuitive and analytical processing people offered more 
money to the so-called “rejecters” and less money to the “acceptors”, it was only 
under the intuitive thinking that this differentiation intensifies and becomes 
more prominent. Strategic and functional offers, which  take into consideration 
the psychological features of the responders, seem to be a function of intuition. 
In the discussion of Study 4 we discussed the superiority of intuition in inducing 
strategic and functional offers in terms of characteristics of the stimuli employed 
in the experiments, characteristics of the elaboration process implied in intuition, 
and characteristics of the output produced by intuitive thinking (cfr. 4.4). 
As for the effect of individual style is concerned, it turned out that individual 
style (intuitive and analytical) does not affect directly the amount of money 
offered by participants, thus inducing us to exclude the possibility that people 
with an intuitive and analytical cognitive and decision style make different 
offers. The individual style per sè is not related to the behaviour people shows in 
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the Ultimatum Game. However, an interaction among the individual style, the 
mode of thinking, and the type of responder, even though it did not reach the 
level of statistical significance, was found. In fact, if we compare the mean 
offers made by intuitive and analytical people under the two modes of thinking, 
it emerges that when analytical people were induced to think analytically they 
offered less money to the rejecters and more to the acceptors as compared to 
analytical people thinking intuitively and intuitive people thinking both 
analytically and intuitively. It seems that when analytical people thought 
analytically they showed an inefficient behaviour, in that they were induced to 
make offers that did not allow to gain as much as possible given the specific 
constraints of responders’ portraits. A possible explanation for these results can 
be found if considering our conclusion regarding the efficiency of intuitive 
mode of thinking on the differentiation of the offers. In fact, it could be the case 
that the negative influence of analytical thinking on the strategicity of the offers 
would be even worsened by the interaction with an individual style which is 
analytical too. While in the “mismatch” condition (intuitive style-analytical 
thinking; analytical style-intuitive thinking) the inefficiency of analysis, 
intended as either individual style or mode of thinking, was mitigated by the 
combination with intuition, meant as either individual style or mode of thinking, 
in the “match” condition, the negative influence of analysis was even worsened 
by the presence of another analytical element. Mismatch conditions could be 
thought as situations of compensation in which the negative effect of analytical 
factors were balanced by the intuitive element. The intuitive “match” condition, 
conversely, contained both advantages of both the intuitive style and thinking. It 
is not the match condition per sè which leads to better decisions (Betsch & 
Kunz, 2008), but, rather, the “added value” of intuition which induces to an 
optimization of the choice.   
The fact that no direct relation between an individual’s disposition to rely on 
intuition and analysis and the offers made during the Ultimatum Game was 
found seems to suggest that individual cognitive and decision styles can not be 
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considered as good predictors of how people perform in a behavioural task. 
Even though several studies testify the existence of a relation between styles and 
performance (Hough & Ogilvie, 2005; Pretz, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2008), others 
do not find any connection between them (Karlsson, unpublished). Our findings 
seem to place themselves in an intermediate position between these two 
extremes. In fact, we did not find a direct relation between style and behaviour, 
nevertheless individual style seemed to play a role, even probably a minor one, 
in modulating the resulting behaviour. Instead of pronouncing on a definitive 
and extreme position concerning the influence of individual style, it could be 
maintained that in the present study styles are not the most important factor in 
determining the participants’ performance. Probably, as suggested by Hammond 
et al. (1996), the main influence comes from the joint effect of the mode of 
thinking employed and the specific characteristic of the task at hand. 
Participants’ behaviour primarily results from both the analytical vs. intuitive 
way of processing information about the different type of responders and the 
features of the task employed, such as the specific object of the elaboration 
(responders’ portraits), the characteristics of the elaboration process itself 
(features which are typical of the intuitive or analytical mode of thinking), and 
the properties of the processes’ output. The minor role played by individual style 
in influencing behaviour could be also taken as an indirect prove of the 
flexibility which the construct of style implies. Specifically, styles are intended 
as preference, habits, tendencies to behave in a specific way. However, they are 
not meant as fixed and unchangeable, but, rather as flexible and adjustable 
depending on the situation at hand. Our results go in this direction, that is that 
probably when the properties of the situation are particularly relevant and play 
the major role, the influence of individual style, as a consequence, is reduced 
and, instead of being the major determinant of the situation, hold a secondary 
position.   
As for the autonomic activation, it turned out that most physiological indexes 
varied across the different phases of the experimental task. In particular, it 
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turned out that the autonomic activation was higher in the phases concerning the 
identification of the correct photo and the offer proposal. This, a part from 
confirming the alternation of different pattern of activation across the distinct 
phases of the task, reveals a higher activation in correspondence of those 
specific phases which implied an active involvement of the participants. In fact, 
as suggested previous research (Pochon et al., 2008), when a motor response is 
also required, this could influence and alter the pattern of activation. As to the 
participants’ physiological activation during the analytical and intuitive 
thinking, no differences emerged. It seems that even though intuitive and 
analytical thinking can be considered as different mental processes as testified 
by the behavioural data we collected, these two mental activities do not 
correspond to different physiological pattern of activation. Whereas most 
neurobiological studies identify a correspondence between specific mental 
process and neural events, the present work detects a non-correspondence 
between these elements. Both cases can be informative. Specifically, if we 
consider that, despite the behavioural differences deriving from intuitive and 
analytical processing, the two modes of thinking do not correspond to different 
pattern of autonomic activation, we can draw some conclusion in this respect. 
Typically, autonomic activations vary depending on the involvement of either 
emotion or attention in the situation at hand (Bierman, Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2005; van’t Wout et al., 2006). In particular, when a mental activity 
involves the implication of emotionally charged stimuli or it requires a great 
allocation of attentional resources, the corresponding physiological activation is 
particularly high. In the present study no differences were identified between the 
pattern of activation corresponding to intuitive and analytical thinking. This 
could be interpreted with the fact that intuition and analysis do not differ in 
terms of level of both emotion and attention involvement. Emotion and attention 
are probably not the proper elements which differentiate the two processes, thus 
confirming that the equivalence between intuition and emotion, on one side, and 
analysis and cognition, on the other side, should be taken very cautiously. 
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Intuition does not coincide with emotion, they are not synonyms, but, rather, 
they probably show some points of overlapping even if it is possible to keep 
them separate (Simon, 1987; Vaughan, 1990; Ray & Myers, 1990). It could be 
suggested that intuition is not necessarily emotionally charged and, at the same 
time, analysis is not necessarily emotionally free. However, since, to our 
knowledge, the autonomic activation corresponding to intuition and analysis has 
never been investigated before, the present study could be considered as a 







































There is little doubt that intuition and analysis play a fundamental role in our 
everyday decision-making. Even if this argument is not new (see Barnard, 
1938), a great interest on it has gathered momentum recently (see Klein, 2003; 
Sadler-Smith, 2008). However, despite this acknowledgment of the importance 
of intuition and analysis in decision-making, there still exists a considerable 
conceptual confusion surrounding what intuition and analysis really are, how 
intuition and analysis work, and under which circumstances the employment of 
one mode of thinking is better than the other (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  In fact, even 
though intuition and analysis have been the subject of research for a very long 
time, any agreement on these points has been reached yet.  
The present work aimed at researching into the constructs of intuition and 
analysis in decision-making through an approach which tried to integrate 
different types of data in order to provide an outline of the topic at hand as 
comprehensive and multifaceted as possible.  
The first part of the investigation concerned the study of intuition and analysis 
by employing self-report inventories devised to measure the individual 
preferences for relying on either intuition or analysis in decision making and, 
more in general, in cognitive functioning. Starting from the establishment of the 
varied conceptual and operational definitions of the constructs underlying the 
existing scales, the main purpose of the first two studies was to examine the 
relationship between different commonly used measures of cognitive and 
decision styles. Basing on these relations the goal was, then, to identify, if 
possible, broader stylistic profiles, which constituting dimensions, even if 
conceptually and operationally conceived in different ways and pertained to 
distinct fields, tap the same intuitive-analytical dimension. Findings from both 
Study 1 and 2 pointed out that these instruments are related one another in a 
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consistent way, so to make it possible to detect two distinct patterns of 
relationships, which roughly correspond to the analytical and intuitive styles. 
However, consistently with the purposed goal of identifying broader individual 
profile, these two styles are enriched by other aspects which contribute to better 
define them, thus providing a multifaceted profile, rather than only single 
dimensions, of these constructs. The two resulting profiles concern both the field 
of decision-making and the broader ambit of cognitive functioning and go 
beyond the intuitive-analytical dimension including more complex and 
differentiated stylistic dimensions. Within each profile the pattern of correlations 
among the instruments which claim to measure the same intuitive-analytical 
dimension, even if very high, does not indicate a complete coincidence. This 
suggests that each scale assesses specific features of the construct and, as a 
consequence, what the scales really measure is only partially the same construct. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (cfr. 2.2.4), this finding could be explained by 
referring to the different levels of analysis implied in each instruments, that is 
the different operationalizations of the constructs, intended alternatively as 
habits, beliefs, or preferences (Leonard, Scholl & Kowalski, 1999). As a general 
implication for practice, we believe that researchers, when employing stylistic 
self-report inventories, should clarify and keep in mind which scale assesses the 
specific features of intuition and analysis they are interested in measuring. In 
particular, it should be useful to know when there is an overlap of the 
instruments and when they make unique contributions in order to make sure that 
what researchers would like to measure corresponds to what the scales they 
employ actually measure.  
The two distinct patterns of correlations emerging from the studies not only 
suggest that individuals, when deciding, exhibit different styles and approaches, 
but, in addition, provide further support to the existence of the intuitive-
analytical dimension. In particular, findings from Study 1 and 2 made a 
contribution to the debate over the nature of these concepts. In fact, as discussed 
in the Introduction, intuition and analysis can be treated as either opposite poles 
 187
along the same bipolar axis (Hayes & Allinson, 1994; Myers & McCaulley, 
1985; Simon, 1987) or as two separate unipolar scales (Hodgkinsons & Sadler-
Smith, 2003; Isenberg, 1984; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Sauter, 1999) which can 
be complementary and concurrent. Our results, which indicated a slight negative 
correlation between intuition and analysis in decision-making inventories, 
contribute evidence to support that people who express a stronger preference for 
one style show a lower perspective for the other one, meaning that, even though 
individuals tend to use more than one decision-making style, they probably have 
a dominant style. Different styles could be conceived as alternative, but not 
mutually exclusive, ways of thinking and deciding. However, as far as the more 
general field of cognitive styles, our findings seem to suggest a complete 
independence between intuition and analysis, thus indicating that styles are 
alternative ways of behaving and, probably, one of them dominates the others. 
All in all, the different styles can be thought as alternative way of approaching a 
task, a problem, or a decision. This result induces us to conclude that styles are 
external manifestations of preferences, attitudes, and tendencies that individuals 
are able to adapt or change. Whether these “surface” manifestations could be 
conceptualized as expressions of more stable underlying dimensions, conceived, 
for example as personality traits (Curry, 1983), was not the proper aim of this 
research. Further research could investigate the relationships between decision 
and cognitive styles measures and personality instruments.  
A different point which is worth deepening is the relationship between the 
mental abilities, as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test, and all the 
stylistic measures. The relative independence of the former from the latter 
represents a very interesting result, since it seems to provide worthwhile 
evidence within the current debate concerning the relationship between 
analytical thinking and mental abilities, and, more in general, between styles and 
abilities. This finding, in fact, could count as evidence for the claim that style is 
different from ability, thus providing further support to the idea that no 
connection between analytical thinking and mental abilities does exist (Epstein 
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et al., 1996; Handley, Newstead & Wright, 2000) and, moreover, that styles can 
not be conceived as abilities, but rather as preferred ways of using abilities 
(Antonietti, 2003). As a consequence, even though in literature some 
relationships between individual differences and abilities are reported (Bruine de 
Bruin, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007; Newstead et al., 2004; Parker & Fishhoff, 
2005), our findings represent a further step toward a better understanding of this 
topic, which seems to be better explained by considering individual style and 
mental abilities as independent.  
The second part of the investigation intended to study intuition and analysis “in 
action”, that is to assess the role of both intuitive-analytical strategies and 
individual styles within a specific strategic context, the Ultimatum Game. 
Starting from the establishment that mindreading abilities play a fundamental 
role to successfully interact in this game, findings of Study 3 provided evidence 
that people can spontaneously (namely, without being hinted at doing so) 
activate relevant mindreading processes in order to identify the psychological 
features of their opponents. This allowed them to realize when they could risk to 
offer low sums of money by presuming that the counterpart would have 
accepted them. Thanks to the activation of relevant mindreading processes, in 
fact, people could differentiate their offers consistently with the psychological 
portraits of the responders they are playing with. Study 3 showed that people are 
capable of predicting others’ actions and viewing the Ultimatum Game from the 
other players’ perspectives. “Putting themselves into others’ shoes” represents 
an ability that people clearly exert even when they are explicitly required to take 
care of their personal economic gain. We believe that this constitutes a very 
interesting finding, in particular given that the study of mindreading processes in 
experimental economics is a line of research which has developed only recently. 
In fact, to our knowledge, very few attempts have been made to explore the role 
of mentalizing in economics interaction (Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Savitsky et 
al., 2005; Singer & Fehr, 2005) but, the few have resulted into very promising 
findings which are worth studying in depth through further investigations. Our 
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research goes in that direction. 
Findings from Study 4 contributed to widen and qualify the results of Study 3. 
In fact, it turned out that the ability of mindreading and, thus, behaving 
strategically, is intensified and sharpened by the employment of intuitive 
thinking. In other words, we found that when people are required to process 
information about the other player’s portrait intuitively, that is relying on their 
first impression, they can better differentiate the offers according to the types of 
responder as compared to the analytical way of thinking. It seems that intuitive 
thinking can lead people to a more strategic and functional behaviour when 
making monetary decisions which imply the consideration of the opponent’s 
psychological features. The possible explanations of this result, which have been 
already discussed in the third chapter (cfr. 3.2.4), are several and varied. 
However, we argue that, whatever explanation is the most plausible, the finding 
concerning the superiority of intuition over analysis in this specific context 
deserves great attention. In fact, this result seems in line with the recently 
renewed interest arisen by the construct of intuition in economics and 
psychology research. This further substantiates the increasing amount of 
evidence which shows that, under specific circumstances, intuition can be not 
only as efficient as, but even more efficient than analysis. Furthermore, a 
practical implication should be derived from this finding. In fact, as discussed in 
the Introduction, intuition can be considered, at least partially, as a learned, as 
opposed to innate, faculty. Hence, if intuition can lead to equal and even better 
outcomes than analysis, we believe that intuition should be also educated 
(Hogarth, 2001) in order to improve the effectiveness of people’s decision 
making.   
Another important finding, resulting from Study 5, concerns the role of intuitive 
and analytical individual style in the context of the Ultimatum Game. After 
excluding the possibility that the individual style per se affects people’s 
behaviour in the Ultimatum Game, we found an interesting interaction between 
the style and the mode of thinking employed. Contrary to the claim that a fit 
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between strategy and style (both intuitive or both analytical) leads to better 
outcomes (Betsch & Kunz, 2008), we found that the “added value” of intuition, 
intended as either strategy or style, plays the major role in inducing to an 
optimization of the choice. In other words, if at least one out of two elements 
(strategy or style) is intuitive, the consequent decision will be better than the 
condition which implies both analytical strategy and style. This result further 
corroborates our previous finding concerning the superiority of intuition in 
strategic contexts. Another interesting and challenging result emerged from 
Study 5. It turned out that individual styles can not be considered as good 
predictors of how people perform in a behavioural task. Even though several 
studies testified the existence of a relation between styles and performance 
(Hough & Ogilvie, 2005; Pretz, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2008), others failed to find 
any connection between them (Karlsson, unpublished). Our results can be placed 
in-between. In fact, we did not find a direct relation between style and 
behaviour, nevertheless individual style seemed to play a role, even probably a 
minor one, in modulating the resulting behaviour. This suggests that the main 
influence comes from the joint effect of the mode of thinking employed and the 
specific characteristic of the task at hand. The minor role played by individual 
style in influencing behaviour could be also taken as an indirect proof of the 
flexibility which the construct of style implies. Styles are not meant as fixed and 
unchangeable, but, rather as flexible and adjustable depending on the situation. 
Our results go in this direction, namely, that probably when the properties of the 
situation are particularly significant and play the major role, the influence of 
individual style holds a secondary position. Individual style does not cause 
deterministically a specific decision-making behaviour, but, conversely, people 
show a great ability of making appropriate shifts in their style to fit the problem 
at hand (see Hough & Ogilvie, 2005).  
A last finding which is worth considering regards the pattern of autonomic 
activation which turned out to be similar in correspondence to intuition and 
analysis. Even though this was an ancillary aim of Study 5, we believe that this 
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provides good evidence that, in contrast with some dual-process models’ claims 
(Epstein, 1994; Sinclair, 2003), intuition does not coincide with emotion. This 
finding further supports that the equivalence between intuition and emotion 
should be taken very cautiously. Intuition does not coincide with emotion, they 
are not synonyms, but, rather, they probably show some points of overlapping, 
even if it is possible to keep them separate (Simon, 1987; Vaughan, 1990; Ray 
& Myers, 1990). It could be argued that intuition is not necessarily emotionally 
charged and, at the same time, analysis is not necessarily emotionally free. The 
employment of alternative techniques, such as neurobiological measures, has 
been useful in providing evidence of a non-equivalence of two theoretical 
constructs. We are convinced that neurobiological data can provide sound 
evidence which constitute additional, and sometimes complementary, 
information about psychological issues, on condition that researchers proceed 
with caution in interpreting the resulting data.    
This work presents also some limitations. As far as the first part of the research 
is concerned, the main drawback regards the use of self-report measures. In fact, 
the measurement of preference, beliefs, and abilities seems to be quite difficult 
through self-report inventories. In fact, they appear to grasp only partial aspects, 
thus providing a measurement which does not account for a comprehensive 
evaluation of the constructs. Nevertheless, at present, self-report measures are 
still the most commonly used method in studying stylistic differences in 
intuition and analysis. We believe that the collection of other types of data, in 
combination with self-report ones, can partially obviate this problem. Rather 
than suppressing the use of self-report measures, the integration with other 
sources of data could represent a good solution to overcome the difficulty which 
may derive from the employment of self-report questionnaires only.  
Another possible limitation can come from the size of the experimental sample 
in Study 5 which may have affected the effect size of the results. The 
numerousness of the sample, however, is a direct consequence of the 
identification criteria employed in Study 2 to select those participants who 
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showed an “extreme” intuitive or analytical profile. In fact, in order to make 
sure that participants were undoubtedly intuitive or analytical, we adopted quite 
restrictive criteria (cfr. 2.2.3.5). As a consequence, only the few people falling in 
these two categories constituted the sample of Study 5. Maybe future research 
with an wider sample would be necessary to provide confirmation of the specific 
findings of Study 5.  
On the whole, this work contributed to shed light on the influence that 
mindreading processes exerts in economic strategic games and, moreover, it 
helped to explore intuition and analysis through “intrinsic” and more ecological 
manipulations which, contrary to the commonly employed emotional and 
cognitive primes, constitute an integral part of the core experiment and are 
closer to the tasks that people usually deal with. What we found is that dual-
process models only partially succeed in getting the plurality and the complexity 
of intuition and analysis, which, probably, are so multifaceted and subtle to be 
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APPENDIX I  
INVENTORIES EMPLOYED IN STUDY 1 AND 2  
 
GENERAL DECISION MAKING STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
a. General Decision Making Style Questionnaire – English Version (Scott & Bruce, 1995) 
 
1. I plan my important decisions carefully (R) 
2. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts (I) 
3. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions (D) 
4. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on (A) 
5. I generally make snap decisions (S) 
6. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making 
decisions (R) 
7. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition (I) 
8. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people (D) 
9. I postpone decision making whenever possible (A) 
10. I often make decisions on the spur of the moment (S) 
11. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way (R) 
12. I generally make decisions that feel right to me (I) 
13. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions (D) 
14. I often procrastinate when it comes to making important decisions (A) 
15. I make quick decisions (S) 
16. My decision making requires careful thought (R) 
17. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than 
to have a rational reason for it (I) 
18. I use the advise of other people in making my important decisions (D) 
19. I generally make important decisions at the last minute (A) 
20. I often make impulsive decisions (S) 
21. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specific goal (R) 
22. When I make a decision, I trust my inner feeling and reactions (I) 
23. I like to have someone to steer me in the right direction when I am faced with 
important decisions (D) 
24. I put off making many decisions because thinking about them makes me uneasy (A) 
25. When making decisions, I do what seems natural at the moment (S) 
 
b. General Decision Making Style Questionnaire – Italian Version (first translation – Study 1) 
 
1. Pianifico attentamente le decisioni importanti (R)     
2. Nel prendere decisioni faccio affidamento sul mio istinto (I) 
3. Quando devo prendere decisioni importanti, spesso ho bisogno dell’aiuto di altre 
persone (D)  
4. Evito di prendere decisioni importanti se c’è qualcuno o qualcosa che mi fa pressione 
(A) 
5. Generalmente prendo decisioni repentine (S) 
6. Prima di prendere una decisione ricontrollo le mie fonti di informazione per essere 
certo/a di possedere i dati pertinenti (R) 
7. Nel prendere decisioni tendo a fare affidamento sul mio intuito (I) 
8. Raramente prendo decisioni importanti senza consultare altre persone (D) 
9. Appena mi è possibile rimando il momento di prendere decisioni (A) 
10. Spesso prendo decisioni su due piedi (S) 
11. Prendo decisioni in modo logico e sistematico (R) 
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12. Di solito decido in base a ciò che mi sembra giusto (I) 
13. E' per me più semplice prendere decisioni importanti se ho il sostegno di altre persone 
(D) 
14. Spesso, quando si tratta di prendere decisioni importanti, cerco di temporeggiare  (A) 
15. Prendo decisioni rapidamente (S) 
16. Per prendere una  decisione ho bisogno di un'attenta riflessione (R) 
17. Quando prendo una decisione è per me più importante avere la sensazione che sia la 
decisione giusta piuttosto che aver trovato una giustificazione razionale per essa (I) 
18. Quando devo prendere decisioni importanti mi avvalgo dei consigli di altre persone 
(D) 
19. Generalmente prendo decisioni importanti all’ultimo minuto (A) 
20. Spesso prendo decisioni in maniera impulsiva (S) 
21. Quando prendo una decisione, prendo in considerazione le diverse possibilità che ho 
per raggiungere il mio obiettivo (R) 
22. Quando prendo una decisione, mi affido alle mie sensazioni e reazioni interiori (I) 
23. Quando devo affrontare decisioni importanti, mi fa piacere se qualcuno mi indirizza 
nella giusta direzione (D) 
24. Rimando molte decisioni poiché mi fa sentire a disagio pensare ad esse (A) 
25. Quando prendo decisioni faccio ciò che in quel momento mi sembra naturale (S) 
     
c. General Decision Making Style Questionnaire – Italian Version                                                 
(definitive version – items 14,17,24 modified – Study 2) 
 
1. Pianifico attentamente le decisioni importanti (R)      
2. Nel prendere decisioni faccio affidamento sul mio istinto (I) 
3. Quando devo prendere decisioni importanti, spesso ho bisogno dell’aiuto di altre 
persone (D)  
4. Evito di prendere decisioni importanti se c’è qualcuno o qualcosa che mi fa pressione 
(A) 
5. Generalmente prendo decisioni repentine (S) 
6. Prima di prendere una decisione ricontrollo le mie fonti di informazione per essere 
certo/a di possedere i dati pertinenti (R) 
7. Nel prendere decisioni tendo a fare affidamento sul mio intuito (I) 
8. Raramente prendo decisioni importanti senza consultare altre persone (D) 
9. Appena mi è possibile rimando il momento di prendere decisioni (A) 
10. Spesso prendo decisioni su due piedi (S) 
11. Prendo decisioni in modo logico e sistematico (R) 
12. Di solito decido in base a ciò che mi sembra giusto (I) 
13. E' per me più semplice prendere decisioni importanti se ho il sostegno di altre persone 
(D) 
14. Spesso rimando il momento in cui devo prendere decisioni importanti  (A) 
15. Prendo decisioni rapidamente (S) 
16. Per prendere una  decisione ho bisogno di un'attenta riflessione (R) 
17. Quando prendo una decisione è per me più importante avere la sensazione che sia la  
decisione giusta piuttosto che trovare una giustificazione razionale (I) 
18. Quando devo prendere decisioni importanti mi avvalgo dei consigli di altre persone 
(D) 
19. Generalmente prendo decisioni importanti all’ultimo minuto (A) 
20. Spesso prendo decisioni in maniera impulsiva (S) 
21. Quando prendo una decisione, prendo in considerazione le diverse possibilità che ho 
per raggiungere il mio obiettivo (R) 
22. Quando prendo una decisione, mi affido alle mie sensazioni e reazioni interiori (I) 
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23. Quando devo affrontare decisioni importanti, mi fa piacere se qualcuno mi indirizza 
nella giusta direzione (D) 
24. Rimando molte decisioni poiché il pensare ad esse mi rende insicuro e ansioso (A) 
25. Quando prendo decisioni faccio ciò che in quel momento mi sembra naturale (S) 
 
 
MAXIMIZATION SCALE  
 
a. Maximization Scale (English version – Schwartz et al. 2002) 
 
1. When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scannino through the available options even 
while attempting to watch one program  
2. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check other station sto see if 
something better is playing, even if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to 
3. I treat relationships like clothing: I expect to try a lot on bifore I get the perfect fit  
4. No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the lookout 
for better opportunities  
5. I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite different from my actual life   
6. I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the best movies, the best singers, the 
best athletes, the best novels, etc.)  
7. I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend  
8. When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothes that I really love   
9. Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling to pick the best one  
10. I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just writing a letter to a friend, because 
it’s so hard to word things just right. I often do several drafts of even simple things.  
11. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself  
12. I never settle for second best  
13. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine what all the other possibilities are, 
even ones that aren’t present at the moment   
 
b. Maximization Scale (Italian version) 
 
1. Quando guardo la televisione, faccio zapping (ossia passo da un canale all’altro), 
dando spesso un’occhiata ai vari programmi anche se ne sto guardando uno in 
particolare  
2. Quando ascolto la radio in macchina, spesso cerco altre stazioni per sentire se c’è 
qualcosa di meglio, anche nel caso in cui sono abbastanza soddisfatto di ciò che sto 
ascoltando  
3. Considero i rapporti interpersonali come vestiti: devo provarne molti prima di trovare 
quello perfetto  
4. Indipendentemente dal grado di soddisfazione del mio lavoro attuale è comunque 
giusto per me stare all’erta per trovare opportunità migliori  
5. Spesso mi trovo a fantasticare su come la mia vita potrebbe essere diversa da quello 
che attualmente è  
6. Mi piacciono le graduatorie (i migliori film, i migliori cantanti, i migliori atleti, i 
migliori racconti, ecc.) 
7. Spesso incontro difficoltà a trovare il regalo per un amico  
8. Quando faccio acquisti, è per me veramente difficile scegliere un abito che mi piaccia 
veramente 
9. Noleggiare una videocassetta è per me veramente difficile perché mi sforzo sempre di 
trovare la migliore  
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10. Ritengo che scrivere sia molto difficile, anche nel caso in cui si tratti solamente di 
scrivere una lettera a un amico, perché è difficile trovare il modo giusto per esprimere 
le cose. Spesso faccio molte minute anche nel caso di messaggi semplici  
11. Indipendentemente da ciò che faccio, mi prefiggo degli obiettivi elevati  
12. Non opto mai per una “seconda scelta”  
13. Ogni volta che devo scegliere, cerco di immaginare tutte le possibili alternative, anche 
quelle che non sono presenti al momento 
 
 
PREFERENCE FOR INTUITION AND DELIBERATION SCALE 
 
a. Preference for Intuition and Deliberation scale (English translation of the original German 
scale – Betsch, 2004) 
 
1. Before making decisions I first think them through (D) 
2. I listen carefully to my deepest feelings (I) 
3. Before making decisions I usually think about the goals I want to achieve (D) 
4. With most decisions it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings (I) 
5. I don’t like situations that require me to rely on my intuition (I) (recode) 
6. I think about myself (D) 
7. I prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance (D) 
8. I prefer drawing conclusions based on my feelings, my knowledge of Human nature, 
and my experience of life (I) 
9. My feelings play an important role in my decisions (I) 
10. I am a perfectionist (D) 
11. I think about a decision particularly carefully if I have to justify it (D) 
12. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings (I) 
13. When I have a problem I first analyze the facts and details before I decide (D) 
14. I think before I act (D) 
15. I prefer emotional people (I) 
16. I think more about my plans and goals than other people do (D) 
17. I am a very intuitive person (I) 
18. I like emotional situations, discussions, and movies (I) 
 
b. Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (Italian version) 
 
1. Rifletto molto bene prima di prendere decisioni (D)  
2. Presto molta attenzione alle mie sensazioni profonde (I)  
3. Prima di prendere decisioni solitamente penso agli obiettivi che intendo 
raggiungere(D)  
4. Nella maggioranza delle decisioni è bene affidarsi completamente alle proprie 
sensazioni (I) 
5. Non mi piacciono le situazioni che richiedono di basarsi sul proprio intuito (I)  
6. Rifletto riguardo a me stesso (D) 
7. Preferisco fare progetti in maniera dettagliata piuttosto che lasciare tutto al caso (D) 
8. Preferisco trarre conclusioni basandomi sulle mie sensazioni, sulla mia conoscenza 
della natura umana e sulla mia esperienza di vita (I) 
9. Le mie sensazioni hanno un ruolo importante nelle mie decisioni (I)  
10. Sono un perfezionista (D)  
11. Rifletto attentamente su una decisione se poi devo rendere conto di essa (D)  
12. Di solito mi baso sulle mie sensazioni quando si tratta di fidarsi delle persone (I)  
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13. Se ho un problema per prima cosa analizzo i fatti e i dettagli della situazione prima di 
prendere una decisione (D) 
14. Rifletto prima di agire (D) 
15. Mi piacciono le persone emotive (I)  
16. Penso ai miei progetti e ai miei obiettivi più di quanto facciano le altre persone (D) 
17. Sono una persona molto intuitiva (I)  
18. Mi piacciono le situazioni, le discussioni e i film che suscitano emozioni (I) 
 
 
STYLE OF LEARNING AND THINKING QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
a. Style of Learning and Thinking (Italian version – Antonietti et al. 2005) 
 
1. a. Mi piace leggere le spiegazioni di ciò che devo fare 
b. Preferisco che mi si mostri come devo fare le cose 
2. a. Mi so esprimere bene a gesti 
b.Non so esprimermi a gesti; preferisco dire a voce ciò che penso e faccio  affidamento 
su ciò che le  persone dicono a parole. 
3. a. Preferisco le lezioni in cui devo ascoltare le spiegazioni dell'insegnante. 
b. Preferisco le lezioni in cui posso muovermi, essere attivo e manipolare direttamente 
le cose. 
4. a. Prendo gusto e mi diverto nel risolvere i problemi. 
b. Affronto con serietà i problemi da risolvere. 
5. a. Per portare a termine un lavoro uso solo il materiale appropriato. 
b. Per portare a termine un lavoro sono in grado di utilizzare qualsiasi cosa abbia a 
disposizione. 
6. a. Preferisco che lavori o compiti siano programmati così da sapere esattamente cosa 
fare 
b. Preferisco lavori o compiti aperti in modo che sia possibile apportare cambiamenti 
mentre  si  procede. 
7. a. Agisco sulla base di sensazioni o supposizioni. 
b. Se posso, preferisco non agire sulla base di sensazioni o supposizioni. 
8. a. Esprimo i miei sentimenti con semplici parole. 
b. Esprimo i miei sentimenti scrivendo poesie, disegnando, cantando, ballando. 
9. a. Mi piace studiare teorie già dimostrate e certe. 
b. Mi piace studiare cose che potrebbero rivelarsi esatte. 
10. a. Mi piace separare le idee e analizzarle una ad una. 
b. Mi piace collegare insieme molte idee. 
11. a. Sono abile nel risolvere problemi ricorrendo a procedimenti logici. 
b. Sono abile nel risolvere problemi ricorrendo a intuizioni e sensazioni. 
12. a. Quando risolvo problemi preferisco immaginare visivamente la situazione descritta. 
b. Mi piace analizzare i problemi leggendo attentamente il testo e ascoltando le 
spiegazioni    dell'insegnante. 
13. a. Imparo facilmente da insegnanti che spiegano le lezioni oralmente. 
b. Imparo facilmente da insegnanti che spiegano le lezioni con azioni. 
14. a. Quando devo ricordare o pensare a qualcosa riesco bene se ricorro a parole. 
b. Quando devo ricordare o pensare a qualcosa riesco bene se ricorro a immagini o 
figure. 
15. a. Mi piace vedere cose finite e complete. 
b. Mi piace organizzare e completare cose incompiute. 
16. a. Sono un tipo riflessivo. 
b. Sono un tipo intuitivo. 
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17. a. Imparo facilmente particolari e fatti specifici. 
b. Imparo facilmente a partire da una visione generale. 
18. a. Imparo e ricordo quelle cose che ho specificatamente studiato. 
b. Imparo e ricordo dettagli e fatti che apprendo dalle cose che accadono in torno a 
me. 
19. a. Mi piace leggere storie su cose realmente accadute. 
b. Mi piace leggere storie su cose fantastiche. 
20. a. E' divertente programmare quello che ho intenzione di fare. 
b. E' divertente sognare. 
21. a. Mi piace ascoltare della musica quando leggo o studio. 
b. Mi piace il silenzio assoluto quando leggo o studio. 
22. a. Mi piace disegnare copiando o completando un modello. 
b. Mi piace disegnare secondo le mie idee. 
23. a. E' emozionante inventare qualcosa. 
b. E' emozionante perfezionare qualcosa. 
24. a. Imparo meglio esplorando. 
b. Imparo meglio analizzando. 
25. a. Mi piacciono le idee presentate in ordine. 
b. Mi piacciono le idee presentate con legami e relazioni tra di loro. 
26. a. Sono abile nel ricordare nomi e parole. 
b. Sono abile nel ricordare suoni e motivi musicali. 
27. a. Spesso ho la testa fra le nuvole. 
b. Non sono quasi mai distratto. 
28. a. Studiando preferisco fare riassunti. 
b. Studiando preferisco sottolineare. 
 
 
COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST  
 
a. Cognitive Reflection Test (English version – Frederick, 2005) 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost?......cents 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?.........minutes 
 
3. In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Everyday the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake?...............days 
 
b. Cognitive Reflection Test (Italian version) 
 
1. Una racchetta e una pallina da ping-pong costano, insieme, un euro e dieci centesimi. 
La racchetta costa un euro in più della pallina. Quanto costa la pallina?.......centesimi 
 
2. Ci sono 5 macchine che producono 5 congegni in 5 minuti. Quanto tempo occorrerà a 
100 macchine per produrre 100 congegni?..........minuti 
 
3. In un lago ci sono delle ninfee che raddoppiano la loro superficie ogni giorno. Le 
ninfee impiegheranno 48 giorni a coprire tutto il lago. Quanti giorni impiegheranno a 
coprire la metà del lago?...............giorni 
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APPENDIX II  
MATERIAL EMPLOYED IN STUDY 3  
 
STUDY 3 - PRE-TEST 1: RESPONDERS’ VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima 
impressione circa le persone.  
Ti verrà presentata la descrizione di 4 persone. Dopo aver letto la descrizione di una persona 
esprimi una valutazione per ognuna delle 10 caratteristiche riportate sotto la descrizione 
stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle.  
Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che corrisponde al tuo parere. 
Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona abbia quella 





Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 





Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, accanita fumatrice. Lavora presso uno 
studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte aziende multinazionali. In passato ha dimostrato la 
sua ambizione e la sua voglio di emergere accentando di difendere una grossa multinazionale 
del tabacco a cui l’associazione antitumori aveva fatto causa. Questa causa è stata la sua 
occasione per emergere, anche perché molti dei suoi colleghi avevano rifiutato l’incarico per 




SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 
AVARO/A        GENEROSO/A 
SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 




Grazie è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti anni come 
magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. È una persona che crede molto nei propri ideali e 
si batte per essi concretamente nel proprio lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così importante 
per lei, le è stato trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame testimoniato anche 
dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla nonna. Per ricoprire il ruolo 
che ha ora, Grazie ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi forma di favoritismo e ha sempre preferito 






Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è anticonformista sia nel 
vestire sia nel modo di pensare e di essere. Per il suo carattere non è m ai riuscito a trovare il 
suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha deciso di cercare la sua strada altrove. Infatti, dopo 
aver lavorato per diversi anni nell’associazione Medici Senza Frontiere, da due anni lavora 




















SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 
AVARO/A        GENEROSO/A 
SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 
AVARO/A        GENEROSO/A 
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STUDY 3 - PRE-TEST 2: RESPONDERS’ VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima 
impressione circa le persone.  
Ti verrà presentata la descrizione di 4 persone. Dopo aver letto la descrizione di una persona 
esprimi una valutazione per ognuna delle 10 caratteristiche riportate sotto la descrizione 
stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle.  
Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che corrisponde al tuo parere. 
Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona abbia quella 






Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 




Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, (accanita) fumatrice. Ha avuto da 
poco due gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte (aziende 
multinazionali) importanti aziende. In passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia 
di emergere accentando di difendere una grossa (multinazionale) azienda del tabacco (a cui 
l’associazione antitumori aveva fatto causa). Questa causa è stata la sua occasione per 
(emergere) farsi conoscere, anche perché molti dei suoi colleghi avevano rifiutato l’incarico 






SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 
AVARO/A        GENEROSO/A 
SIMPATICO/A        ANTIPATICO/A 
EGOISTA        ALTRUISTA 
HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA        NON HA SENSO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 
BRUTTO/A        ATTRAENTE 
UMILE        SUPERBO/A 
ONESTO/A        DISONESTO/A 
NON HA DIGNITA’ PERSONALE        HA DIGNITA PERSONALE 
OPPORTUNISTA        DISINTERESSATO/A 
CORDIALE        SCONTROSO/A 





Grazie è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti anni come 
magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. È una persona che crede molto nei propri ideali e 
si batte per essi concretamente nel proprio lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così importante 
per lei, le è stato trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame testimoniato anche 
dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla nonna. Per ricoprire il ruolo 
che ha ora, Grazie ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi forma di favoritismo e ha sempre preferito 






Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è anticonformista sia nel 
vestire sia nel modo di pensare e di essere. Per il suo carattere ruvido e litigioso non è m ai 
riuscito a trovare il suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha deciso di cercare la sua strada 
altrove. Infatti, dopo aver lavorato per diversi anni nell’associazione Medici Senza Frontiere, 
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STUDY 3 - PRE-TEST 3: RESPONDERS’ VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima 
impressione circa le persone.  
Ti verrà presentata la descrizione di 4 persone. Dopo aver letto la descrizione di una persona 
esprimi una valutazione per ognuna delle 10 caratteristiche riportate sotto la descrizione 
stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle.  
Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che corrisponde al tuo parere. 
Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona abbia quella 






Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 




Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, fumatrice. Ha avuto da poco due 
gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte importanti aziende. In 
passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia di emergere accentando di difendere 
una grossa azienda del tabacco. Questa causa è stata la sua occasione per  farsi conoscere, 
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Grazie è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti anni come 
magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. È una persona che crede molto nei propri ideali e 
si batte per essi concretamente nel proprio lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così importante 
per lei, le è stato trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame testimoniato anche 
dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla nonna. Per ricoprire il ruolo 
che ha ora, Grazie ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi forma di favoritismo e ha sempre preferito 






Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è anticonformista (sia nel 
vestire sia nel modo di pensare e di essere). Per il suo carattere (ruvido e) litigioso non è m ai 
riuscito a trovare il suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha deciso di cercare la sua strada 
altrove. Infatti, dopo aver lavorato per diversi anni nell’associazione Medici Senza Frontiere, 
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STUDY 3 –  ULTIMATUM GAME: MIND-READING - VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS / 
THREE CONSTRAINTS (SPONTANEOUS, MAXIMIZING, THRESHOLD) 
 
 
Ti vengono dati 10 euro. Devi spartirli con la persona sotto descritta dandole una parte dei 10 
euro. Se la persona accetta la spartizione che le proponi, ciascuno di voi riceverà il denaro 
(nella misura prevista dalla spartizione). Se la persona rifiuta la spartizione, nessuno di voi 
riceverà il denaro. La persona sa che hai 10 euro da spartire con lei e conosce le condizioni 
del gioco. 
Il gioco ti sarà proposto quattro volte, ogni volta con una persona diversa. Ogni volta puoi 
cambiare la proposta di spartizione. Il tuo scopo è quello di massimizzare il più possibile il 
tuo guadagno oppure Devi essere il più possibile sicuro di guadagnare, con le quattro 
proposte, almeno 25 euro. Solo se totalizzerai almeno 25 euro il denaro ti verrà 
effettivamente dato oppure non dire niente. Prima di stabilire le spartizioni leggi le 
descrizioni delle quattro persone cui dovrai proporre la suddivisione dei 10 euro. 
 
La prima persona cui devi proporre la spartizione dei 10 euro è GRAZIA. 
Grazia è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti anni come 
magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. È una persona che crede molto nei propri ideali e 
si batte per essi concretamente nel proprio lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così importante 
per lei, le è stato trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame testimoniato anche 
dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla nonna. Per ricoprire il ruolo 
che ha ora, Grazie ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi forma di favoritismo e ha sempre preferito 
affermarsi e farsi strada da sola.  
Quanti euro proponi di dare a Grazia?       …. euro 
 
La seconda persona cui devi proporre la spartizione dei 10 euro è MARINA. 
Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, fumatrice. Ha avuto da poco due 
gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte importanti aziende. In 
passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia di emergere accentando di difendere 
una grossa azienda del tabacco. Questa causa è stata la sua occasione per  farsi conoscere, 
anche perché molti dei suoi colleghi avevano rifiutato l’incarico per la bassa ricompensa 
economica.  
Quanti euro proponi di dare a Marina?       …. euro 
 
La terza persona cui devi proporre la spartizione dei 10 euro è MARCO. 
Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è anticonformista. Per il suo 
carattere litigioso non è m ai riuscito a trovare il suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha 
deciso di cercare la sua strada altrove. Infatti, dopo aver lavorato per diversi anni 
nell’associazione Medici Senza Frontiere, da due anni lavora presso l’ospedale che dirige in 
Ghana.  
Quanti euro proponi di dare a Marco?       …. euro 
 
La quarta persona cui devi proporre la spartizione dei 10 euro è GIANNI. 
Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 
particolarmente vicino.  
Quanti euro proponi di dare a Gianni?       …. euro 
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APPENDIX III 
MATERIAL EMPLOYED IN STUDY 4 AND 5 
 
STUDY 4 –  PRE-TEST 1: RESPONDERS’ PHOTOS 
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone. 
Ti verrà presentata una serie di foto di alcune persone. Dopo aver osservato ciascuna foto esprimi una 
valutazione per ognuna delle caratteristiche riportate sotto la foto stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una 
coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle. Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che 
corrisponde al tuo parere. Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona 
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STUDY 4 –  PRE-TEST 2: RESPONDERS’ PHOTOS  
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone. 
Ti verrà presentata una serie di foto di alcune persone. Dopo aver osservato ciascuna foto esprimi una 
valutazione per ognuna delle caratteristiche riportate sotto la foto stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una 
coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle. Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che 
corrisponde al tuo parere. Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona 
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STUDY 4 –  PRE-TEST 3: RESPONDERS’ PHOTOS  
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone. 
Ti verrà presentata una serie di foto di alcune persone. Dopo aver osservato ciascuna foto esprimi una 
valutazione per ognuna delle caratteristiche riportate sotto la foto stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una 
coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle. Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che 
corrisponde al tuo parere. Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona 
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STUDY 4 –  PRE-TEST 4: RESPONDERS’ PHOTOS  
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone. 
Ti verrà presentata una serie di foto di alcune persone. Dopo aver osservato ciascuna foto esprimi una 
valutazione per ognuna delle caratteristiche riportate sotto la foto stessa. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una 
coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle. Esprimi la tua valutazione mettendo una crocetta nella casella che 
corrisponde al tuo parere. Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più significa che tu ritieni che quella persona 
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MARINA                                                          
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STUDY 4 –  PRE-TEST 5: RESPONDERS’ VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS AND 
CORRESPONDING PHOTOS ASSEMBLED 
 
Lo studio a cui stai per partecipare ha come scopo capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone. 
Ti verrà presentata la descrizione e la corrispondente foto di alcune persone. Dopo aver letto la descrizione e 
osservato la foto esprimi una valutazione per ognuna delle caratteristiche riportate sotto la descrizione e la foto 
stesse. Ciascuna caratteristica è definita da una coppia di opposti separati da 7 caselle. Esprimi la tua valutazione 
mettendo una crocetta nella casella che corrisponde al tuo parere. Più la casella è vicina a una qualità, più 
significa che tu ritieni che quella persona abbia quella qualità.  
 
GRAZIA    
Grazia è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti 
anni come magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. È una persona che 
crede molto nei suoi ideali e si batte concretamente per essi nel proprio 
lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così importante per lei, le è stato 
trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame testimoniato 
anche dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla 
nonna. Per ricoprire il ruolo che ha ora, Grazia ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi 
forma di favoritismo e ha sempre preferito affermarsi e farsi strada da sola.  
 
MARINA                 
Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, fumatrice. Ha da 
poco avuto due gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi 
clienti molte importanti aziende. 
In passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia di emergere 
accettando di difendere una grossa azienda del tabacco. Questa causa è 
stata la sua occasione per farsi conoscere, anche perché molti dei suoi 
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MARCO 
Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è 
anticonformista. Per il suo carattere litigioso non è mai riuscito a trovare il 
suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha deciso di cercare la sua strada 
altrove. Infatti, dopo aver lavorato per diversi anni nell’associazione Medici 





Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come 
consulente finanziario. Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta 
gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere accomodante e alle sue doti 
persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si pone, 
talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso 
della vendita di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano 
riposto la loro fiducia nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In 
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STUDY 4 and 5 –  ULTIMATUM GAME: INTUITIVE AND ANALYTICAL MODES OF 
THINKING  
 
(The example of the intuitive task and the example of the analytical one are reported below. 
In brackets the presentation  time of every slide; when time is not reported, no time 
constraints are set for that slide) .  
 
 
1. ISTRUZIONI - 1 (20 sec.) 
 
Lo studio cui stai per partecipare ha un duplice scopo: 
- capire come ci si forma la prima impressione circa le persone; 
- indagare come le persone valutano gli altri in maniera razionale. 
Pertanto nel corso della prova sarai invitato a fare l’una o l’altra cosa. 
Ogni volta ti sarà detto quale delle due cose - PRIMA IMPRESSIONE o VALUTAZIONE 
RAZIONALE - dovrai fare. 
 
 
2. ISTRUZIONI – 2 (25 sec.) 
 
Immagina di partecipare a questo gioco. 
Ti vengono dati 10 euro. Devi spartirli con un altro giocatore (che ti verrà descritto durante il 
gioco) proponendogli/le a tuo piacere una parte dei 10 euro. Dopodiché lui/lei deciderà se 
accettare o meno l’offerta di spartizione. Se l'altro giocatore accetta la spartizione che gli/le 
proponi, ciascuno di voi riceverà il denaro. Se il giocatore rifiuta la spartizione, nessuno di voi 
riceverà il denaro. 
L'altro giocatore sa che hai 10 euro da spartire con lui/lei e conosce le condizioni del gioco.  
 
 
3. ISTRUZIONI – 3 (20 sec.) 
 
Il gioco ti sarà proposto quattro volte, ogni volta con un giocatore diverso. 
Non incontrerai di persona l’altro giocatore. Tuttavia ti verranno di volta in volta fornite delle 
informazioni su di lui/lei.  
Ad ogni giocatore puoi fare una proposta di spartizione diversa.  
Il tuo scopo è quello di guadagnare il più possibile. 
Alla fine, dopo aver fatto le tue proposte a tutti i quattro giocatori, saprai se le hanno accettate 
o  no.  
 
 
4. ISTRUZIONI – 4 
 
Le istruzioni ti sono chiare? 
Hai qualche domanda da fare? 
Se tutto è chiaro, incominciamo 








5. INTRODUZIONE  (5 sec.) 
 
ECCO IL PRIMO GIOCATORE AL QUALE DEVI PROPORRE LA SPARTIZIONE DEI 
100 EURO.  
PRIMA IMPRESSIONE 
 
6. DESCRIZIONE PERSONAGGIO (25 sec.) 
GRAZIA 
Grazia è una donna sulla sessantina, occhiali, capelli grigi. Lavora da molti anni come 
magistrato presso il tribunale della sua città. E’ una persona che crede molto nei propri 
ideali e si batte per essi concretamente nel proprio lavoro. Il senso di giustizia, valore così 
importante per lei, le è stato trasmesso dalla sua famiglia a cui è molto legata, legame 
testimoniato anche dal gioiello di famiglia, una collana di perle, tramandatole dalla nonna. 
Per ricoprire il ruolo che ha ora, Grazia ha sempre rifiutato qualsiasi forma di favoritismo e 
ha sempre preferito affermarsi e farsi strada da sola. 
 
7. SPIEGAZIONE DEL TASK (10 sec.) 
Ora che ti sei fatto un’idea dell’altro giocatore, abbina alla descrizione che hai appena letto  
la foto che ti sembra corrisponda ad essa. È importante che tu selezioni l’immagine sulla base 
dell’impressione che ti sei fatta.  
Tieni conto che hai a disposizione solo 3 secondi per effettuare la tua scelta.  
 
8. FOTO (3 sec.) 
 
 
9. ABBINAMENTO DESCRIZIONE – FOTO 
Sulla base dell'impressione che ti sei fatta, chi è Grazia? Scegli una delle tre foto. 
 
10. OFFERTA  





11. INTRODUZIONE  (5 sec.) 
 
ECCO IL SECONDO GIOCATORE AL QUALE DEVI PROPORRE LA SPARTIZIONE 
DEI 100 EURO.  
PRIMA IMPRESSIONE 
 
12. DESCRIZIONE PERSONAGGIO (25 sec.) 
MARCO 
Marco è medico pediatra, castano, con barba. Il suo stile di vita è anticonformista. Per il suo 
carattere litigioso non è mai riuscito a trovare il suo ruolo negli ospedali italiani e così ha 
deciso di cercare la sua strada altrove. Infatti, dopo aver lavorato per diversi anni 
nell’associazione Medici senza Frontiere, da due anni lavora presso l’ospedale che dirige in 
Ghana. 
 
13. SPIEGAZIONE DEL TASK (10 sec.) 
Ora che ti sei fatto un’idea dell’altro giocatore, abbina alla descrizione che hai appena letto  
la foto che ti sembra corrisponda ad essa. È importante che tu selezioni l’immagine sulla base 
dell’impressione che ti sei fatta.  
Tieni conto che hai a disposizione solo 3 secondi per effettuare la tua scelta.  
 
14. FOTO (3 sec.) 
  
15. ABBINAMENTO DESCRIZIONE – FOTO 
Sulla base dell'impressione che ti sei fatta, chi è Marco? Scegli una delle tre foto. 
16. OFFERTA  
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Dovendo spartire i 100 euro ricevuti, quanti euro proponi a Marco? 
17. INTRODUZIONE  (5 sec.) 
ECCO IL TERZO GIOCATORE AL QUALE DEVI PROPORRE LA SPARTIZIONE DEI 
100 EURO.  
VALUTAZIONE RAZIONALE 
 
18.  DESCRIZIONE PERSONAGGIO (25 sec.) 
GIANNI 
Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante e alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 
particolarmente vicino. 
 
19. SPIEGAZIONE DEL TASK (15 sec.) 
Ora che ti sei fatto un’idea dell’altro giocatore, abbina alla descrizione che hai appena letto la 
foto che ti sembra corrisponda ad essa. Rileggi attentamente le informazioni sul giocatore (ti 
verranno ora ripresentate). Sappi che solo una delle immagini proposte corrisponde a tutte le 
informazioni fornite dalla descrizione. Pertanto presta molta attenzione nell’effettuare 
l’abbinamento. 
Tieni conto che hai a disposizione 30 secondi per effettuare la tua scelta.  
 
20. FOTO E DESCRIZIONE (30 sec.) 
 
Gianni è un uomo di mezza età, capelli corti e brizzolati. Lavora come consulente finanziario. 
Ha raggiunto questa posizione facendo molta gavetta ma anche grazie al suo essere 
accomodante e alle sue doti persuasive e comunicative. Raggiunge sempre gli obiettivi che si 
pone, talvolta scendendo a compromessi. Era stato coinvolto in passato nel caso della vendita 
di azioni ormai svalutate a piccoli risparmiatori che avevano riposto la loro fiducia 
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nell’istituto bancario presso cui Gianni lavora. In questo difficile periodo la moglie gli è stata 
particolarmente vicino. 
 
21. ABBINAMENTO DECRIZIONE E FOTO 
Sulla base dei ragionamenti che hai fatto, chi è Gianni? Scegli una delle tre foto. 
 
22. OFFERTA 
 Dovendo spartire i 100 euro ricevuti, quanti euro proponi a Gianni? 
 
23. INTRODUZIONE  (5 sec.) 
ECCO IL QUARTO GIOCATORE AL QUALE DEVI PROPORRE LA SPARTIZIONE 
DEI 100 EURO.  
VALUTAZIONE RAZIONALE 
 
24. DESCRIZIONE PERSONAGGIO (25 sec.) 
MARINA 
Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, fumatrice. Ha da poco avuto due 
gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte importanti aziende. 
In passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia di emergere accettando di 
difendere una grossa azienda del tabacco. Questa causa è stata la sua occasione per farsi 
conoscere, anche perché molti dei suoi colleghi avevano rifiutato l’incarico per la bassa 
ricompensa economica. 
 
25. SPIEGAZIONE DEL TASK (15 sec.) 
Ora che ti sei fatto un’idea dell’altro giocatore, abbina alla descrizione che hai appena letto la 
foto che ti sembra corrisponda ad essa. Rileggi attentamente le informazioni sul giocatore (ti 
verranno ora ripresentate). Sappi che solo una delle immagini proposte corrisponde a tutte le 
informazioni fornite dalla descrizione. Pertanto presta molta attenzione nell’effettuare 
l’abbinamento. 
Tieni conto che hai a disposizione 30 secondi per effettuare la tua scelta.  
 
26. FOTO E DESCRIZIONE (30 sec.) 
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Marina è una giovane donna, bionda, di media statura, fumatrice. Ha da poco avuto due 
gemelli e lavora presso uno studio legale che ha tra i suoi clienti molte importanti aziende. 
In passato ha dimostrato la sua ambizione e la sua voglia di emergere accettando di 
difendere una grossa azienda del tabacco. Questa causa è stata la sua occasione per farsi 
conoscere, anche perché molti dei suoi colleghi avevano rifiutato l’incarico per la bassa 
ricompensa economica. 
 
27. ABBINAMENTO DECRIZIONE E FOTO 
Sulla base dei ragionamenti che hai fatto, chi è Marina? Scegli una delle tre foto. 
 
28. OFFERTA 
 Dovendo spartire i 100 euro ricevuti, quanti euro proponi a Marina? 
 
 
 
